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For much of his life,
concerns related

Al.¥;1Ustinewas preoccupied

saint

to the freedan

of the In.mm will.

view of the hLmm will thro1.¥;Jbout his life,
developnent.
maintained

In his

that

very end of his life

he

of evil can be traced

this,

periods

freedan

intervention.
before

that

choice.
the

At the

rnnan will

that Al.¥;1Ustine's view of the freedcm

this

as it

(386-397).

the first

To danonstrate

period

(386-391),

before his

in which he held that the rnnan will

is the period

In other
God

words, it is possible

or to refuse

The second period

his episcopacy,

during

is found in his works durin;J three

decade. The first

to turn to

developnent

to Christianity

his position

of indifference.

individual

to evil

study I dEm)nstrate

I outline

ordination,

a significant

to God apart fran divine intervention.

his conversion

within

his

to turn

of the human will underwent a significant

decade after

one notices

came to defend the position

did not have the ability
In this

If one traces

1tgainst the Manicbaeans he

early writm;s

the origin

with

to turn regardless

(391-396), after

for an
of divine

his ordination

in which, alt.ho\¥;1h still

is the period

ii

has the

and

holding

to the freedan of indifference,

degree the stzuJgle

Augustine reoogni!7.ed to a

in the lnmm will.

The third

much

greater

period is his early

years as bishop (396-400). DurmJthis time, Au;Justine held that it is
impossible for an individual

to turn to God without divine intervention

and it is impossible to refuse to turn,

if such intervention

was

granted.
Finally,
developnent.
scriptures

I briefly
First,

how his own

realize

the

spiritual

shaw

that it

possible influences
was

moral and spiritual

difficulty

on this

Au:JU9tine's study of the

which was, probably, the principal

discuss

possible

I

sketch three

influence.

Next,

I

stzuJgle may have helped him

of IIIBlcmJ
right moral choices. The third

influence was his attanpt

at refo:nning the moral and

lives of those in his OOD;Jregation. These three factors

may

have helped Au:JU9tine recognize that it is only with the aid of divine
intervention

that an individual

can turn to God.

iii
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Augustine was a man driven by the problem of the existe:nc:e of
evil in the world. This problem was the jq>etus for

Each stage in his developnent was deeply influenced

and thought.

questions

burning

of his work

much

it raised. It

him into Manichaeism and it was

drove

one of several

issues that caused him to beoane disenchanted

His attraction

to the Neo-Platonists

brought to the nature of evil.
Christian

by the

was partly

insights

These

due

with it.

to the insight

were carried

they

into his

world-view, upon his conversion, and, although sane of than

remained intact

~bout

into a m::>reconsistently

his life,

Christian

others were gradually
~ch

transfoi:med

to the problem.

This transfo:cmation was not at all soooth. If the problem of evil
served

as a constant underlying force behind his thought,

philosophical
the

specifics

result,

it was

and theological

controversy that was the anvil on which

of his positions

were continuously baDIDered out. As a

a systematic exposition of Augustine's position

on the problem

of evil involves both a careful llllravelin;J of themes which are anbedded
in specific

polemical writin;Js and a scrupulous consideration

of

chronology.
The two

which raised

most llll)Ortant groups against
the problem of evil

which Augustine argued and

to the surface were the Manichees and

1

the Pelagians.
of their

The Manichees were a sect founded by Mani (d. 276).

more significant

especially

beliefs

of good and evil,

religious

authority

religious

practice.

included

an absolute

as being against

It was the dualistic

a dualistic
repudiation

The Manichees believed

ultimate

the principle

principle

of Darkness,

beings,

result

this

to

approach

an answer to
two

(God) and the

in power. They

These were not

b1t

materialistic),

the source of goodness and the source of evil.
dualism was ever present

a000rdingly,

and anything related

(a material
practiced

to the bodily

This acoount attracted
evil,

acm,12',,1

war with each other.

of Evil and the soul

The Manichees,

or

(Manichaeism is fundamentally

they were, respectively,
In human nature,

there

of Light,

or any

existed

that

or Ahriman. 1 These were equal

were engaged in an eternal
spiritual

of faith

which presented

view of reality

the problem of evil.
principles,

view of reality,

and an ascetic

reason,

sane

soul)

in that
derived

asceticism,

the

a

body was

fran the Good.

suppressing

the body

appetites.

Au3UStineas a solution

as well as for its high view of reason.

As Peter

to the riddle

of

Brown relates:

Qily this group, Au3UStinethou;Jht, could answer the question
that had begun to "to:rment" him as soon as his "conversion"
to
''Fran what cause do
philosophy bad caused him to think seriously:
we do evil?" The Manichaean answer to the problem of evil is the
core of the Manichaeism of the young Au3UStine.2

1
2

See Frederick COpleston, A History of Philosophy:
Medieval Philosophy: Augustine to Sootus, Vol. II,
(Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1950) , p. 41.
Peter Brown, AlXNStine of Hippo (Berkeley:
university
of california
Press, 1967), p. 46.
2

Au;JUstine followed the sect for nine yea.rs. Even toward the end of
his association

especially

with than,

he took oanfort

in their

answers about evil;

about the evil that was a part of his own experience.

In the

COnfessiones he wrote:

For it still seaned to me "that it was not we that sin, tut that I
know not what other nature sinned in us." And it gratified
my pride
to be free fran blame, and, after I had oc:mnitted any fault, not to
acknowledge that I had done any,- "that Thou mightest beal my soul
because it had sinned against Thee;" l::Jut I loved to excuse it, and
to accuse sanethiD;J else (I "WOtnot what) which was with me, l::Jut
was not I. But assuredly ij was wholly I, and my iq;>iety bad
divided me a')ainst
Finally

myself.

it was the very th:iD]s for which he entered

that pranpted him to leave. His growm;J disillusionment

Manichaeism
regardin;J

Manichaeism was pranpted by, amo:rg other th:i.D]s, the inadequacy
their
the
n:>re

solution

to the problem of evil.

Portalie

acquainted

Au;JUstine remained puzzled;

turned out to be no solution
Good, why should one prefer

the

he has been eternally

dualistic

If Evil was just

at all.

solution

as powerful. as

one to the other? If God was of such a

nature that he could be thwarted by a material

4

less he was able to put

he became with Manichaeism, the

to rest. 114

Ultimately,

3

"The fact of

matter was that the problem of evil always lx>thered him and the

his anxiety

fact,

observes,

of

thwarted,

certainly

principle;

and if,

God was not worthy of

COnfessiones, v, 10, 18, trans.
J. G. Pilkington
in A select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers, Vol. I, ed. Philip SChaff, (Grand Rapids,
Mich.: F.erdmans Publis~
CO., reprint 1983),
Hereafter COnf. All citations to COnfessiones are to
this edition.
Eugene Portalie,
A Guide to the Thought of Saint
Augustine, trans. Ralph J. Bastian, (Chicago: Henry
Regnery CCllpauy, 1960), p. 11.
3

in

devotion.

Although disenchanted,

Augllstine held on to the sect bcping

answers to cane al01¥1. He drifted

for better

philosophical

scepticism but in 386

for a time into

he began

reading sane of the works

:rt was the thought of the Neo-Platonists

of Plotinus.

that freed him

fran sane of the dead-ends of Manichaeism.
in the context of the prablan of evil,

Specifically,
Neo-Platonists

Su;Jgested not only that Evil is not equal to Good (God

or the one) but that evil is not even a substance at all.
positive

:rt is but a lack, or a privation,

existence.

This view allowed ~tine

a subject.

within

morally perfect

and be the

as the

creator

thing.

''And :r inquired

a substance,

of evil.

but

what iniquity

a perversion

of sane

good

without cbarging Him

evil because evil is not a

was, and ascertained it not to be

of the will, ••• 115

set the intellectual

conversion to Christianity

:rt bas no

to see bow God could be

creator of everything

God did not create

The Neo-Platonists

Augustine's

the

stage for Al.¥_1Ustine's

in late AugUst of 386. 6 As a Christian,

early work was strongly

influenced by Nao-Platonic

After a very short time, he turned his literary

attention

thanes,

to the sect

fran which he bad emerged and launched a tarrage

of tracts,

books which eventually

:rn these works, his

developing position

devastated

on the origin,

the Manichees.

letters

and

nature and role of evil was central.

one of the thanes which emerges in these works is the freedan of
the

individual

specifically

will as the origin of evil.

in response to Manichaean detenninism.

------ Oonf. ,
5
6

This is developed

VII,

16, 22.

see Peter :erown,p. 74.
4

1tgainst the

Manichaean notion that the individual

individual

Augustine posited

as being capable of and responsible

Manichaeism held a strict
result

is a pawn in the oosmic

between the Good and the Evil Principles,

struggle
the

lnmm

deteminism.

of the evil principle

The

within him.

for generating

evil a man did was a direct

As we

have seen, this

was

worked out in Au;1U5tine's own life as an excuse for his conduct.
blameless;

the

a Christian,

responsible

was blameworthy.

he realized

that each individual

bnman being was

for the wrong he or she did. ''Every man is the author of

his evil deeds. 117 Au;1Uatine locates

in the man h:imself. It is,

as

which freely chooses evil.

The lnDan

this

He was

he bad grasped the :i.nplications of Meo-Platonism and bad

Once

becane

Evil Principle

evil.

the

authorship

of the evil deed

Au;1U5tine argues below, the mind itself
will is oanpletely

uncoeroed

in

evil choosing. Augustine writes:

So we are left

with the conclusion that whatever is equal or
superior to a ruling mind possessing virtue cannot make it serve
lust because of its just character.
And whatever is inferior
cannot
do it by reason of its weakness. So our argument teaches us: Nothing
makes a mind a oonpanion of cupidity,
except its own will and free
choice. 8
The

origin

of evil lay in the free choice of the will.

It is this

issue of the freedan of the lnmm will that was the substance

of the

second major controversy

for Augustine. This was the controversy

the Pelagians.

originally

7

8

Pelagius,

fran Britain,

moved

to Rane where

De libero arbitrio,
I, i, 1 in Augustine: Earlier
writin;Js, trans. J.H.S. Burleigh, (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1953), Herefafter De lib art>. All
references to De libero arbitrio are to this edition
unless otherwise noted.
Ibid., I, xi, 21.

5

with

he joined

in discussions

Expositions
was

on Paul.

of the Letters

out of these came his book,

of Saint Paul.

year 411, ~ine

In the

made aware of the nature of Pelagius'

views and he began to marshal

arguments against what he oonsidered to be heresy.
lasted 1.mtil ~ine's
work against

Julian

Pelagians

effect

death.
of Ecl.amn

In

fact,

who was

The controversy

work is an i'l')('!("ll{>lete

his last

a follower of Pelagian ~t.

held that there is no such thing as original

of the sin of .Mam on subsequent generations

bad exaq;,le.

Each person has a perfectly

can remain sinless.
divine intervention.

unnecessary.
initial

free will by which he or she

Grace, as Au;JUStine understood

Grace, for Pelagians,

is very different;

gift of free will as well as other gifts
example and forgiveness

1qclinst the Pelagians,

in a person's

person to do any good deed or to have faith.
sin, Augustine was adamant that the effects
subsequent generations.

by that

first

grace,

In

is totally

it includes the

of God such as, the
for past sins.

Au;JUStine emphasized original

for divine intervention

race and guilt

is siq;>ly that of a

There is no bondage of the will and no need for any

D:>ral law, and Qirist's

necessity

sin. The

life

sin and the

in order for that

emphasizing original

of .Mam's sin plagued

Not only was evil introduced into the

transmitted,

but every individual's

bJJDaD

freedan is inprlred

sin. While .Mam had the unhindered freedan to sin or to

not sin, apart fran the grace of God, all of the rest of lnmmity

6

is

only free

to sin. 9 ~ine

virtuous.

He insisted,

Of course the

at all.

In fact

claimed

that

Al~h

Pelagian.

Pelagians

~ine

of pagans were also

denied that

be

their

freedan

arbitrio

and

position.

his views on many subjects

ever held beliefs

that

were

11

developnent
contradicted

Pelagius

made the charge,

the

question

or not Au:JUStine's view of the freedan

mt

many charge

by the

In actuality,

freedan

supported

to admit that

c:him:Jed so radically.

really

this could be called

denied that

bad previously

~ine

as to whether

11

virtues

the

they quoted passages out of De libero

Ever since

10

however, that

never unwillin;J

developed,

9

even pagaM could be

that

fran. God. 10

gifts

later

admitted

"later
the

began shortly

''Anti-Pelagian"

real
after

It is evident
that

the

"early

that

there

~ine'•

bas been raised

of the will

had

was significant
was cx:mpletely

~ine'•.

developnent

of Al.rgUstine' s view of banan

be became a priest

themes were explicit

In Retractions,

in 391. Many of his

long before

be had ever

I, 8, 4 Au:JUStine writes,
''Unless
this will, then, is freed by the grace of God fran.
this servitude by which it bas been made 'servant
of
sin, ' ••• , mortal men cannot live rightly and
devoutly."
trans. Sister Mary Inez Bogan in The
Fathers
of the Church, Vol. 60,
(Washington D.C.:
catholic
university
Press, 1968), Hereafter
Retr.
see g>istle, 138, 3, 17, trans. J. G. Clmningham in
Philip SChaff ed. The Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers,
Vol. I, First Series
(reprint Grand
Mich.: F.erdmaDS 1983), Hereafter
_R?.
Rapids,
see Retr., I, a, 3-6. In section 4 Al.rgUstine writes,
"In these and similar
statements of mine, because
there was no mention of the grace of God, which was
not the subject under discussion
at the time, the
Pelagians think or may think that we held their
opinion. But they are mistaken in~
this."
7

heard of Pelagius.

with the Pelagians

deal of Au;JUStine's time and energy, be was :basically

a great
a:nd

Althou;Jh the oontroversy

awlying-

the position

he had already

worked out.

occupied
def'ending-

Gilson writes:

[W] e are inclined
to consider useless the di sc,JSsion of Pelagius'
How oould his task of
influence on his doctrine of liberty.
OR)OsiDg' Pelagian error possibly lead him to exaggerate the rights
of grace and jeopardize free choice, if it is true that be never
questioned free choice and if, m:>reover, be ascribed everything to
grace since the day he read and understood st. Paul? st. Augustine
was never to go any further because he went at once as far as one
can go: Man can only do what God gives him the strEDJtb to

do I• •

12

• •

Before we shall

to recognize

view of the freedan

Augustine's
greater

understanding-

glance,

the

fact,

be able

there

used to refer

is a slight

of the will,

have to gain a
At first

appear to be interchangeable.

and "choice''

difference

we shall

of

use of his key tams.

of Augustine's

tems ''will"

the developnent

in meaning-. ''Will"

to the m:>ral individual

himself.

Iavid

(voluntas)
Mosher

In

is

explains:

Augustine's
definition
[of ''will"] points beyond choice to a whole
movement or tendency or posture of the soul, of which individual
choices are sinply manifestations.
It therefore
follows fran the
definition
that will is the individual
himself, but the individual
viewed as the source of all his thou;Jhts, feeling's and actions as
well as of all his choices. However, when understood this way, will
for st. Augustine finally and m:>st importantly beoaDes almost
synonymous with the notion of ''m:>ral self'' or ''m:>ral personality,"
i.e. , the individual
as m:>ral agent, because it is by reason of the
quality of its thou;Jhts, feeling's, actions and choices that the
self is judged to be m:>rally good or l:lad. 13
12

13

Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of saint
Augustine, trans. L.E.M. Lynch (New York: Randall
House, 1960), p. 160. Hereafter,
Gilson.
Crux
David L. Mosher, 11st. Augustine on Freedan,"
Vol. XII (1974-75) P• 20. 8ee also John M. Rist,
''Augustine on Free Will and Predestination,"
in
Essays ed. R.
Augustine: A COllection of critical
A. Markus (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1972),
p. 220.
8

as the iooral self,

The will,

1m00erced. Nothing forces
movement of the will
must be a voluntary

in that

is free

it

is unoc:upelled

to act one way or another.

the will

is one which merits

either

movement. ~ine

points

praise

this

or

If the

or blame,

it

out:

Moreover, unless the movement of the will towards this or that
object is voluntary and within our power, a man would not be
praiseworthy
when he turns to the higher objects nor blamewoU11Y
when he turns to lower objects,
usin3' his will like a hinge.

the often used phrase,

In

to

refers
the

life

"the deliberative

''Free Choice,"
and decision

of the soul. 1115 This is free

and therefore

unoanpelled

''Choice''

making role

(l:ibenln)

it is that

(arbitriun)
of the will

in that

for which the soul

it

in

is

is m::>rally

accountable.

the choice of the will

The view that

ioorally

accountable

a oc:q>at:ibilist

which both

sanething

of the will.
concerns

position

s concerns

of those who are involved

in the contemporary

important

distinction

14
15

to ~ine's

This is because ~ine'

issue.

Still,

study

these tams

is

and unooeroed is a view to

It may be

to use tams such as "oc:q>at:ibilism''

when referrin3'

over this

In this

it is voluntary

and an iT\t'YJT{)i\+-ibilist may agree.

of an anachronism

"incxq>atibilism''

the

because

is one for which the will

can be useful

and

on the freedan

seem far ranoved

to clarify

fran

controversy
an

in ~ine.
I shall

use the term "incxlrpatibilism''

De lib arb., III, i, 3.
David Mosher, 11st. Au:JUStine on Freedan,"
9

p. 20.

for the view

that a choice between two options is free only if it is within the
power of the individual

change in antecedent conditions.
freedan of indifference.
central

choices.

The

koordingly

when

context of this
of

God

question is whether or not it is within the

An

God

or to refrain

fran sinning.

willing.

to the intervention

In other words, is it within the power of

God

without any intervention

by

God, or is

a necessary antecedent condition of willing

inc::,arpa+ibilist answer is that it is possible

will to turn to

in the

I shall discuss antecedent conditions,

will to turn to

God's intervention

to Him?

freedan of the will is in moral and

study, I shall always be referring

in a person's

a person's

the

will to turn to

power of a person's

to as the

This is sanetimes referred

It must be kept in mind that Augustine's

concern in discussing

spiritual

either of the two options without any

to choose

God

without divine

intervention.

to turn

for a person's

There are no

antecedent conditions which must be introduced in order to enable the
will to choose rightly.
By the

term

intervention

"ocq,atibilism''

I shall mean the view that divine

is both a necessary and sufficient

order for the will to be able to turn to
sinning.

Without this

away fran God.

intervention

When God intervenes,

God

the will

antecedent condition

or to refrain

in

fran

can only choose to turn

a person cannot refuse

to turn to

Him.
The term

''voluntary,"

adhere to ocq,atibilism
i.noc:trpatibilist

however,

is used differently

by those

and those adhering to :inoaJpltibilism.

who

For the

a choice is free if it is voluntary in the sense that

it is one in which the person

has the

10

freedan of indifference,

i.e.,

of the two options is within the power of the individual.

either

oanpatibilist

The

it is voltmtary.

By

will also insist
"voltmtary,"

that a choice is free in that
he means that the choice is

however,

in accordance with the will even if the will does not have the ability

to choose the other option,
In

given no change in antecedent

this way a choice can be necessary

option within the power of the will)
with the will)

(in that there

in the use of his tenni:nology. We shall

writings,

position.

The

see, however,

that in his early

will is the cause of the choice while it

it oauld have chosen the other option;

antecedent
In his

condition

works inmecUately after

his oonsec:ration as bishop

to choose the good in a given situation.
perhaps,

change in antecedent
have the capacity

(and

controversy) , Augustine lays a great deal more

anphasis on God's grace as a necessary condition

situations,

even if every other

was the same.

long before the Pelagian

still

positions

not caused by anything else. When the will chooses one

is itself

present

between these

he seems to have held an

before his ordination,

i.noalpltibilist

option,

(in aooordanoe

at the same time.
seems not to have differentiated

~tine

was only one

it can be free

and

conditions.

the will

of the will's

While in many non-moral

oauld have chosen either

conditions,

option without a

in a DMmll choice the will

to choose both options.

can the will choose rightly.

The

ability

does not

only if God's grace is
choice of good or evil

is

voltmtary but grace is necessary in order to choose the good.

God's grace is also a sufficient

condition

11

in the will's

choosing the

good.

If God intervenes

by sending Bis grace,

will will turn to

the

Him. It is not within the power of the individual. to refuse to turn to
God, if Bis grace is present.

This is a version of oanpatibilism.

While the Manichaean and Pelagian disputes

are usually seen as the

major cxmtroversies which gave inpetus to Augustine's wri~
Problan of Evil and the freedcm of the will,
and

influences

change in his vocation
first

decade after

and

in his sense of personal

calling

his Christian

life,

contemplation

and

these

calling

during

occurred

during

catholic

in 386, with a vision to pursue a life

of sheltered

study. By 391 he had been ordained priest

was patiently

broke

and within

with accepted practice
new

explaining the creed to the assembled

bishops of Africa! 1116only two years after

was oonsecrated

the

period

the

allowed Augustine to preach. ''Within two years, Valerius'

acquisition

was the

underwent the most profound changes. He began

a very short time, his bishop, Valerius,
and

of

that the most flmdarnental developnents in

view of the freedan of the will

in which his life

0lle

his conversion.

It is not insignificant
Augustine's

were other events

there

which shaped his thought as well.

on the

this,

oo-adjutor bishop. In 396 Valerius died

in 395, he
and

Augustine

became bishop of Hippo, where he served rmtil he died in 430.
The wri~

after

which Augustine produced during

his oonversion follow closely his sense of vocation

The style

of each book, the problEIIIS it develops

employed to solve them all reflect
Augustine's
16

this first

the

mind at the time of writing.

Peter Brown,

p. 139.
12

and the

and

decade
calling.

methods

ooncerns uppemost in
These

concerns were dictated

largely

by his vocation

early dialogues,

In the

to reach the truth

trying

reason.

In Book III

meet a very Nao-Platonic

we

and the

of De libero

such as the fall.

vision of
arbitrio

with the iq:,lications

wrestli?q

his life work.

and bow he perceived

(written

of a specifically

Simplicianum, be is doi?q a serious exegetical
passages in Paul and be is attanpti?q

difficult

t.hrcuJhan ascent of

God

about 395) be is

biblical

in the work De diversis

By 397,

philosopher

doctrine

guaestionibls

ad

study of one of the ioost
to relate

the text to

concerns about the freedan of the will.
My

thesis,

in this study,

developnent in Au;Justine
period.

1

s view of the freeckm of the will during this

began by

Au;Justine

have described it.

is that there was a very significant

boldm:3' the incmpa+-.ibilist

position,

By 397 be bad cane to bold the axnpatibilist

God's grace came to be seen as a necessary and sufficient
the turnilxJ of an individual's
Au;Justine

1

s life

through

is that Augustine,

ioore diligently

this period,

there

as a priest,

than ever before.

condition

to

issues which, it

were three

this developnent.
began

The first

of

to study the seriptures

The responsibility

preach:m;J forced him to pore over the texts
oamnmicate their

view.

will to God. Given the changes in

may be SUNested, may have influenced
these

as we

of regularly

and try to grasp and

meanings accurately.

The second possible

influence

was

his own contimrl.ng str\¥;1gle to

live a holy life.

His desire of an ascent of reason to a vision of God,

in this

rapidly

and sin's

have

life,

was

effect

caused

shown to be only a dream.

The reality

of sin

in the habits of the will became all too clear and may

him to see human freedan in a different

13

light.

A third
persuade

influence may be suggested.

his congregation to live holy lives,

only the sluggishness

of his own will,

the average fourth century
powerful.

Perhaps,

influence

in the literature.

in his desire

be was

faced with, not

:tut the m:>ral difficulties

This was most likely

Christian.

on his mind and it bas been very rarely

Nevertheless,

to

of
least

the

alluded to

there is sane reason to believe

this may have played a role in the developnent of Augustine's

that

view of

the freedan of the will.
To pursue this
human

freedan,

libero

arbitrio

I shall first

held fran 386-391,

as it is expounded in De

explain the view be held between his ordination

and his consecration
third

especially

early view of

Book I. I shall also draw fran other works of this same

Next I shall

period.

set out Augustine's

as bishop (391-395),

books of De libero

arbi trio.

focussiD:J on the second and

After that I shall explain the later

view Augustine expressed in De diversis

guaestionil::Jus ad Simplicianum

Book I, QUestion 2 (397). I shall also refer to the COnfessiones.

once the differences
shall briefly

sketch

developnent,

beginning

discuss Augustine's
separate

in Augustine's

each of the possible

with the influence

positions

are ma.de clear,

influences

on this

of Scripture.

treatment of the ninth chapter of

In this

I shall

Ranans in three

works, the Exposi tio guanmdam propositionum ex Epistola

Rana.nos, the De diversis

ad

quaestionil::Jus LXXXIII, and the De diversis

guaestionil::Jus ad Simplicianum. The influence

of his own m:>ral struggle

will be drawn fran the COnfessiones and various letters.
of the struggle

I

of his congregation will be illustrated

and sezmons.

14

The influence

fran letters

I shall
influences
period

conclude that it may have been in response to these three
that Augustine's

between his conversion

view of lnmm freedan

in 386 and the writilq

Oonfessiones in 397.

15

developed

of his

durin:1the

AUGUS'l'INE'S VIEW OF 'DIE Fl<EEOCIIJ.
OF 'DIE WILL

FR:H CXlNVERSION 'l'O ORDINM'ION

AugUstine was converted to Christianity

perhaps

no exaggeration

in A1¥;JUSt
of 386. 1 It is

to say that the next few years of his life were

shaped as much by the life

he

left

as by his new life

This is true of both the content and the perspective
works. In fact,

sane of his pre-conversion

throughout his life.
philosophical

history

There was also

and

of his earliest
remained

another way in which his

influenced his early years as a Christian.

was in his understanding

stories

influences

as a Christian.

of his own life

rumors about Christian

oanbined with the Nao-Platonic teachiiq

This

calling.
ascetics

and

of the soul's

100nasteries 2
ascent to

fulfillment

through contemplation 3 forged A1¥;JUStine'sview of what

constituted

the best

for a Philosopher and Christian.

of the mind. He would pursue a life

life
think,

converse and contemplate.

conversion,

life
1
2
3

life

This was the

in which he could be free to

Augustine's

plan, just prior to his

is described by Brown:

For at least a year, Augustine had regarded sane follll of this
11in Philosophy'• as the
only possible life for himself. But he
see Peter Brown, p. 74.
see COnf., VIII, 6, 14 & 15.
Henry Chadwick, Augustine (OXford: OXford University
Press, 1986), p. 21.
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bad intended to retire gracefully into such a life. He would marry
a rich and, so he hoped, a well educated
heiress.
He would serve
the short spell of J:OUtine administration
required of a cultured
local governor. SUpported by his wife's estates and protected by
the senatorial
privileges of a fozmer adrnini~tor,
be
have
found himself free, in a few years, to follow his clream.

f'111-d

his conversion,

Upon

marriage.

still

He

desired

however,
to

~

retreat

11

11

abandoned any plans of

and clevote birnSAlf exclusively

to Philosophy. At the end of the tem in which he tau;;ht rhetoric,
Augustine retired
joined by faithful
Shortly thereafter,
and

later

to the estate
friends

of a friend at cassiciacum where he was

and students

as well as his JOOther, Monica.

he resigned fran his post as teacher of rhetoric

devoted himself to Philosophy. Recalluq
in the Confessions,

Augustine writes

fran the fever of the world we found rest

this sane eleven years
that cassiciacum was, •'Where

in Tbee, •••

115

Brown writes:

to cassiciacum, in septembP..r386, he
a lOD;J-established and
delightful tradition:
delivered fran the cares of a public career,
he was about to enter upon a life of creative leisure, dedicated to
This was the ancient ideal of 1'0tium li.beral.e'•,
serious pursuits.
back upon this period of
of a "cultured retirement"; and loo~
his life, Augustine oould speak of it as a time of •'Christianae
vitae otium'', a •'Christian otium'•. This ideal was to fo:cn the
background of Augustri9 1 s life fran that time until his ordination
as a priest, in 391.
When

Augustine retired

would have appeared to be followuq

It was at this retreat
originated.

These

philosophical
particular
4
5
6

four books

demonstrate the confidence he bad in the

for which he was searchiD;1, he writes

Brown,

p. 116.

Conf., IX, 3, S.
Peter

first

methodology he bad adopted. When he didn 1 t have the

answer

Peter

that Augustine's

Brown.

p. 115.
17

as though the

answer is just

out of his grasp. This confidence

and difficulty

depth

philosophical
of truth

and of the

rn:nnanlife

end of

a universe

in contra

investigates

~itiOS,

rnJMDsoul in the Soliloguia,

in De beata vita,

Augustine refutes

addresses

nature

the

the highest

on the place of evil in

and writes

created and sustained by God in De ordine.

At Easter
baptized

which be tackled.

of the topics

scepticism

is also sbawn by the

in 387 Augustine and Alypius left

in Milan. They never went ba.clt. Plans to retum

by ~rose

Africa were pursued but a series

of chaI¥;1es far greater

those of geography were oil the horizon,
Monica. Au;Ustine

m::,urned

privately

to

than si.q)ly

beginning with the death of

and deeply.

in Rane (where be began to write De libero

There were delays

amitrio)

and Augustine's

late

They settled

388.

to be

cassiciacum

party did not reach carthage

on Augustine 1 s family property

in Africa 1.mtil
in Thagaste as a
However,

as Peter Brown points

out, there was a shifti!¥'J

focus:

oould never be another cassiciacum. Even during his
stay in Rane, Au;Ustine's writi!¥'Js shaw a new detennination.
Fran
that time onwards, he intended to live a secluded life no longer,
as in Milan, on the fringe of a society of intellectual
laymen, but
clirectlJ in the shadow of the organized life of the catholic
Church.
Thagaste

The two years

Augustine's
losses,
local
7

in Thagaste were marked with the deaths

close friend

in addition
catholics

Nebridius

to the bitter

and Manichaeans,

of

and his own son, .Meodatus.

controversy

These

which raged between the

seened to drive him into a ioore active

Peter Brown, p. 132.
18

life.

In

390 he writes to OOelestinus:

Oh haw I wish that I could oontimm] ly say one thiig to you!
It is this: Iet us shake off the blrden of unprofitable cares, and
bear only those which are useful. For I do not know whether
anything like 0e111>leteexeuption fran care is to be hoped for in
this 110rld. 8

It was at Thagaste that several
begun. The earliest

guaestionibus

and

m:>st philosophical

LXXXIIIwere written

relationship

between

Augustine argues,

are means to truth

questions

and others

in the De diversis
9 In

in this period.

the 110rk De

and Adeodatus converse on the memrlD;J of signs and

Magistro, Augustine
the

110rks were written

110rds and reality.

In

Devera religione

against Manichaeism, that both authority
and that

of Christianity

the truth

and reason

is reasonable and

oanpelli.D;1.
As if he sensed his future, Augustine

pw:posely avoided towns

which were in need of bishops in order to avoid beiD;J forced into the

job.

travelled

When Augustine

to Hi:wo in 391, he was secure in the

knowledge that Hi:wo had a bishop. He was suzprised to be ordained to
the

priesthood

nearly by force.

Fran his conversion to his ordination,

carve out the kind of life

center of the major theological

shall see in the next chapter,
8
9

,Ip.,

18,

had

attempted to

that afforded study and contemplation.

was, however, increasi.D;1ly thrust
the

Augustine

closer to active church life
controversies

of his time.

As

to
we

once be was ordained and he took on the

1.

See David L. Mosher1 s Introduction

to his

translation
of this work (pp. 11-19) in The Fathers
of the Church, Vol. 70 (Washington D.C.: catholic

university

and

He

Press, 1982)
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pastoral

burden of the

out by his responsibilities

to his new calling.

View of the Freedan of the Will

~'S

in the cassiciacun

Not surprisingly,

Augustine's

staq;, of his Nao-Platonism.

subjects

dialogs

bnman beings,

they

four

focus is general

with the concerns of

with in a rmiversal

are dealt

for example,

in a world controlled

~

remains very general.

with a cock fight, 10 they

observations

to rmiversal

This same pattern

and

of concrete
Even when the

quickly

(Reason)

Nothing more?

(Aug.)

I desire

No~

situations.

Instead

participants

are

nw::,vefran specific

7 trans.

J.

1111 Al thol.gh

Russell in The
~,

H. S. Burleigh

Augustine Earlier
Writings
(Philadelhia:
westlninster Press, 1953), Hereafter sol.
20

an

bring up many issues

could

De ordine,
I, 8, 25 trans. Robert P.
Fathers of the Church, Vol. 5 (IJldwig
Hereafter De ord.

ii,

in which Augustine

to know God and the soul.

whatever.

into the nature of the soul

:I,

of

to be an issue which

is seen in the SOliloguia

his own reason, 11(Aug.)

Soliloguia,

about the place

laws.

implores

investigation

writes

by God. This appears

concern aver and analysis

discussion

distracted

11

In each of the

central

the

intersect

topics

in the

evident

manner.

'WOul.delicit

10

works :bear the heaviest

This is particularly

Even when the

In De ordine,

the

earliest

OCllp)Sed or beglm at cassiciacum,

individual

evil

Dialogues

and methods with which he was preoccupied.

and speculative.

abstract

study was squeezed

arry time for leisurely

life,

1948),

in

relatilY;J to particular
ends in the eternal

made pass~

no position

given the focus of these early dialogues,

does not address the freedan of the will

that ~tine

begins and

and al:>stract.

It is not surpris~,

He

Au;JUstine's d;smssion

lnlnan beings,

ocmnents about the existence

that is explicitly

articulated,

in any detail.

of free will tut there
let alone defended.

is

It is

only as he oonfronted Manicbaeism and he had to aooomit for the origin
of evil that he developed what could be oonsidered a theory about the
nature of lnmm freedan.
s acknow.1 edgment of the existence

~ine'

in his introductory

of free will is seen

prayer in the SOliloguia in which he oarment-s that

it is by God's laws that the soul is free:

In all that I say cane to 'rrrJaid, Thou who art alone God, ••• by
whose laws, established forever, the unstable movement of mutable
thiD1s is not pennitted to be disordered, tut is ever rec!uced to
awarent stability by the reins which hold in the revolving ages;
by whose laws the soul's will is free, and by unalterable
necessity
rewards are distr:ihtted to the good and pmisments
to the evil.
God, fran whan all good things flow down to us, and by wban all
evilJs warded off fran us, above whan is nothing, ••• Bear me, 'rrrJ

God.
In De

beata vita,

Augustine opens by explaining

why so few people

reach "the port of philosophy -fran which, indeed, one enters to the
hinterland

of the haWYlife-.

of the will in the pass~

1113 He

briefly

ocmnent:

For, since God or nature or necessity
12

13

alludes to the existence

or our own will,

or a

SOl., I, i, 4.
De beata vita,
1, 1 trans. Ludwig Schopp in The
Fathers of the Church, Vol. 5 (Ludwig Schopp, 1948),
Hereafter
De bt vt.
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oanbination of sane or all of these, would have us founder in this
world heedlessly and :t;,y chance as in a stonily sea- the matter is
indeed not clear, ••• 14
Augustine says a little

m=>rein a passage in De ordine:

But who is so dull of mind that he will hesitate to attrib.Jte
to divine power and divine goverment whatever there is of ~er
in
coi:porea.l operations, apart fran hllnan ancmianent and will?
Fran these brief

derive a full-fledged

references

to free will,

theory of hllnan freedan.

or not Augustine held to any theory at this
existence of free will.

in the

He is

it is i:q:,ossible to
It is not clear whether

t:ilne. He clearly

anpbasiziDJ,

that God's providence over "corporeal operations"
least,
the

the

in the De ordine,

is OClll)lete up to, at

danain of hman freedan. ADi1W3tinesays nothing,

capacities

believed

here, al:lout

or the nature of this will.

That there is no theory of free will in this work is significant
in that

evil is not linked to choice as in later works. Augustine does

not even raise the question of evil's

origin.

It is divine order and

providence that is his primary concern.

The Freedan

of the Will in the works

Imnediately Beyond Cassiciacln

It is in the next few years that the freedan of the will beoaDes
m=,re inp)rtant

for Augustine. Shortly after

leaving cassiciacun,

Augustine wrote two pieces that followed in the style of the

------14
Debt
15

vt.,

De ord.,

1, 1.

I, 1, 2.
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cassiciacun
De

dialogues.

quantitate

either

De

:imnortalitate

animae was written

animae was written

There is,

however,

choice near the very end of De guantitate

concerning

says little

in 387-388. ~tine

about the freedan of the will.

in 387 and
in

a statanent

anima~ that does ,

merit attention:

indeed, is given free choice, and they who
endeavor to unde:nnine it with futile reasoni.D;Js are so blind that
they do not understand that of their own will they are voicing
these absurd and :inpious statanents.
And the gift of free choice is
such that, ma.1tin] use of it in any way whatever, the soul does not
disturb any portion of divine order and law. It is conferred by the
all wise and all prevailing Lord of all creation. 16
To the soul,

~tine

two :inportant statanents

asserts

that it is obviously true that

he asserts

choice. Choice is a gift to the soul.
argue
and

against

the existence

with free

lnlDims are endowed

In fact,

he clams,

one could not

of free will without choosing to so argue

asserts

are cautious
ordine,

that by the exercise

any portion of divine

person cannot "disturb

in atteq>ti.ng to extract

theory

order

of the will,
and law."

a

JUst

as we

a systan fran the one sentence in

it must be .rEIJ'IEIN")P..red
that this

one not of sufficient

full

passage. First,

thereby dEm:>nstrati.ng that the will is free.

second, ~ine

De

in this

too is a very brief

cxmnent;

14m;Jth or depth to warrant the extraction

of a

of the will.

It does sean, however, to be more clear than the other passage.
The freedan of the will

is given by God J::ut it is sanehow limited

what it can acoanplish.

It is not that ~ine

16

is stating

that the

De guantitate
animae, 36, 80
trans.
John J.
Mc.Mahon in The Fathers of the Church, Vol. 4 (Imwi.g
Schq:.p 1947), Hereafter De guant anim.
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in

divine will limits the options open to the h\Dan will.
states

that even when h\Dan beiD;Js make use of their

whatever, divine order is preserved.

~ine

does

Rather, he
wills in any way

not explain

bow the

divine order takes into account any possible movement of the will.

It

is not that he is sayin:J that God's order is decreed in response to the
human

choosil¥;Js. Nor is it that God's order eliminates

freedan.

any real

God's plan includes and is not hindered by

6aDebow

the real

choices people make.
It is not until Au;1Ustine en:;iages in his anti-Manicllaean polanics
that he articulates

relationship

the

between the

origin of evil and

wrorKJful free choices. It is in this context that he is forced to
develop and articulate

The Freedan

Augustine's

a theory of human freedan.

of the Will in De Libero Arbitrio

treatise

De

libero arbitrio

which include a clearly articulated

position

freedan. Augustine began to write it in

395. 17 There was m::>st likely

oanplete it until
between

Rane

is the first
on the

I

of his works

nature of human

in 388 blt
a

Book

did

not

great time lapse

the writi.D;J of Book I and that of Book II. 18 The purpose of

this work is well stated by Kaufman:

The intention of Au;1Ustine's earliest
treatise on free choice
not to explore the range of the will's operation (with or
without divine assistance) • The treatise was rather a rebuttal
to
the Manichaean argument that the God who created all thil¥;Js was

was

17

18

see Portalie,

p. 48.
O'C0nnell, ''De Libero A:rbitrio I: Stoicisn
Revisited,"
AugUstinian Studies Vol. I (1970)

Robert

J.

p. 51.
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for the existence of evi1. 19

responsible

AugUstine, directinJ
anphasizes the privative
good

his attacks

the Manicbaeans, thus

against

that all created thinJs are

nature of evil,

in themselves and that evil has its origin in the misused freedan

of the In.mm will.
nature of

bl.lnan

It is out of these

themes

that a position

freedan can be discovered.

Book I opens with Evodius ~,

God be not the author

''whether

of evil 11• 20 Augustine readily acknowledges that he already
that

God

exists

investigation

and that God is not responsible

aooounts of evil,

just,

for evil.

is to determine whether or not these

demonstrated by reason. Therefore he attali>ts

consistent

on the

responsibility,

with this position.

freedan

to

and the

He

writes,

His

thinJs can

be

l:Juild or discover
will that are

Because, as Augustine

only vol1mtary evil is punished.

believes

ass\DeS,

God

is

''God is not the

author of the evil a man does tbou;Jh He is the author of the evil a man
suffers."

and ''EVery

Evodius

asks

evil man is the author of bis evil deeds.

for the "cause why

answer, AugUstine acknowledges

we do

the difficulty

1

-21

evil. 1122 In begimli.ng to
of Evodius' problan:

[A]ll thiD;1s that exist are fran one God; and yet God is not the
author of sins. The difficulty for the mind is this. If sins
originate with souls which God has created, and which therefore
have their origin fran God, bow are sins not to be charged against
19

20
21
22

Peter Iver :Kaufman, ''The Lesson of conversion: A
Note on the <)lestion of continuity in Augustine's
onderstand.i.Jq of Grace and Human Will," Augustinian
Studies

Vol.

11 (1980) P• 59.

lib arb., I, i, 1.
Ibid.
Ibid., I, ii, 4.

De

25

God at

least

mediately?

23

Before one can discover
DDJStgrasp the nature,
What is it that

bJJmansdo evil,

or the essence, of evil.

makes an

AD;JUstine claims,

one

What exactly is evil? ,

act or thou;Jht evil? AD;JUstine considers

and

the views that what makes sanethm3' evil is that it is a

rejects

violation
the

why

of a civil

law and the view that an act is evil because of

lust which 11c:x,c:mpmies
it.

disorder,

and goodness

Evil, then,

is discovered to be

order.

Briefly to express in words as best I can the idea of eternal
as it is 91:aJrped upon our minds I s~d
say this: it is just
all thm:Js should be in perfect order. 4
If the
~tine

essence

takes

this

of

goodness

is perfect

idea of perfect

law

that

order, evil is disorder.

order and the OC111?lementary
idea

of disorder and applies than to hman existence.

Perfect

order

in man

is defined as:

Whatever it is that puts man above the beasts,
mind or spirit
(perhaps
it is best called by :both names, for we find both in the
divine scriptures),
whatever it is called, if it daninates and
rules the other~
of which man is OC111?0sed,then a man is most
perfectly ordered.
It is the reason of a man which should rule the rest of him.
question arises

ooncerni.D;J whether or not it is even poss:il:>le for

_____
_

reason so to rule.
as
23
24

25

lust,
,

Perhaps

sane other part of the nature of man, such

is stro1¥1er or more daninant than reason.

Ibid.
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

The

vi, 15.
I, viii, 18.
I,

26

AD;JUstine' s response

to this ~estion

since it is true that the mind should rule,

is that

it must be stron;ier

lust.

than

It would be inconsistent

with good order

for that which should rule to be weaker than that which should be
ruled.

For Augustine,
This position

vice)

reason is stron;ier

that the mind is stron;ier

'beoanes an important

the human mind to do evil.
powerful

vicious

[vice-filled]

If a vicious
evil,

evil

either.

is freely

is more powerful

can overoane

of its

corporeal

nature)

The only thin;Js more powerful

greater

virtuous

souls

than a lnlDim soul,
human soul

a soul

in light

vice,

forces

''then

amed with virtue.

soul

and force

object

can force

soul

no
1126

it to do

(inferior

a virtuous

Althol¥Jh these

of their virtue,

(or any other

that nothilg

than

than a virtuous

(God and an;iels).

lust

If the mind is n:>re

chosen.

Augustine argues, no corporeal

certainly,
in virtue

Evil

cannot overoane a virtuous

soul

soul

soul

than

premise in the argunent

lust and if virtue

than

lust.

than

soul

to any
to do

would be other
have more power

they would not influence

a

for evil.

At present we can be sure that whatever it be that may rightly
it cannot be l.mjust in any way. so
excel a mind stron;i in virtue,
that not even it, though it have the power, will canpel a mind to
serve lust •••• so we are left with the conclusion that whatever is
equal or superior to a rulin;J mind possessin;J virtue cannot make it
serve lust because of its just character.
And whatever is inferior
cannot do it by reason of its weakness. so our argument teaches us:
Nothin;J makes a~
a oanpal'lion of cupidity, except its own will
and free choice.
As Babcock explains,
26

27

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

''The mind cannot be canpelled

I, x, 20.
I, xi, 21.
27

either

internally

Qlly the exercise of its own will,

or externally.

can make it serve lust.

agency,

evil. 1128~ine
choice,

It is, therefore,

the

CXl!pll.sion which forces
In the next

souls of existing

a soul

brief section,
bl.mm beings

penalty of sin affects

that it wills evil.

author of its own

own free

concludes that it is by the soul's

l.Ul00erC8d by anything,

its own

There

is no outside

to choose evil.
however,

are,

argues that

~ine

in fact,

not unbjme.red.

the very capacity to consistently

the

The

choose

correctly.

as in itself a small penalty that the soul is
lust, spoiled of its resources of virtue,
drawn hither
and thither in abject poverty, naw ~ falsehood as if it
were truth, now acting onthe defensive, now rejecting what it had
foDDerly approved bit none the less falling into other falsehoods,
now holding its assent back, and often fearing the D:>St obvious
reasonings, now despairing of ever f:indjng the truth and sticking
in the dark pit of folly, naw attempting to reach the light of
intelligence,
and again falling back in sheer weariness? Meantime
the cupidities exercise their daninion tyrannically and disturb the
man's whole mind and life with varying and contrary teq,ests,
fear
on one side, longing on the other; here anxiety, there vain and
false rejoicing; here torture because Sallething loved bas been
lost, there eagerness to obtain what it does not possess; here
grief for injury suffered, there incitanents to seek revenge.
Wherever it turns it can be restricted
by avarice, wasted by
luxury, bound by ambition, inflated
by pride, tortured by &fNY,
enveloped in sloth, excited by wantonness, afflicted by subjection,
Em>tions which inhabit and
suffering all the other ~tless
trouble the realm of lust. 9

Is it to be

daninated

~ine

asserts

not natural.
think
28
29

regarded

by

that the present condition of the rnnan soul is

It is the just penalty for sin. He

that a condition like that is not penal,

asks

when

William s. Babooclt, ''Augustine on sin and
1'gency," The Journal of Religious Ethics
(Spring 1988) p. 35.
De lib arb., I, xi, 22.
28

of this,

''Can we

we see that
Moral

Vol. 16

it must be undergone by all who
soul in its natural
the

person.

by God

do

not cleave to wisdan? 30 The hanan
in its rule aver the rest of

is unbimered

state

This natural

state

is bow the soul was originally

created

before sin entered the world. once sin became a factor,

ignorance and impotence weighs cSowneach

both

h1Dan soul.

Evodius, seeiDJ this ignorance and illp>tence,

m:gues that

these

can be the just penalty

for sin only

of wisdan should

to descend and beoome a servant to lust. 1131

choose

if anybody placed on the height

11

Only if the will of a person is unhindered could the choice to sin be
called

If the weight of impotence

free or voluntary.

person oould not choose to be either
penalty

would be unjust.
the

beyond

effects
human

first

or evil,

that the

any subsequent

It seems, reports Evodius, that no person

had ever been free,

of the penalty

good

was such

in this sense, fran the hindering

for sin. If this is the case, it seems that the

will is not free to avoid sin and any penalty

is unjust.

Au:JUstine's response is that it is within the power ·of each
indivictual

to have a good will or not to have a good will.

eagerly desires
when

it is true,

to be wise, one will have a good will.
deep and

when it governs the person's

If one

The very desire,

life

is a good

will.

You see, then, I imagine, that it is in the power of our will
to enjoy or to be without so great and so true a good. For what is
so oanpletely within the power of the will as the will itself?
Whoever has a good will has sanethiD]' which is far better than all
earthly realms and all bodily pleasures. Whoever does not have it,
lacks that which is more excellent than all the goods which are not
in our power, and yet be can have it by williD]' it sinply. 32
30
31

32

Ibid.
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

I, xi, 23.
I, xii,

26.
29

Evodius 1 question was that be could not understand
a just penalty

for a

soul

which was never vise to

ignorance and impotence. ~'s
never been wise, it is still

new, to have a good will.
pursue wisda:n eagerly.

penalty

position

bow

t,e sbackl.ed

by

is that even if one

within one's power to choose,

This choice is,

it could be

in essence,

here

bas ,

and

the choice to

Ignorance and :illp>tenoe, then, are the just

for refusing to have a good will and so to pursue wisda:n.

As

Benjamin and Hackstaff translate:

Therefore, if we should love and embrace with our will the
will, and place it before all other things that we cannot keep
even if we will to do so, then those virtues,
as reason
demonstrates, will dwell in our spirit, and to possess them is to
live rightly and honorably. Fran this it is established that
whoever wants to live rightly and honorably, if his will for this
surpasses his will for ten;;,oral goods, achieves this great good so
easily ~t
to have what he wills is nothing other than the act of
willing.
good

It is clear in this translation

his will for ten;;,oral goods." once one has that will,

easy to have what one wills

act of willing

33

and having

is

that one has a will for this which

not ellC>u;Jh.It is essential
"surpasses

that wanting to live rightly

because

there

what one wills.

is no difference

between the

This is beca:11seone is

lib arb. I, xi11,
29 trans. Anna s. Benjamin and
L. H. Hackstaff, (Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill,
·1964). This passage is labeled section 97 in this
edition.
De

30

it is

willing

already

In this

explicitly
apart

life

a good and honorable life. 34
it is unclear whether or not AugUstine is

passage,

that it is within the power of a person's

asserting

fran any divine intervention,
enou:;Jh to attain

it.

to desire the right

Fran the context,

held

responsible

for

to pursue the good will.

If it is true that the good will can and sbould
next question

and honorable '

however, it can be

concluded that AD;1Usti.ne holds that we are justly
pursuin;J or refusing

will,

be pursued,

the

is, why is it that not every person is baR?Y?Obviously

every person wishes to be happy.

AtXJUStine,
once again, points out

wishing and willing.

one who wishes to

the

distinction

between

might still

not will to have a good will because be might not be ready

to accept the righteous
aci:xanpanies a good

standard

be happy

of living which necessarily

will.

It is not su.tprising that unhappy men do not obtain what they wish,
that is, a happy life. For they do not at the same time wish its
acc:x:,rpaniment, without which no one is wo~
of it, and no one
obtains it, that is to say a righteous life. 5
To will

a good will

which dernancls right

living

happy but do not will

in order to obtain it.
34

35

involves willing

aooording to the eternal

as a means to baR)iness.

Many

law

wish to be

it because they refuse to will what is necessary
AugUstine

explains:

It seems that Babcock (''AU:JUSti.ne
on sin and Moral
Agency," p. 36) misunderstands this text. He states
that living rightly is, first, to be preferred above
all transient goods and, second, that it is
iJJ'IDedi.ately within our grasp. The text indicates
that to prefer to live rightly is a condition for
baviD;J a good will, which is itself the condition
for achieving this good so easily.
De lib arb.,
I, xiv, 30.
31

so when we say that men are unbaR?Yvoluntarily, we cSo not mean
that they want to be UDba£py, but that their wills are in such a
state that vnbart>iness must follow even against their will. so it
is not inconsistent with our previous reasoning that all men wish
to be happy but cannot be; for all cSo not 1sh to live aright, and
it is that wish that merits the bappy life. 6
It is iq;,ossible
transient

[a good will]

to ''Prefer

goods'• and at the same time

before all fup.tive

not wish to live rightly.

obvious. If the condition which is a prerequisite
will is having a greater
goods, it seans that this

the good

This is

to achieving a good
than to attain

condition is within an individual's

choice. That one cannot attain
willing

to live rightly

desire

and

taiporal
power of

will wit.bout a smpassing

does not imply that one has not the power to

to live rightly

will in this manner.
The

refusing

fact that AL¥1UStinebolds that we are justly

punished

for

to have such a desire dem:>nstrates that it is within the

individual's

power of choice. This is especially

considered that Al¥;JUStine is arguing directly
suggestion that we are not justly

evident when it is

against

held responsible

Evodius 1

for the failure

to

have this good will.
Au;1ustine next begins a brief
the

eternal

law and the taiporal

of the essence of evil.

discussion

law. This further
that the eternal

He writes

our love away fran temporal things,
eternal

things. 1137 corresponding

eternal

and the temporal,

36
37

Ibid.
Ibid.,

I,~,

there

on the natures of both
develops his notions

law, •'bids us turn

to cleanse it and turn it towards

to the two classes
are two classes

32.
32

of things,

the

of men, •'those

who

love

and pursue

eternal

things

and those who pursue talp)ral

things.

1138

This is a foreshadowiD;J of a theme which will beoane pz:aninent in De
Dei. Au;Justine aiphasizes

civitate

individual

that it is the will of each

which determines that which the individual

will pursue.

What each one chooses to pursue and embrace is within the power of
his will to det.enni ne- Will alone can drive the mind fran its seat
of authority and fran the right oourse. And it is manifest that
when anyone uses anything badly it is noj the thiD] but the man
that uses it badly that is to be blamed. 9
John Roth expounds on the nature of this choice:

To turn toward tanporal things (for example, material wealth,
political power, sensual pleasure) and to make them the focus of
tem, is to concern
one's •'ul.timate concern," to use Paul Tillich's
oneself primarily with that which is changm;J and perishing, and
hence of less reality,
value, and sustaining power. In these
circumstances, one may lose birnSAlf to gimensi.ons of reality that
stand lower on the hierarchical
scale. 4

The essence of evil was initially
further
When

clarified

and

located as disorder.

is now l.mderstood as disorder

a man chooses to pursue the tanporal

etenlal

things

which he was created

things

to pursue,

This is

in the will of man.

rather than the
his will is in disorder.

we may give our minds to consider whether doing evil is
anything else than to neglect eternal things which the mind itself
perceives and enjoys and loves and cannot lose, and to pursue, as
if they were great and wonderful., tanporal things which are
perceived by the body, the lowest part of human nature, and can
never be possessed with oanplete certainty. For in this class, ft
seems to me, all evil deeds, that is sins, are to be included. 4

Now

38
39
40

41

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

I, xvi,
I, xvi,

34.
34.

John It. Roth, Problems of the Philosophy of
Religion (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing co.,
1971),
De lib

p. 23.

am.,

I, xvi,

34.
33

In Book

I Au;Justine bas axgued that the will of a buman beirg

unconstrained

outside factors.

by any

to pursue eternal
however, that,

A

as a result

a good will,

mt

It is possible

the will's

eclipse

temporal things,

of sin. The hindrances
for sin

penalty

and they

do

not

power to choose. When one chooses to pursue

one's will is evil.

essence is evil mt

for a person to

goods. It is this willing

that is hindered by the penalty

which weigh down the will are the just

totally

But this

only if the person bas a will to live rightly

that sw:passes his or her will for tanporal
to live rightly

It is true,

things.

of sin, the will is hindered.

hinderance is not a oc:mpulsion to sin.
choose

person freely chooses whether

or to pursue talp)ral

things

is

This is not that the will in its

its choice was disordered and blameworthy. The

essence of evil is this disorder in the will.

In

this way, evil finds

its source in the free mt wrong choice of man.
Roth outlines

two implications

that Augustine is seek:m;J by this

account:

least two important implications present in this
Augustine wants to make clear that there is
nothing necessary about man's doing evil. The anphasis on free
choice rules out the view that men bad or have to do evil. Men do
evil, mt it results fran free choices. Second, the relation
between human freedan and evil is an important factor in
Augustine's denial that God causes the evil that men do and
experience at the bands of each other. The evil men do and
experience fran each other does have a cause,~
the cause is to
be fOlmd in the human will rather than in God.
There are at

response.

Nothing
42

First,

is within

the

power of an individual

more

Roth, Problems of the Philosophy of Religion,
34

than

his own

p. 24.

choice. Therefore,

when

one chooses evil,

blameworthy and one is justly

The Freedan

punished.

period

in which Augustine diSCll.9ses the

freedan. of the will is Devera religione.

emphasizes a positive

apologetic

for catholic

as

relationship

between

Authority and Reason.

Incarnation

and bow

In this

Christianity.

a valid means to knawlecge
He also

and

He

references

defends the

''Reason sees the created lmiverse as pointing to

The first
There

to the

freedan of the will.

emerged in De libero arbitrio

themes which

theme

Book

is that of the efficacious

are two related

to

choose

whether

vice. Au;Ustine writes that,
1:,p.,

he

makes

sane of these reinforce
I.
nature of each person's

points in this theme. First,

has the capacity to choose his or her destiny.
individual

defends

explains the

1144It is in the oontext of these issues that Augustine

several

in

is an anti-Manichaean work in which Au;Ustine

the use of Authority

43
44

written

religion.11 43

Devera religione

will.

was

11
ooncemiD;J the

it as a work written,

Au;Ustine introduces

catholic

God.

This book

in 390 and sent to Rananianus with a caver letter.

Thagaste

letter

considered

of the Will in De Vera Religione

work fran this

Another

one is rightly

each person

It is up to the

will be a man of virtue

or a man of

11
0n this floor everyone voll.Dltarily

1.5, 1.

see J.H.s. Burleigh 1 s Introduction

to Devera
religione (hereafter Dever rel.) in Augustine:
p. 224. All references to Dever
Earlier Writings
rel. are to Burleigh 1 s translation.

35

makes

himself

either

or "chaff"
choice.

com or chaff. 1145 Whether a man is 11corn''

(one whose life

We shall

see that

the different

that

voluntary

nature

The second point

voluntary

nature

this

can be intel:preted

intel:pretations
of the

view a wrong choice,

result

of a voluntary
in different

in different

ways and
of the

notions

free choice.

follows

of the

is a result

is carnal)

(a good man)

fran the first.

individual's

or sin,

This view of the

choice

as blameable.

is essential.
Augustine

in order

to

argues:

If the defect we call sin overtook a man against his will,
like a fever, the penalty which follows the sinner and is called
condemnation would rightly seem to be unjust. But in fact sin is so
much a voluntary
evil that it is not sin at all unless it is
voluntary •••• lastly if it is not by the exercise of the will that
we do wrong, no one at all is to be censured or
wamed •••• therefore,
it is by the will that sin is oc:mnitted. And
since there is no doubt that sins are oc:mnitted, I cannot see that
God
it can be doubted that souls have free choice in willing.
jud:;Jed that men would serve him better if they served him freely.
and not by
That could ~t be so if they served him by necessity
free will. 4
There

order

is no just

for the person

has chosen the act.
where there

is strong

pmisbment

of an act that

to be responsible,
Augustine bolds that
persuasion.

is not voluntary.

it Dn1St be true that
this

In order

In

he or she

is true even in cases

to be n:>rally responsible,

the person Dn1St choose to sin by his or her own will.

He writes:

Man is said to have been persuaded by the wicked angel, but even so
it was his will that consented. If he bad consented by necessity,
45

10. Dr. William Young bas pointed
translated
is [rather
as, ''On this floor everyone voluntarily
than •'makes himself"]
either com or chaff."
De ver rel.,
xiv, 27.

De ver rel.

, vi,

out to me that the Latin text is better
46

36

he would have been

held guilty of no sin. 47

Another thane mentioned in Devera religione
Augustine

1

which reinforces

s view of the freedan of the will is that of the nature of an

evil choice. o:mtrary to the Manichaean notion that the body itself
any

bodily pleasure is evil,

choice is not evil.
Rather,

that the object

This is because there is no evil substance

in a case of~

it is the~

Augustine asserts

itself

and

of one's
at all.

fran the highest good to sane lower good,
that is evil.

The

evil resides

in the choice.

Augustine writes:

There is therefore

a good which it is sin for the rational soul to
love because it belong-s to a lower order of being. The sin is evil,
not the substance that is sinfully loved. 48
All kinds of sin and all heresies

have this pattern

in ocmnon,

to Augustine.

acoordm;r

This is the origin of all in;,iety of sinners who have been
condemned for their sins. Not only do they wish to scrutinize the
creation contrary to the oc:mnandmentof God, and to enjoy it rather
than God's law and truththat was the sin of the first man who
misused his free will- but in their state of condemnation they also
make this addition to their sin. They not only love but also serve
the creature rather than the creator, and worship the parts of the
creation fran the loftiest to the lowliest. 49
In Devera

inheritance
hinted
47
48
49

religione,

there

of sin and iooral

is no developed cSoctrine of the

difficulty

at in De libero arbitrio

Book I, this inheritance

Ibid.,
xiv, 28.
Ibid. , xx, 38.

Ibid.,

xxxvii,

fran Mam. Altbou:Jh this was

68.
37

was not deemed

to the individual's

devasta~
the

will.

There

is m:>ral difficulty,

persuasion of satan but there is no oc:q,ulsion.

and

It is still

"his

50

will that consented.

11

Assessment

In this early period,~

volrmtary evil

between

essential

arpbasizes

and coerced

part of his theory,

can be considered sin
At first

and

the helpful

or CC'IJ'{)P..lled
evil.

can be justly

punished.

glance, it seems that the fact that the choice is

oould have chosen to be evil or to not be evil.
corn 11 [a good man] or "chaff"

whether a man is

11

is a result

an individual

we observed 51 that
[one whose life

0Clllp8.tibilist inteJ:pretation

is that,

in two different

ways. The

while a person's

destiny

of volrmtary choice, there were antecedent conditions

result
rendered

necessary.

that choice necessary.

The choice was both volrmtary

It was volrmtary in that the person is

with his will

is a
which
and

corn 11 in accordance

11

(not against his will) • The choice was, at the same time,

necessary because

he

antecedent conditions,

oould not have willed,

choice was volrmtary

intex:pretation,
and

not necessary.

xiv, 28.

see pages

given the present

to be "chaff''.

The incanpatibilist

Ibid.,

is

of a volrmtary choice.

This can, however, be understood

50
51

It is an

in these works, that only volrmtary evil

volrmtary SUWorts the view that in any given situation,

carnal]

distinction

35, 36 above.
38

on the other band, is that the
The

particular

man who chose to

be

corn 11 bad it in his power to cb:x>se to be

11

antecedent

oondi tion was identical

inoarpa+-.ibilist

in both cases.

and a oanpatibilist

choice is voltmtary

even if every

11cbaff"

Both an

would bold that

it is becanM

it is one for which the individual.

that

the

is morally

accountable.
To detennine which intm:pretation

at this

we must observe that,

point,

is free because
accordance

act.

1

with the will.

'Voltmtary"

therefore,
action
the

it is voltmtary.

is one that

scbane,

to one another

''neceSSar:Y''•The contrary

is not voltmtary,

that

is,

one that

and,

of a free

is done against

will.
An inoanpatibilist

voltmtary.
necessary

also claims that

However, a voltmtary

act. ''Voltmtary''

voltmtary;

it is necessary.

Augustine

opposed to one another.
AugUstine

are contraries.

of the two options,
choice''

we see that,

bolds that
An act

is

act cannot be, at the same time,

A ''necessary

As we look into the texts,

develq:ment,

a free act is one that

and "necessary''

person oould have chosen either

voltmtary'•

11

cannot be both.

a

unless

the

the choice is not

is no choice at all.

at this

point

in his

and ''necessary''

are

In De vera religione

writes:

If the defect we call sin overtook a man against his
like a fever, the penalty which follows the sinner and is
condemnation 'WOul.drightly seem to be tmjust. But in fact
much a vol'~.tary
evil that it is not sin at all tmless it
2
voltmtary.
52

an act

it is free if it is done in

are not contrary
and

position

act oould be also a necessary

A voltmtary

are "free''

Augustine's

in a CCllpltibilist

That is,

and ''necessary''

neither

best fits

Dever

rel.,

xiv,

27.
39

will,
called
sin is so
is ·

said to have been persuaded by the wicked ~l,
but even so
it was his will that consented. If he bad ~ted
by necessity,
he would have been held guilty of no sin. 5

Man is

Clearly,

in these passages, Au:JUStine is qp>sing

a necessary act

and an act for which a person could be held blameworthy,

voll.mtary act. This is a fairly
position.

clear statanent

that is,

a

of the ino:mp,+:ibilist

.lUJUStinebrilqs

In another passage, fran De libero arbitrio,

out that the will bas it in its power to choose either

alternative:

You see, then, I imagine, that it is in the power of our will
or to be without so great and so true a good. For what is
so cxq,letely within the power of the will as the will itself?
Whoever has a good will has sanet:ltin;Jwhich is far better than all
earthly realms and all bodily pleasures. Whoever does not have it,
lacks that which is n:>re excellent than all the goods whice are not
in our power, and yet he can have it by willing it s:inply. 4
to enjoy

He asserts

that it is in the power of the will to attain

will or not to attain

it.

antecedent

that would be necessary before the will oould

attain

conditions

No

mention is

a good

the other option.~,

made

of any differences

in the

in this passage, Au;;JUstine points

that all the person needs is to will in order to attain

out

the good will.

It seems clear that Au:JUStine is saying that a person bas it within his
or her power to attain
oonsideration
this

55

of antecedent

of the two options regardless
oonditions.

In fact,

can actualize
Ibid., xiv,
lib arb.,
Ibid.

De

28.
I,

either
xii,

of the two options.
26.

40

of any

the whole tenor of

passage is to emphasize that by merely ''willing

individual
53
54

either

it s:inplY'•55 the
This is also closer

to an inocq>atibilist
oanpatibilist

notion of the freedan of the will than it is to a

view.

In the period between ~ine's

the priesthood

conversion and his ordination

a theory of

he articulates

(386-391)

will of which there are four major m;redients.
will has the ability

lnmm

to choose either

not OClli)elled to choose one or the other.

sin that it be voll.mtary

and

(and

primarily

hindered in its choices.
inp)tence.

Each soul

m;redient

nature of

is that,

as a

the will

is

is weighed down by ignorance and

of choosing or obtaining

to the soul in that reason no

is that evil is located

of the soul rather

than in the object

in the disordered

of the willin].

sane lower good in the place of the highest

essence of an evil willi.J:¥;J. Fourth,

rightly.

Au;Justine' s intention

point,

of grace at all.

is not to establish

:rt seems as though he suggests

will is able to choose rightly

is the

necessary to enable the will to choose

God as

At this

good

To love

in these works, there is little

mention of the grace of

role

person is

the whole of the person.

The third

and desire

A

for a m,:nanwill to

the sin of the individual),

These do not raoove the possibility

rules

willing

is that each

assertions

The second m;redient

the good, b1t sin has brought disorder

lo~er

inp)rtant

that it is possible

choose a good will and obtain it.

of sin

The first

These are that it is part of the essential

follow fran this.

result

freedan of the

the

evil or good.
Two

to

without the special
41

that

the

intervention

the

human

of God.

As

we have seen, Augustine's position during this

characterized

as an inocq,atibilist

period can be

position.

There are three aspects of Augustine's view of the freedan of the
will which will develop tbrol¥Jhout the next six years.
view of the ability

of the will to choose rightly.

The first

The second is his

position

regarding the depth of the effect of Mam's sin on this

ability.

The

sufficiency

third is his view of both the necessity
of God's grace for right willing.

A1¥;Justinewill bold to the necessity
condition of willing rightly.

As

is his

and the

we shall see,

of God's grace as an antecedent

This is a cc:upltibilist

view in that the

will does not have the power to choose either of the possible

options

without a difference

towards

this

in antecedent

view will begin shortly after

conditions.

The

his ordination

391.

42

transition

to the priesthood

in

amP.l'ER

AUGUSTINE'S VIEW OF THE

III

Fl<EE[Q{

OF THE WILL

It was in the sprilxJ of 3911 that Augustine
order to found a monastery.

As we

traveled

have mentioned,

to Hippo in

2 Augustine

Pl,U'POsely avoided those towns in which there was no catholic
fear of bei.Jq consecrated

Valerius,

bishop,

bishop by force.

Hippo, baviD;J its own

seemed safe.

It was Valerius who, in a sern,on, expressed the desperate
church so powerfully

the

seeing Augustine

to the

burst

in the back of the church,

into tears.

Augustine,

priestly

criticizilq

callilq
priests

3

Augustine

of

dragged him
iJJ'IDM.iately

supposed it was because he had aspired

of bishop and now bad to settle

for bei.Jq a

however, was overwhelmed with lx>th the difficulty
and the raslmess of his fozmer habit
and bishops. 3

TWenty-five years later
1
2

needs

leaped into action.

they forcibly

him for ordination.

Those present

to the higher office

the

that the congregation

front and presented

priest.

bishop for

Augustine

See Peter Brown, p. 74.
Seep. 19 above.
See~-,
21, 2.
43

recalled

that day:

of

of

I, whan you see, with God's grace, as your bishop- I came as a
young man to this city, as many of you knew. I was looking for a
place to set up a monastery, to live with 'Jlf'J ''brethren".
I bad
given up all hope in this world. What I could have been, I wished
not to be: nor did I seek to be what I am now. For I chose to be
humble in the house of 'Jlf'J God rather
than to live in the tents of
I kept apart fran those wbo loved the world: mt I did not
sinners.
think 'Jlf'j8elf equal to those wbo ruled over ocmgregations.
At the
lord's Feast,
I did not take up a higher position,
mt chose a
lower and more retiring
place: and it pleased the lord to say •'Rise
up''.

I feared the office of a bishop to such an extent that, as
soon as 'Jlf'J reputation
came to matter among "servants
of God", I
would not go to any place where I knew there was no bishop. I was
on 'Jlf'J guard against this: I did what I could to seek salvation
in a
bumble position rather than be in dalqer in high office.
But, as I
said, a slave may not contradict
his lord. I came to this city to
see a friend, whan I thought I might gain for God, that he might
live with us in the monastery. I felt secure, for the place already
bad a bishop. I was~I was made a priest ••• and fran there,
I became your bishop.
Almost imned:i.ately,
an "arduous

Augustine

work which now disquiets

was thrown into what he describes
and crushes

his own inadequacy, he wrote to Valerius
time in which he could concentrate

of the fact

that

it

'Jlf'J

pleading

spirit.11 5 Seeing

for a short

on the study of scripture.

is bis own spiritual

life

that

period of
He writes

needs bealiD;J and

growth as well as of the need he bas to grasp bow to minister

in such a way that they too attain

as

to others

salvation:

[W]hen I have learned 'Jlf'J infimity,
'Jlf'J duty is to study with
contain for such a
diligence
all the remedies which the scriptures
case as mine, and to make it 'Jlf'J l::lusiness by prayer and reading to
secure that 'Jlf'J soul be endued with the heal th and vigor necessary
for labors so responsible. 6

4
5
6

sei:mon, 355, 2, cited
l:Q., 21,

in Peter

3.

lbid.
44

Brown, p. 138.

But 11rf difficulty
is in the question bow I am to use this truth in
of others, seeking what is pro;itable
ministeril¥;J to the salvation
not for myself alone, but for many, that they may be saved.

of Au;Justine 1 s pleading

The intensity

life

calling.

ordination

his focus.

changed

pastoral

ministry

occupied

the

graciously

may

awear to have

his credit

that

Africa,

7
8

settle

breaks

by Aurelius

Al thc>u]h

part,

on Valerius'

ensured

ioonastery]

He even gave Ai¥;Justine

it was to

with tradition.

both that

As

this

was officially

in

reo,g:nh:ed

men- many of them fonner

in his town. 1.S

The first

time, this

was in 393, while

invited

[the

and

however. Valerius

for a location.

were two other ways in which Valerius

practice.

to this

and other

a group of extraordinary

Manichees- should

accepted

this

''He, therefore,

institution

and that

There

been a concession

he allowed

Brown observes,

unprecedented

Up

allowed him to develop it.

and wisely

use of the garden on the church property

Peter

did he

part of his attention.

greater

Au;Justine did not have to give up the monastery,

this

No longer

of the people of Hippo. Their needs came first

He was now a servant

the

life

freedan. to pursue his dream of a monastery on his own tenns.

have the

the

radically

in his

to an active

he had been moving closer

Even~

in the Church,

as a turning point

be viewed his ordination

that

deloonstrates

time of preparation

for this

was that

privilege

Ai¥;Justine

he allowed

broke

A1¥;Justine to preach.

bad been reserved

was still

for the bishops.

only a priest,

to address the assenhled

Ibid., 21, 4.
Peter Brown, p. 140.
45

with the

bishops

that

It

he was

of Africa

on the

creed. 9 This message was published

invitation

indicates

~

the Church in Africa.

the growiD;J extant of Augustine's

tradition

The second break with

oonsecrated

Augustine

as De fide et symbolo. This

as auxiliary

in 395 when Valerius

occurred

action was effective

bishop fran Valerius'
The catholic

schismatics.
veteran

Church

of many disputes

praninent

rnenber,

served Hi.we> as nll.ing

in 396 to Augustine's own in 430.

were the Manichees. Augustine,

this sect,

with

level.

turned

to a public debate.

Fortunatus

in dialectics

already

Fortunatus,

which threatened

the

claimed that they were the true church
this group, the catholic
oonsecration)

which Augustine

is

debate

of Jesus

Donatists

were the

church

Christ.

bishops were spiritually

Acoording

descended

who

to

(thro'l:gh

of

in 303-305. 11 The acts of ex>llaboration deprived the
authority

acoording to the Donatists,

or power. Those they

were not true bishops.

oonsecrated

11

in contrast,

9

See J.H.S. Burleigh's
Introduction to Faith and the
creed,
in AugUstine: Earlier writi,Ms. p. 351.
See OOpleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. :II, p.
44.
Peter Brown, p. 215.

were spiritually

11 ,

The Donatist

bishops,

11

wielded.

fran bishops who had ex>llaborated in the Persecution

bishops of any spiritual

10

a

in Acta ex>ntra Fortunatum Manichaeum.

The schismatics

Diocletian

a

was no match for the

two days he was forced to leave town. The text of this

recorded

and

to the

his attack

In 392, he cballen;ied

of knowlea;,e and skill

breadth

in that Augustine

him into service.

of Hi.we> in 391 was besieged by heretics

The heretics

Manichees at a local

After

death

bad

bisbcp. 10 This prevented any other

town that might be in need of a bishop fran snatching

Valerius'

influence

descended fran Donatus who bad

46

been

consecrated

very bishop who bad been elected

by the

to replace the

collaborators.
Augustine's

works against the Donatist position

many

hrmedi.ately concern

the

to keep in mind that,

freedan of

the

f:can his first

the

survival

effect

The

literary

writing.

of the small catholic

ocmmmjty at Hippo.

his noi:mal pastoral

of the n:>nastery left very little
Although Augustine

Augustine was

of which independently

each

of these controversies,

establishment

the

Bawever, it is 1Jll)Ortant

days as a priest,

embroiled in two major controversies
threatened

will.

not

do

produced

a

work and

leisure

time for

n:>mJmental mm,hp.rof

books, it is no exaggeration to say that every one was influenced
sane jDIJ!edi.ate controversy.
meet sane particular

Most of them were written

by

specifically

to

challenge.

It is in this context that Augustine cx:upleted Books II and III of
De

libero

Paul.

amitrio.

turned

He also

He began a ccmnentary

circulated

his attention

to

writings

the

on 'RaDans, which was soon abandoned

a work consisting

of brief ccmnent.s on selected

and he

passages in

that book. This was the Expositio 84 propositionum Epistolae
Rananos. He preached many sennons includin;

of st.

ad

those that were collected

into De sennone Danini in n:>nte.
This period,
transition
pastoral

between

for Augustine.

ordination
He

the

and

Scripture.

consecration,

planted himself in Hippo

ministry with great effort.

of OClllDOn,
uneducated men and
theologian

and

He became
He also

Wailell.

and

a preacher

developed

an exegete as his works

became

All of this had effects

on his position

47

was one of

took on his
and

a leader

into a

increasiD;Jly focussed on
regardiJ¥'J the

freeda:n of the will.

In

this chapter

AugUstine held duriJ¥;J this period

The Freedan of the
Fortunatum

It
debate

was
was

held between Fortunatus
Fortunatus

tried

out the position

both Acta contra

Books II and III.

Will in Acta contra
Manicbaeum

of 392 that the public

and Au;JUstine.12 The debate lasted

to keep the discussion

on ground

considered safe, that is, the morals of Manic.haeans, Augustine

eventually

suooeeded

The discussion

in pressin:;J his doctrinal
aver many issues,

rmv;Jed

of God, the origin
the

arbitrio

in late Au;JUst or early Sept.anber

two days. Althou;h
which be

draw

by examining

Manichaeumand De libero

Fortunatum

I shall

including the inviolable

of the soul,

and pw:pose

context of the origin of evil,

the

criticiSID.9 of the sect.

and the

nature

origin of evil.

In

freedan of the will is

discu.ssed.
1'gainst Fortunatus'
all

things

good,

and

dualism, Au;JUStine contended that •'God made

ordered them well;

sin, ••• 1113 In contrast,

Fortunatus

but He did not make

declared that evil

was "apart

God. 1114 By this he meant that evil was a substance distinct
Augustine

traced

the

_____
_

Sin
_,
12

by

definition,

origin of evil,

Peter Brawn gives the date August 28 (seep. 141).
The text of Acta contra Fortunatum Manichaeum gives
the date sept.e:nbP..r5. See the translation
by Albert
H. Newman in A select Library of the Nicene and
Rapids,
Mich.:
Hereafter C Fort.
C Fort.,
15.
Ibid., 16.
(Grand

14

ed. Philip
Eerdmans

48

fran God.

to the choice of the will.

is voluntary.

Post-Nicene Fathers,
13

again,

fran

SCbaff, Vol. IV,
Publishing, 1983)

I ask you, therefore,
acoordin;J to that passage which bas been read
[Ephesians 2:1-18], bow can we have sins if contrary nature oc:m;;,els
us to do what we do? For ·be who is carpel led by nature to do
anythiD;J, does not sin. But be who sins, sins by free will .
Wherefore would repentance be enjoined upon us, if we have done
not.hiD;J evil, l:lut only the race of darkness? Likewise, I ask, to
whan is forgiveness
of sins granted, to us or to the race of
darkness? If to the race of darkness, their race will also reign
with Him, receivin;J the forgiveness
of sin; l:lut if to us it is
For it is the height of
manifest that we have sinned vollmtarily.
folly for him to be pardoned who bas done no 9n1. But be bas done
no evil, who bas done not.hin;J of his awn will.
In another

place,

Augustine

adds:

For if anyone, so to speak, should be :bound by saneone in his other
JIIE'fflbP_rs,and with his band sanet.hin;J false should be written
without his awn will, I ask whether if this were laid open before a
juci;Je, be could condemn this one for the crime of falsehood.
Wherefore, if it is manifest that there is no sin where there is
not free exercise of the will, I wish to bear what evil the soul
which you call either part, or power, or word, or sanet.hin;J else,
of
of God, bas done, that it should be pmished by God, or ~t
sin, or merit forgiveness,
since it bas in no way sinned?
In response
Fortunatus

~

to be as free
New

Testament

powerless

to Augustine's

up that,

discussion

in human experience,

as Au;Justine iq,lies.

Scriptures

in the struggle

of the freedan of the will,

In addition,

which seem to

against

sin.

cboosilxJdoes
be~

auwortthat

not seem

in certain

the individual

is

He argues:

Therefore it is evident fran these thiJxJs that the good soul seems
to sin not vollmtarily,
l:lut by the doilxJ of that which is not
subject to the law of God. For it likewise follows that "the flesh
and the spirit
against the flesh; so
lusteth against the spirit
that ye may not do the thiJxJs that ye will." 1'gain: "I see another
warring against the law of 'lfrJ mind and leading
law in 'lfrJ JDESDbP'C'S,
me captive in the law of sin and of death. Therefore I mn a
miserable man: who shall deliver me fran the body of this death,
lmless it be the grace of God tbrou:Jh our IDrd Jesus Christ,"
15

16

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

17.
20.
49

wban the

•~

world?" 7

It awears,

world bas been crucified

reasons Fortunatus,

that the will is not free in the

sense that Augustine bas been asserting.
New

Testament shaw that cboosilq rightly

possible

to me and I to the

Both hlDan

is difficult,

Augustine responds by discussilq

at all.

experience and the
if it is

the i-ole of habit

Coonsuetudo) in the exercise of the free cboioe of the will.

I say that there was free exercise of will in that man who was
first foxmed. He was so made that absolutely nothing could resist
bis will, if he had willed to keep the precepts of God. But after
he vollllltarily sinned, we who have descended
fnm bis stock were
pllJD:1edinto necessity. But each one of us can find out by a little
consideration that what I say is true. For today in our actions
before we are implicated by an'/ habit, we have free cboice of doing
anything or not doilq it. But when by that liberty we have done
sanething and the pernicious sweetness and pleasure of that deed
bas taken hold upon the mind, by its own habit the mind is so
implicated that af~
it cannot conquer what by sinning it bas
fashioned for itself.
Prendiville

explains this necessity:

explains, possessed free will. He was so made that if
to observe God's cx:mnands, nothing could resist bis will.
he sinned (and that by an act of bis free will), we, bis
descendants, were thrown into a certain 11necessity. 11 We can verify
this ''necessity" for ourselves. Today, before we acquire a habit,
we have the free choice to do a certain action or not. When,
however, we have done sanething freely, and the pernicious
sweetness and pleasure of the action bas gripped our soul, then it
beco:nes so involved in its habit, that later it cannot rreroane
what it made for itself by sinning in the first place. 1
Adam, he

he willed
But after

17
18
19

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

21.
22.

1"1'he Developnent of the Idea
John G. Prendiville,
of Habit in the Thought of saint Augustine, 11
Traditio,
Vol. 28 (1972) p. 69.
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The ''necessity"

into which we are thrown in virtue

of being

descendants is not that of being OClll')letely and inherently

cboosin; rightly

or WJ:"OD;Jly.
It is a necessity

bring-s upon biJDSAlfor herself.

each person

in any habit"

fran doin; any given action.

refraining

is a resultin;

effect

a deep attraction;

the

doin; or in

in

once an option is
In

in;>licatecf

''we are

chosen,

sane cases, this is

the

mind is attracted

and

habit of choosi.D;Jthe option which bring-s this pleasure.

of this habit is a stron;
another.

inclination

is important to keep in mind that what is inherited
Adam's sin is the disposition
be bound by them.
In

indeed can be,,-2°

it foms
The effect

than

a •tnecessi ty." It
as a result

of

to foi:m these habits of the soul and to

The necessity

response to Fortunatus

flesh is hostile

and

to choose in one way rather

that AL¥1tJStine
calls

It is this inclination

there

called a •tpern:i.cious sweetness

once it is experienced,

pleasure."

Before

of the choice in the mind.

what AD;Ustine

incapable of

the experience of which

is the freedan of indifference

there

.Mam 1 s

itself
1

is not inherited.

use of the passage, •"l'he mind of the

to God; is not subject to the law of God, neither
Augustine

the will 1 s capacity

further

describes

the effect

of habit on

to choose:

this is what wars against the soul, habit fo:cmedin the flesh.
This is indeed the mind of the flesh, which, as l<>n:Jas it cannot
thus be subject to the law of God, so lon; is it the mind of the
flesh; but when the soul bas been illuninated it ceases to be the
mind of the flesh. For thus it is said the mind of the flesh cannot
be subject to the law of God, just as if it were said, that snow
cannot be wai:m. For as lon; as it is snow, it can in no way be
wai:m.
But as the snow is melted by beat, so that it may beoaDe
wai:m,
so the mind of the flesh, that is, habit fo:cmedwith the
flesh, when our mind bas beoane illuninated,
that is, when God bas
subjected
for Himself the whole man to the choice of the divine

And

20

C

Fort. , 21 quotin:J Ranans 8: 7.
51

law, instead of the evil habit of the soul, makes a good habit •
.k,oordi.n:Jly it is most truly said by the IDrd of the two trees, the
one good and the other evil, which you have called to mind, that
they have their own fruits; that is, neither can the good tree
yield evil fruit, nor the evil tree good fruit, but so lcm;J as it
is evil. Let us take two men, a good and a bad. As lcm;r as be is
good, be cannot yield evil fruit; as lcm;J as be is bad be cannot
yield good fruit. But that you may Jcnow that these two trees are so
placed by the IDrd, that free choice may be there signified, that
these two trees are not natures but our wills, He Bi rnself says in
the gospel: •'Either make the tree good or make the tree evil. 11 Who
is it that can make nature? If therefore we are 0C111MDdedto 1f81t8
a
tree either good or evil, it is ours to choose what we will. 2
As

reasons,

lcm;r as the mind ranainq the mind of the flesh,

~

it cannot be subject to God. This is not statin;J,

Fortunatus wished to inply,

as

that the mind of the flesh can never be

free to choose. Rather

it is only as lcm;J as the mind TSDains of the

flesh that it is

by necessity.

illuminated,
the

lx>1md

once the

it is no lon:ier the mind of the flesh.

habits of evil

and beccmes

Au;JUstine clarifies

the

distinction

natures can be seen because of the

nature.

wills,

fruit

between

his view

That they are wills

0C'JJINU)d

and

that of

and

to make them either

not
good

It is not within a person, s power to change or to make his or

evil.

the

It is freed fran

subject to good habit.

Fortunatus by e:xplai.ni.n:J the two trees.

own

soul bas been

Therefore,

the trees

must represent

wills.

it is clear that the source of evil fruit

nature.

This directly

is a necessary result

challe!Y:Jes Fortunatus

or
her

Because they are

is the will and not
1

notion that the evil

of the dark nature within

humans which

derived fran the evil principle.
Prendiville
this
21

suomarizes the role of habit in Au;)Ustine 1 s tllowJht at

time:

Ibid.,

22.
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Thus by 394 one finds Au;Justine in kind of a half-way position
between the t.ho\¥;Jht of the De Vera Religione and the confessions.
The ideas that be is a:iphasizing are these:
Man's will is free; any
necessity toward evil that be experiences is the result of J:iad

habits which be freely develops; this developnent is possible
made up of bocly and soul; be can rid
himself of these habits with God's 1,lP and his own efforts,
and
thus attain peace even in this life. 2

because be is a oanplex bein;J,

of the Will in De Libero

The Freedan

Books II & III

Arbitrio

De Libero

Arbitrio

Book II

centers on

Book II of De libero arbitrio

question of whether

the

or not God should have given free will to man. Au;Justine's strategy

of

Book II is,

can

first,

to denonstrate

be known by reason and not just

that God does exist and that this
by

faith.

Beoondly, be will argue that

all good tlrln;Js that exist are fran God. Third, be reasons that free
will is itself

a good thin;J. If it is a good thin;J, and all good tlrln;Js

cane fran God, then we know that

it is fran God and that it is right

that He gave it to us. Therefore God is not to be blamed for evil
because it was right
use it

that be should give us free will even though we

to do evil.

Au;Justine's argunents for the existence of
do not,

in themselves,

observe

that be is confident,

22

concern us in this

John G. Prendiville,

both

study.

in virtue

God

of his faith

''The Developnent

but

It is enog;Jh to
and in virtue

of the Idea of

Habit in the Tlloa;ht of saint Au;Justine,"
53

are interestin]

p. 74.

of his reason, that
exists,

bow we

God does exist.

His concern is,

given that

can answer the question of the origin

God

nature of evil

and

in such a way that does not include making God morally blameworthy

the evil

in the world. Be is attanpting

to discover notions of freedan,

bl.amewortb;ness,

evil and God's sovereignty which render

view consistent.

QlCe

next step,

his theistic

Au;lUstine has dE1DOnstratedthe existence

to his own and EYodius' satisfaction),

(at least

cane fran God.

Au;ustine claims that in the metaphysical structure
thing

is an essential

in so far as they exist,

things,

God, certainly

all good things,

God. ~ine

writes,

owe their

existence

God. By understanding
no form, ~ine
receives

for existence.

God

are fran God. If all things

can be no good things,

whether great or

to God, as we have seen, evil is not fran

that evil is not a positive

thing

and

can coherently bold that every existing

but that

Be

that it

has

thing
God

created

did not create evil because evil is not a thing.

it is established

QlCe

are fran

also are fran

its form fran God and is good. It can be said that

everything

All

existence to God.1123 Although all

small, which do not owe their
things

dependence upon

of each

in so far as they exist,

''There

of God

he moves on to the

that of dEIDOnstrating that all good things

individual

for

that

God does

exist

and

that

Be made every

thing that is good, it must next be dEIDOnstrated that free will is to
be

considered a good thing.

thing,

shown

it can then be known that it has been given by

there is no reason to regret
~tine
23

If free will can be

good

God and

that

its having been given.

pursues two lines

De lib arb.,

to be a

II, xvii,

of thought in
46.
54

order

to establish

that

free will is indeed a good thing.
free will can be

used

~

itself.

use

can

hand,

for evil does not preclude its being good in

wen though it is possible,

one's band to do evil.

can an incorporeal

thing

such

8Y'8D

(such

as the hair on one's

although they are not necessary

good

life.

virtuous

must

be

a physical abject,

use for evil,

~

presents

bead)

an

for ·

and wen ocmnon,

as free will be considered

line of reasoning

numerous things

If

in spite of its potential

be good

The second

be shows that the fact that

appeals to the lunan band which no one considers

evil thing in itself
one to

First,

like the

bow much

more

good?

is tbat there are

which are considered

in order for one to live a

Since free will is necessary

for a virtuous

life,

it

considered a good thing.

What perversity

it is to m:m,bArour hairs moong the good things
they are small and utterly contemptible, and to attribute
their creation to God, the creator of all good things because all
good things,
the greatest and the least, cane fran him fran whcm is
thou]h

all good; and yet to hesitate to ascribe free will to him, seei.D;J
that wi tbout it no one can live aright even on the testimony of
those who live evil lives. 2
Au:;1\lStine

There

recognizes that there is a distinction

are goods,

can never

such

be used

as justice,

for evil.

called int;e:nnet'liate goods.

Free
These

which are called

between

great goods.

goods.
These

will belOD3S to the class of goods
can be used either

for good or for

evil but they are good in themselves.
To use an inte:nuettiate good for evil is not to choose sane evil

thing.

It is, as

fran the highest
24

Ibid.,

we

have seen, an evil cboosin;J. It is to turn away

good and

II, xviii,

to turn to a lower good. It is the turning
49.
55

which is evil,

itself

not the lower good to which the will
to turn that

Nor is it the capac:ity

is itself

is turned.

evil.

so it baA;>ens that the good things SOl.¥Jht by sinners cannot in any
way be bad, nor can free will be bad, for we found that it was to
be mmibered im:,ng the intennediate
goods. What is bad is its
turning way fran the unchangeable good and its turning to
changeable~That "aversion'' and 1'conversion' 1 is voluntary and
not ex>eroed.
If it is this

turnm;J of the will

is what the cause of this

turning

upon this

to Book III:

as a transition

that

oould be.

is evil,

the next question

~

briefly

touches

But perhaps you are going to ask what is the cause of the
movement of the will when it turns fran the imnutable to the
mutable good. That movement is certainly
evil, although free will
DDJStbe mmibered among good things since without it no one can live
aright.
We cannot doubt that that movement of the will, that
turning way fran the IDrd. God, is sin; but surely we cannot say
that God is the author of sin? God, then, will not be the cause of
that movement; but what will be its cause? If you ask this, and I
answer that I do not know, prly
you will be saddened, And yet
that would be a true answer. 6
~

turning

pleads

of the will.

ignorance

oonoerning the cause of the actual

Al¥;JUstine is not throwiiq

realm of mystery to avoid wrestling
reasons

''Why Al.r;UStine's

abdication
reason
25
26

27

position

of the philosophical

is that

this

with it.

the question
Maker points

into

the

out two

ought not to be looked at as an
demand for

intelligil:>ility.

is not the end to AUg'UStine 1 s pursuit

Ibid., II, xix, 53.
Ibid., II, xx, 54.
William Maker, ''Al.¥JUStine
on Evil: The Dilemna. of
the Philosophers,"
The International
Jounlal
for
Philosophy of Religion Vol. 15 (1984) p. 155.
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027

one

of truth

in

the

area of the problElll of evil.
The other

He is not just

qui ttiD;J.

reason is that the nature of the will itself

is such

that this question is unanswerable. •'This is the fact that we
experience
sanething

the

will as an initiating

which in and of itself

or 1DSetenni:ned causal force,

as

causes things to baA?ft'\ which would

otherwise not baA?ffl'. 1128 It seems, for his aooount, that there

can

be

no cause outside of the choosing agent birnSAlf.

All good is fran God. Hence there is no natural existence which is
not fran God. Now that m::wementof "aversion," which we admit is
sin, is a defective m::wement; and all defect canes fran nothing.
Observe where it belongs and you will have no doubt that it does
not belong to God. Because that defective m::wementis voluntary, it
is placed within our power. If you fear it, all you have to do is
simply not to will it. If you do not will it, it will not
exi

'st

• 29

Au;Justine closes
cause of the will'S

Book

turning.

question of the canpatibility

II by setting

This leads directly

Book

Amitrio

into the canplicated

in Book III.

Book III

III opens with a discussion

divine foreknowl~e

of the relationship

and human.freedcm. Evodius is still

question concerning the origin of the will' s turning,
the
28

29

m::wementby which the will itself

turns

p. 155.
lib arb., II, :xx, 54.

Ibid.,
De

the

concerning

of divine foreknowleciJe and this concept

of rnnnan free&:m. This he tac:kles

De Lil:>ero

up the question

57

between

pressin;J bis

"[W] henc:e

fran the ~eable

arises
good,

which is the oarmon property

the blame lies
He writes,

resulted.

m::wementby nature,

presently,

such

the

issues regarding

for the sinful will and all of the evil which
"[I]f

free will is so given that it has that

it turns of necessity

to mutable goods;

blame attaches where nature and necessity
if anything,

••• 1130 This

to its own interests

to him because this question captures

is illp>rtant
where

of all,

prevail.

1131 In

and

no

other words,

as God's foreknowlecge which Evodius bring-sup

is such that the m::wementof the will fran the ilrmutal:>leto

the mutable good is necessary

such a way that

(in just

the soul cannot

avoid this m::wement), the person cannot be held responsible.
of freedan that is

The type

culpability,

here as in the

dee:ned

necessary for moral

writin;s surveyed in Chapter II, is an

ll'OCIJ'{)atibilist view. As I have indicated,
a person to be sufficiently
actually

I take this to mean that for

free regarding a choice, he must be

able to choose either

of the alternatives

even if every other

antecedent oondi tion remained the same. Au;Justine writes:

Moreover, unless the m::wementof the will towards this or that
object is voll.mtary and within our power, a man would not be
praiseworthy when he turns to the higher objects nor blamewon11Y'
when he turns to lower objects, using his will like a hinge. 2

The

highlights
either

reference

to a hinge in this passage is a canparlson which

this feature of the will.

Just

way, one can turn one's will either

as one can turn a hinge
towards

the

highest good or

to sane lower good. It is within one's power to choose either
30

31
32

Ibid.,
Ibid.
Ibid.,

III,

i, 1.

III,

i, 3.
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and so to

''do otherwise.••
Evodi.us turns to the problan of divine foreknowledge:

I have a deep desire to know bow it can be that God knows all
beforehand and that, nevertheless, we do not sin by
necessity •••• since God foreknew that man woul.d sin, that which God
foreknew must necessarily cane to pass. Haw then is ~ will free
when there is ~tly
this unavoidable necessity?
things

Au;1UStine articulates

the

problan as follows:

Your trouble is this. You wonder bow it can be that these two
propositions are not contradictory and inc:arpa+-.ible, namely that
God has foreknowledge of all future events, and that we sin
voll.mtarily and not by necessity. For if, you say, God foreknows
that a man will sin, he must necessarily sin. But if there is
necessity there is no voll.mtary choice in sjnnjng, but rather fixed
and unavoidable necessity.
You are afraid that by that reasoning
the conclusion may be reached either that God's foreknowledge of
all future events must be impiously denied, or, if that cannot~
denied, that sin is cxmnitted not voll.mtarily but by necessity.

Au:1UStine
takes three approaches to this question.
highlight

undesirable

that attaches

Au:1UStine's first

two

consequences which follow if God's foreknowledge

did preclude freedan of the will.
the necessity

The first

The third

is an investigation

into

to knowledge.

approach in answeriD:Jthis problem is to point

out that if God's foreknowledge rules out future

rules out God's own freedan.

mwan freedan,

it also

It is assumed that God is free in any and

all of His actions.

Don't you see that you will have to be careful lest saneone say to
you that, if all things of which God has foreknowledge are done by
necessity and not voll.mtarily, bis own future acts will be done not
33
34

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

III,
III,

ii, 4.
iii, 6.
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voluntarily

against
year,

freedan,
his will.

it would be possible
If,

creates

voluntarily,

then

Au;Justine,

say that

Evodius will

it is possible
here,

that

use of the

is~

''Therefore
it

He goes

on:

is true.

this

If God's

be happy by

by necessity

fact

one

that,

and not

again.c;t:. his

in his view, to

is equivalent

to sayi.D;J that

''not voluntarily."

Acoording to Evodius, this

future,

in exactly

he is made happy

sanethi.DJ
baWened ''by necessity''

it occurred

that,

God knows that

then

foreknowledge

for God to make Evodius happy ,

If Evodius is happy (in one year)

necessity.

will.

necessity,

if

it is true that

for instance,

be happy, then

Evodius will

foreknowledge

is to show that,

second approach

Au;Justine's
precluded

35

but by necessity.

is impossible.

Augustine

thou;Jh God knows how we are goi.D;J to will

is not proved that we do not voluntarily

will

ooncludes
in the
anythiD;J. 1136

When you said that you did not make yourself happy, you said it as
if I bad denied it. What I say is that when you beoane happy in the
future it will not take place against your will but in aooordance
with your willi.D;J. Therefore, though God has foreknowledge of your
happiness in the future, and though nothin;J can ba£{)81' otherwise
than as He has foreknown it (for that would mean that there is no
foreknowledge) we are not thereby oaJP!lled to think that you will
not be happy voluntarily.
That would be absurd and far fran true.

God's foreknowledge, which is even today quite certain that you are
to be happy at a future date, does not rob you of your will to
happiness when you actually attain happiness. Similarly if ever in
the future you have a culpable will, it ~¼l be none the less your
will because God has foreknowledge of it.
35
36

37

lbid.
lbid.,
Ibid.

III,

iii,

7.
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God foreknows both the voluntary

willin;J and the result

williD;J. In this way, His foreknowledge, rather
freedan,

actually

preserves

and protects

of that

than eliminating

br1nan

it.

God has foreknowledge of our will,

so that of which he bas
foreknowledge must cane to pass. In other words, we shall exercise
our wills in the future because he has foreknowledge that we shall
do so; and there can be no will or voluntary action 1.Ulless it be in
our power. Hence God has also foreknowledge of our power to will.
My power is not taken fran me by God's foreknowledge. Indeed I
shall be more certainly in possession of 1lrJpower because he whose
foreknowledge is never mistaken, foreknows that I shall have the
power.38

As

craig

observes:

Hence, foreknowledge, far fran being i.ncaJpat.il>le with free
will, actually serves to guarantee it. For since God foreknows our
future acts of will, these will cane to pass as He foreknows than.
He foreknows that these acts will be acts of our will and therefore
within our power •••• [Al.¥;1Ustine]argues that even if there is in
God's mind a definite pattern of causation which he foreknows, it
does not follow that no roan is left for the free choice of our
will. For our wills are included in that very pattern of causes
foreknown by God, since the wills of men are included among the
causes of men's deeds. How then can the order of causes which is
fixed in God's foreknowledge deprive us of the use of our will when
our wills are an :iq;>orta.nt part of the causal series itself? OJr
acts
will have just as much power as God foresaw than to
have.

ii

The third

approach

issue is an analysis

Al.¥;1Ustinemakes to the foreknowledge/free

of the necessity

that attaches

will

to foreknowledge.

lO;JUStine asks Evodius whether bis view that foreknowledge is

foreknowledge that is bein;J considered or is it c!'ue to the nature of
38
39

Ibid.,
III,
iii,
8.
William Lane Craig,
The Problem of Divine
Foreknowledge and Future Contingents fran Aristotle
to suarez
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), pp. 68-69.
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foreknowledge in general.

Altho\.¥J}lEvodius clams

that it is divine

foreknowledge that is the problem, A1¥;)ustine demonstrates

that any sort

of foreknowledge will brinI the problem Evodius sees.

If you knew in advance that such and such a man would sin, there
would be no necessity for him to sin. [Evodius replies]-xnc3eed
there would, for I should have no real foreknowledge unless I knew
for certain what was goinI to ba["1?8!\. [A1¥;)ustine's conclusion]-SO
it is foreknowledge generally and not God's foreknowledge specially
that causes the events foreknown to ba[t)Em by necessity? There
would be no such th.iD] as foreknowledge unless there was certain
foreknowledge. 40

Au;Justine's point is that the problem Evodius bas raised is not
lmique

foreknowledge. It is true of any possible

to divine

foreknowledge. Implied in this
belief.

is the view that knowledge entails

If what one claims to know is false,

one does not have

knowledge. Qlly what is true can be known. Therefore,
'P' must be true.
certain

true

Hence, if one foreknows that

if

one knows 'P',

'x' will oocur, it is

that 'X' will occur. If anyone, not just God, bas foreknowledge

that a man will sin, it is certain

describes this

that the man will sin. Au;Justine

case.

unless I am mistaken, you would not directly oanpel the man to sin,
thol.gh you knew beforehand that he was goinI to sin. Nor does your
prescience itself oanpel him to sin even thol.gh he was certainly
goinI to sin, as we must assume if you have real prescience. So
there is no contradiction here. Simply you know beforehand what
another is goinI to do with his own will. Similarly God oanpels no
he sees beforehand those who are goinI to sin by
man to sin, ~h
their own will. 4
40

41

De lib arb.,
Ibid.

III,

iv, 10.

62

If it is foreknowleci;Je s:i.q,ly that seans to preclucle
this is because any foreknowldJ& of an avant carries

free will,

with it the

oertai.nty that the avant will take place. 'l'be necessity

attaches

to the

foreknawleci;Je as a type of knowleci;Je. It does not attach to the
foreknawleci;Je because of the divine nature of the knowlect;Je.
Foreknawleci;Je of an action,
not OCJTt>P..l
the action.

does

the necessity

necessity

The

certainty

of knowlecge does not entail

of the object of knowldJ&.

This distinction
the

whether by God or any other k:nowi.iq bein;J,

bas cane to be known as the distinction

of the oonsequence and the necessity

between

of the oonsequent.

As Konyndyk explains:

Basic:ally,the distinction is between two different ways of
takin:;J the soope of necessity in a conditional. The oocurrence of
the word ''necessarily" in a conditional may signal the necessity of
the oonnection between the antecedent and the consequent of that
conditional, that is to say, the necessity of the oonseguence. or
'nec:essaril'Y'' may indicate the necessity of the oonseguent of the
oonditional. 42

1

Usin;J 'N' as 'necessarily',

A

q)

(if p, then

Nq)

of the

can represent

this distinction

= the necessity of the oonseguence.

= the necessity of

proper understanding

necessity
42

N(if p, then

we

oonsequenoe

the

oonseguent.

of forekncwlecge would reveal
awlies

mt the necessity

that the

of the

Kenneth Konyndyk, Introducto:cy
Modal Ipgic
(Notre
University of Notre Dame Press, 1986),

Dame, Ind.:
p. 21.
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as:

oonsequent does not. 0nly if,
applied,

however, the necessity

would the event itself

indifference
~

be necessary

and the free&ID. of

the event be eliminated.

ooncernilq

of the consequent

points out, foreknawlEd;Je is similar

In this

respect,

to IDEIIK>ry
knowledge.

JUst as you awly no ocapllsion to past events by baviIXJthem
in your JDEm:>ry,so God by his foreknowledge does not use OCllpl].sion
in the case of future events. Just as you renenbP:r your past
actions,
tllou;Jb all that you .ranen,J,P..r were not actions of your own,
so God bas foreknowledge of all f's own actions,
but is not the
agent of all that be foreknows. 4
Au:;1UStineconcludes that God is not the cause of the movement of
the

will of a bl.mm being even t.bal.¥pl God foreknows that the person's

will will so move. The person birnself is the agent and cause of his own
will's
Each

turning.

In this

way,

God

is not to be blamed for the evil will.

person is culpable for his or her own turning of will fran the

highest

good to sane lesser

goods.

It is important to observe what it is that Al.l:;1UStineis attem;>ting
to demonstrate. He is not arguing for a reconciliation

foreknowledge and

a causal necessity
arguing
does

human

freedan in which divine

and yet the will is still

that divine

of divine

foreknowledge prodllCeS

free.

Rather,

he is

foreknowledge, even tllou;Jb it is never mistaken,

not cause the will to choose one way or another. The will is free

fran causal necessity

in the sense that Craig observes:

"Rather,

bave seen that in books one, two, and three Au:;1UStineaweared to
affi.m
43

a view of the will which entailed
De

lib arb.,

III,

iv, 11.
64

the liberty

of

we

1144

indifference.

in a brief section,

Augustine,

obligation

to the fact of lnmm freedan.

because he bas

held guilty.

received free will and sufficient
a fact of mral

experience,

have been given free will

''No man is

that which the individual

<l:>ligation arises

power. 1145 since obligation

sufficient

and

guilty
does

not

if he bas

it is reasonable to believe

Guilt canes to the individual

absence of real

Be writes,

not received this or that power. But because he

do as he ou;ht he is justly

be

next m:gues fran the notion of

seems to
that people

power to do what is right.

only if the individual

fails

could choose. There is no real

to choose

guilt

in the

freedan of will.

Another way to approach this is to suppose that there were no free

Au;JUstine writes,

will.
given,

and

man bas been

11If

'~htness'

made

depends

upon what bas been

that be sins by necessity,

to sin. 1146 If, then, man is not sufficiently

then he ought

free to choose good over

man would be right to sin. All sin would cane fran his nature.

evil,
Perhaps

God

Au;JUstine is

could be blamed t:ut not man because man 1'ou;ht" to sin.

aweaJ.inIto

an intuition

that it seems unacceptable

say that one ou;ht to sin. If one rejects

to

that one ou;ht to sin,

Augustine wants to say that one must acknowleck;Jethat sin is by choice.

Evodius
discussion

44
45
46

awears again

in the dialogue at this point

and

on to another issue.

William lane Craig, The Problan of Divine
Foreknowledqe and Future contingents fran Aristotle
to suarez, p. 71.
De lib am., III, r.,, 45.
Ibid., III, r.,, 46.
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moves the

But I should like to know, if possible, why those beings do not sin
wban God knew beforehand would not sin, and why those others do sin
wban be foresaw would sin. I do not now think that God's
foreknawle&Je OC'IJl)Als
the one to sin and the other not to sin. But
if there were no cause rational creatures would not be divided into
classes as they are: those who never sin, those who oontirniaJ ly
sin, and the int:e:nnetti.ary class of those who sanetimes sin and
sanetimes are turned towards well-doing. What is the reason for
this division? I do not want you to reply that it is the will that
does it. What I want to know is what cause lies behind willing? 47

It may be the case, Augustine
for an infinite
Scriptural

points out, that Evodius is asking

rEqress of causes. Using the idea

by the

~ested

phrase, ''Avarice is the root of all evilS''

(I Tim 6:10)

Augustine presses Evodius 1 question.

But you ask what is the cause of this root. How then will it be the
root of all evils? If it bas a cause, that cause will be the root
of evil. And if you find a cause, as I said, you will ask for a
cause of that cause, and there will be no limit to your
·
·
inquiry.

48

But what cause of willing can there be prior to willirq?
it is a will, in which case we have not got beyond the root
of evil will. or it is not a will, and in that case there is no sin
in it. Either, then, will itself is the first cause of sin, or the
first cause is without sin. 49

Either

Augustine
There

is here arguinJ that the evil will is its

is no prior cause which

makes

the will choose evil.

own

If

cause.
~

forces the will to choose sin, it is not a vollmtary choice and,
therefore,

it is not sin. This view of the cause of the evil will is a

case of agent causation.
respect

The person

biJDsP.lf is an uncaused cause with

to the choice. He is not CC'llpl'-lledeither

the cause of the choice when be chooses.
47
48
49

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

III,
III,
III,

xvii,
:xvii,

xvii,

47.
48.
49.
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way and be

beo:JDes

Robert

Brown argues at length

that this

first

evil will must be

iD<Xl"{)~ible:

Here he asserts that an evil will bas no efficient
cause, or no
11essential
11 cause.
The evil will stands as efficient
cause of an
evil deed, but this will itself bas no efficient
cause. If the
first instance of evil willing did have an efficient
cause, that
cause could only be the nature of the willing being itself.
it has a
(Excluded fran the outset are the other two possibilities:
prior evil will as its cause; G:,c, biJD!3Al.fcauses the evil will.) If
the first
being that willed evil bad a created nature that was
good, its willing evil is an ~licable
fact which cannot be
acoomited for by its nature. 5
Brown, s main concern in his paper

Au;JUStinetries
Brown,

to make this

nanents

causation.

11 •

5 1 Brown himself

Rather,

or a 1'transcenden+-.al

human soul

explanation.

fall",

to a necessary

evil will

52

accept agent

fall,

is inoarprehensible

is the agent and cause of the will.

as in Irenaeus,

simply because

There is no further

52

that it is outside

choose good. This leads

51

one of his

as in :Kant. Au;JUStine, however, is here

Au;JUStine then discusses sane scriptural

50

According to

evil will explicable.

will not ultimately

he looks either

that the first

asserting

indicate

in which

Au;JUStine1 s admission of ignorance in this passage is

•'better

the

first

is with passages

the

passages which seem to

soope of a human being's

to a discussion

about the results

power to

of the fall

First Evil Will MUst be
IDoanprehensible: A critique of Au;JUStine, 11
Journal
of the ~can
Academy of Religion Vol. 46
p. 319.
Robert F. Brown,

Ibid.,

1"1'he

p. 326.

For a contemporary defense of a similiar position,
see Roderick Chisolm's paper, 11HnrnanFreedcm and the
self''
in Free Will Gary Watson ed.
(OXford: OXford
university Press, 1982), pp. 24-35.
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of man.

were a description
of man's nature and not of the penalty
his situation
W0Uld not be sinful.
If man has not departed
natural state in which he was created, and which could not
better, he is doing what he cu;Jht even if he does evil. But
DOW man might be good if he were different.
Because be is what he
DOW is,
he is not good, nor is it in his power to becxlDe good,
either bec,anse he does not see what he cu;Jbt to be, or, seeinJ it,
bas not the power to be ~j he sees he Ol.l;1ht to be. Wbo can doubt
that his is a penal state?

If this
of sin,
f:ran the
be made

state

The penal

these two penal

lost

also lost

conditions,

ignorance

writes,

as he was created.
speak of the

They

freedan

does not appeal

are the penalty

53
54
55

and

of man

When we

we are speaking of the

that

the effects

to choose one way rather

is no l01¥Jer in his natural

•'he is not good,

De lib
Ibid.,
Ibid.

of right

state.

of the soul which
than another.

xviii,
52.

51.

· 68

Man,

Of man AD;1UStine writes

nor is it in his power to becxlDe good."

arb., III,
III, xviii,

choosing,

of Mam 1 s sin go deeper

to fom habits

disposition

strong inclinations
sin,

of the difficulty

as he did in Acta contra Fortunatum

he implies

than merely an inherited

that

ignorance

of man as oondemned.

to do right,

discussion

to habit,

Manichaeum. Instead

after

Of this

wherein man was createc1.n 55

Au3UStine, in this

include

it.

0C1Dplete1y, even

do not bel.01¥J to the nature

"these

of the will

0C1Dpletely, and he bas

which is right,

that

soul

1154 Each sinful

and difficulty.

choose to try to perfom

difficulty~

of which he was

there are for every sinful

fact

to perfom

the ability

that

to know what is right,

the ability

if he should

freedan

man bas lost

to make good use. "In

miwilling

man bas

is that

In other

words, to sane degree,

man's original

nature

bas been lost

because

of

.Mam's sin.
.Mam was free

originally,

There was no ocmpul.sion either

wrongly.
the ability

to live rightly

was corrupted

right

to choose to live

and be lacked

or to live

way. CllC8 be sinned,

in his own~the

rightly

.Mam lost

His original

disoerment

to understand

as well as the power to do what small part

nature

what was

of the right

be oauld

recognize.
This is a stronger

fran sin than that which we observed

results
I.

view of the hinderance

This is still

be insists

that

not Au;Ustine's
guilt

also bolds that

it is still

to God in order

to receive

grace.

As

Au;Ustine

turning

arbitrio
on this.

of Mam's

the power of the

individual

divine aid to overoane this penalty
without the prior

on both of these points.

~ed

God's prior

as a result

see in the next chapter,

we shall

and even the

to God to receive

after

sin.

Book
Bare,

He

to turn
of sin.
of His

intervention

his beooming bishop,

Guilt was seen as inherited

help was impossible

without

grace.

Au;Ustine,

once be distinguished

ln;a:oanity was created
seeks to defend the

admits,

within

to God is possible

The turning

in De libero

most developed position

is not inherited

which

of the will

object

between the

freedan

with which

fran the freedan with which it now finds
doctrine

of the inherited

penalty

of sin.

itself,

sane,

be

to this.

:tf .Mam and Eve sinned,
what have we miserable creatures
done to deserve to be born in the darlmess of ignorance and in the
toils of difficulty,
that, in the first plaoe, we should err not
~ what we ou:Jht to do, and, in the second plaoe,
when the
precepts of justice begin to be q>ened out to us, we should wish to
They say:

69

obey

~fl

but by sane necessity

of carnal lust should not bave the

power?

Augustine's

first

response is a rather

quiet and stop mumur~
point,

abusive

ad bani.nan, ''Keep

against God.1157 Secondly, and 100re to the

he a[t)8a.ls to the fact that each person sins even in relation

to

the capacity with which he or she was born.

You are not held guilty because you are ignorant in spite of
yourself, but because you neglect to seek the knowledge you do not
possess. You are not held guilty because you do not use your
wounded membe,:-sbut because you despise
hlm who is will~
to heal
them. These are your own personal sins. 58

It is not the sin which one involuntarily

inherits

that is the

source of guilt and punisllnent, but, Augustine is arguing,
personal sin of the individual

which merits guilt and pmisbnent.

personal sins are voluntary and not
capacity to understand
penal effects

it is the

due to

Mam at all.

These

Even if one's

or choose right is inpaired by the inherited

of Mam's sin, one still

chooses to ignore the capacity one bas

voluntarily
:been

sins

when

one

given and deliberately

lives below one's possibilities.
Even tllc>u;Jh lnnan freedan
is still

ability

true,

acoo~

is,

to sane degree,

56

57
58

in the Fall,

to turn and receive

divine aid for overcxning this

loss. This

which will be placed

on the

of God's grace in sane of AugUstine's subsequent works. Be
Ibid.,

III,

it

to AugUstine, that Mam's ciescend,mts bave the

is a foreshadowing of the great anpbasis

necessity

lost

xix, 53.

Ibid.
Ibid.
70

writes:

But if any of Maln's race should be willing to turn to God, and so
overoane the punisllnent which had been merited by the original
turniD;J away fran God, it was fitting not only that he should not
be hindered but that he should also receive divine aid. In this way
also the creator showed bow easily man might have retained,
if he
his
had so willed, the nature with which he was created, bec:a~
offspring had power to tr.msamd that in which he was born. 9
It is important to observe that in this passage, ~ine
that the divine aid canes after
While it is true that

we need

ignorance and difficulty,
who

are willing

a person is willing

to turn to God.

divine aid to overoane that pmjsbnent

of

it seems that this divine aid canes to those

to turn to God. AugUstine does not say, at this

that God gives aid in order to enable sane to be willirq
God. Rather,

:inplies

beirq or beoaning willing to turn,

point,

to turn to

seems to be prior to

God's intervention.
Even thou;lh man inherits

ignorance and difficulty

as a result

.Mani's sin, man bas been given great advantages, even after
It is possible
and

trarquility

for the individual

soul to advance "towards

1.mtil it reaches the perfection

Since this advance is possible,

after

the

fall,

the

of

fall.

knowledge

of the happy life. 1160
it is just to bold as

culpable those who choose not to advance.

If by its own will it neglects to advance by means of good studies
piety- for the capacity to do so is not denied to it- it justly
falls into a still graver state of ignorance and SUUNle, which is
now penal, and is ranked aioong inferior creatures acoording to the
awropriate and fitting government of the lmiverse. Natural
ignorance and natural impotence are not reckoned to the soul as
guilt. The guilt arises because it does not eagerly pursue
and

-------Ibid.,
59

60

Ibid.,

III,
III,

xx, 55.
xxii, 64.
71

knowledge, and does not fil:ve adequate
facility
in doing right. 1
It is the individual's

own

attention

unwillmJDeSS to use the abilities

which he bas been given and to purposefully

guilt.

brings

~,

is inherited.

to acquiring

grow towards

AugUstine is denying that the guilt

that

wjsdan

of Mam's sin

the penalty is passed on.

Qlly

Assessment

~t

this

than previously,

period, Au;;JUStineaclmowledges, m:>re explicitly

the reality

concernsabout

of moral 8tru:1gle.

the

nature of this 8tru:1gle and its relevance to the freedan of the will
take up a central
In ~

freely

place in these writings.

oontra Fortunatum Manichaeum, the will is pictured
in an experience of

choosing sane option which may result
The attraction

pleasure.

as

of this pleasure may entice the will to fOJ:ma

habit of choosin;J in such a way that the pleasure

is repeated.

This

habit am beoane so stronq that the will may be unable to conquer it.
Before this
option.

habit is famed,

It is only after

the will is free to choose or refuse

choice is made that the pleasure

habit which may beoane bindinq on the will.
fo:m habits

way that is inherited

In De

Mam himself

libero arbitrio
was oorrupted

III,

produces the

It is the disposition

to

fran Mam. GUilt and m:>ral

are not mentioned as beinq directly

difficulty

61

in this

the

inherited.

AugUstine is holding that the nature of

when he sinned.

Ibid.
72

This

corruption

resulted

in

the

inability

bit which is rightly

acoanplish that little
is inherited
introduced

by all

evil.

and

a total

Ea.ch

manner, or to

chosen. This corrupt nature

of the descendants of Mam.

distinction

the

Mam was created
Adam had

in a consistent

to choose rightly,

As

a result,

Au:JUStine

freedan of the will with which

between the

that which all subsequent generations

freedan of indifference.

experience.

He oould choose to be good or

of his descendents have a limited freedan of indifference.

The choice is available

to be evil or to turn for divine aid in order

to be good. Whether the person turns for this help or not is within the
power of the person's

of a person's

will.

This is so even if it is not in the power

will to live rightly

In both of these

independently of divine aid.

works Au;Justine

seems to be sbifti.D;J his position

on the freedan of the will towards a OClli)a.tibilist one. certainly,
there is a recognition
the

ability

that outside factors have a great influence

of the will to choose rightly.

texts will reveal,

"voluntary''

however,

that he still

A careful

iruxrnpatibilist

position

CXl1'pll'ison of the

bolds that ''necessary''

are of contrary mea,ninJ. Au;JUStine still

on

and

bolds the

in that the voluntary nature of the choice

implies that the will oould have chosen each of the two options wit.bout
a change in antecedent conditions.
This beoaDes clear when it is reme,nl:)Ared
that,

of di vine foreknowledge and
show ''bow

human

freedan, Au;JUStine was attenpti.D;J to

it can be possible that these

contradictory

and

all future events,

two propositions

i'10Cl1'piltible, namely that
and that

we

in the diSC11Ssion

God

sin voluntarily
73

are not

has foreknowledge of

and

not

by

necessity.

1162

craig's

analysis of this is helpful:

an the oanpatibilist
view, Au;Justine has to reject the seoond as
false, for we do indeed sin voluntarily and by necessity. But the
whole intention of Au;Justine is to shaw that both propositions

are

true.63

Augustine's
necessity.

In his

assertion

is that

we

sin voluntarily

view, these are clearly

and

contrary to one another.

fact that be takes so many pages to daoonstrate

claim that be is boldm;J the incmpltibilist

position.

contra Fortuna.tum Manichaeum, Augustine argues that there

is no sin where there is oanpul.sion. He writes,

nature to do~,
1164 In

which eliminates

nature of a sinful choice is all the mre support for the

the voluntary

will.

The

that divine

foreknowledge does not introduce the kind of necessity

In Acta

not by

this

does

''be

not sin. But be who sins,

same passage, be equates a person's

will with sinning "of his
These are contrasted

own

who is oa:ipelled by
sins by free
sinning

by free

will" and also with sinning voll.mtarily.

with :being oai;,elled by nature.

If it is our

nature that produces sin, it is not our will and the sin is not
voluntary,
habit,

it is necessary.

Even when the moral

the person became bo1md voluntarily

and

agent is

bound by

can turn voluntarily

receive the di vine aid and :be freed.

62

63

64

Ibid., III, iii, 6.
William Iane craig, The ProblElll of Divine
Foreknowledge and Future contingents fran Aristotle
to suarez, p. 71.
C

Fort.,

17.
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to

Dur~

period,

this

fran his ordination

advancanent to the rank of bishop, ~ine'
the

will was in transition.

First,

it is still

it be voluntary.

to be made.

There are four observations

This is understood

to his

s view of the freedan of

considered part of the essential

oanpulsion or necessity.
option,

to the priesthood

as be~

nature of sin that

in contrast

unless the will could have

with

chosen

either

it is not a voluntary choice.

The second observation

is that sin is still

located in the

disordered will which chooses to prefer a lower good to the highest
good. The object which the soul prefers
Third,

~ine

moral struggle.

takes

is not, in itself,

a deeper and more realistic

He acknawledges that out of certain

habits of choice can arise which are difficult

evil.
look at the

choices of the will

or inpossible

to

overoane. Even within this period, his view of the depth of the
difficulty

inherited

fran Mam increased.

The fourth observation

is that divine aid is necessary in order

for the will to overoane its difficulties

and

turn to God. It seems

that AugUstine bolds that it is within the power of the soul to be
will~

to turn to God even if the actual turning

can only be

acx,anplished with divine aid. This aid canes to those who choose to be
will~

to turn to

will~

to turn to God, he or she will be able to turn. The ability

turn,

however,

God.

is fran

In this

way if the individual

God.

75

chooses to be

to

We shall

see in the next chapter

even the willin;ness
within the soul's

that ~ine

to turn to God is a gift

will bold that

fran God. It is not

power to be willin:1 unless God intervenes

the soul to be williDJ.

76

to enable

CJmPl'ER

IV

AUGUSTINE'S VIEW OF '!'HEFREEIXHOF '!'HEWILL
~

IN '!'HE~y

before Christmas in 395, when Valerius

It was shortly

Au:Justine bad already
of the blrden
this

been

USm;J his extraordinary

of the administration

praootion,

Valerius

gifts

to handle much

Within a year of

of the church.

had died and AUgUstine became the

in Hi.J;p). He served in this

bishop

elevated

to that of coadjutor-bishop.

fran the rank of priest

Augustine

OF HIS EP~

ruling

for the ranaiJ>der of his

capacity

life.
As we noted earlier,

controversies
these

with Manichaeans and Donatists.

sects with

Augustine's

1 the church in Hippo was surrouMed

attention.

guaestionibls

bishop Simplician
portions

In addition,

1

he delivered

problems.

of

in response

46,

Of

many exegetical

special

ad Sipm1.icianum which ~tine

to questions

of scripture.

------see p.

MeetiD;J the challenge

sennons, debates and other works occupied much of

sennons and wrote on exegetical
diversis

by

aJ:x:Jve.

77

significance

is De

sent to the

oonoernm;J several

difficult

In these early years as bishop, Al¥11,lstinealso wrote what has
beoane

his most widely read work, the COnfessiones. He began in 397 and

0C1Dpletedit by 401. 2 This work can be considered an autobiography of
the

heart.

Au;JUstine is less concerned with events and achievements

than he is with the developnent of his interior

life.

The constant

thane of his confessiBJ is his heart and haw his motivations

shaped his

thought and life.
The COnfessiones is a rich mine fran which much can be quarried

regarding Augustine's
my study of this

life,

thought and concerns. I shall concentrate

period on Au;JUstine's view of the freedan of the will.

Fran both the COnfessiones and De diversis

quaestioni.bus ad

Aimplicianum we shall see a position on the freedan of the will which
represents

significant

developnents fran his earlier

views. These two

works are, in sane sense, 0C1Dplimentaryto one another.

As

Peter Brown

observes:

surprisiBJly enough, therefore, the austere answer to the
seoond Problan of the Various Problems for Rimplicianus is the
intellectual. charter of the confessions. For both books faced
squarely the central problan of the nature of h1mm motivation. In
both books, the will is now seen as dependent on a capacity for
"delight", and conscious actions as the result of a mysterious
alliance of intellect and feeliBJ: they are merely the final
outgrowth of hidden processes, the processes by which the ''heart"
is "stirred",
is "massaged and set" by the band of God~ 3 -

2
3

See Peter Brown, p. 184.
Peter Brown, p. 170.
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~tine's

view of the Freedan

De Diversis

Simplician was the

Quaestionibus M Sinp1.iciamn

man who

~

succeeded

397. 4 He bad made Au;1UStine's acquaintance

conversion

in 386. Simplician

had

which ~tine

contact.

(the

was readi~)

as bishop

in Milan in

before the latter's

influenced Au;1UStine greatly

encouraging him to read the Platonists
conversion of Victorinus

of the Will in

and by telling

translator

him of the

of the Platonist

• 5 over the years the

by both

writings

two maintained

Simplician bad read Au;1UStine's EKpositio quarundam

propositionum

ex &Jistola ad Rananos and requested

understanding

sane

of st. Paul's

difficult

too pleased to try to solve the perplexities
guaestionibus

this letter

texts.

further

~tine

help in
was only

and sent De diversis

ad Sinplici.anum with a cover letter,

probably in 397. In

he bmbly states:

As for the questions which you have condescended to oarm;u:X,me
to resolve, even if tllrou;Jh the dullness of my mind I did not
understand than, I might tllrou;Jh the assistance of your merits find
an answer to than. This only I ask, that on acoount of my weakness
you intercede with God for me, and that whatever writings of mine
oane into your sacred hands, whether on the topics to which you
have in a manner so kind and fatherly directed my attention,
or on
any others, you will not only take pains to read than, but also
accept the charge of reviewing and correcting than; for I
acknowledge the mistakes which I myself have made, as readily as
the gifts which God bas bestowed on me. 6
4

5
6

see the Introduction to To Sinplician - on Various
Questions in Al.¥;1µstine: Farlier Writi.J;ss ed. J. H.
S. Burleigh
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1953), p. 372. All citations of To Simplician
(hereafter M simp-) are to this translation.
see Conf., VIII, 2.
_g,., 37, 3.
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Book I oonsists of A1.¥JUstine's treatment of two questions.
first

is ooncerni.n;J the text of ~n.q

9:10-29. It is Augustine's
so vital

7:7-25. The second is on Ranans

exposition of this

second question which is

in seein1 the developnent of his views. This is the same

passage on which he wrote just two years earlier
diversis

quaestionil:lus LXXXIII.7

this second question sane thirty
solution

of this

choice of the
in this
human

The

question,

human

will;

in QUestion 68 of De

Iookin1back

over his treatment

years later,

Augustine writes,

of
"In

the

I, indeed, labored in defense of the free
mt the grace of

section that Augustine elaborates

God

001XIll9red
••• •,.S It is

a view of the efficacy

of

choice which is, acoordin1 to sane cxmnentators, his mature

view. 9
Augustine looks into this
the

section of scripture

oontext. He wishes to understand this

of the author's

particular

purpose for the whole book. Of this

by first

oonsultin1

passage in light

purpose, Augustine

writes:

It is that no man should glory in meritorious works, in which the
Israelites
dared to glory, alleging that they bad served the law
that bad been given to them, and that for that reason they had
received evcm;,elical grace as due to their merits. so they were
unwillin1 that the same grace should :be given to the Gentiles, as
if they are unworthy of it unless they undertook to observe the
Jewish sacred rites. 10
7

8
9

10

For the date of 394-395 for the questions on st.
Paul, in De diversis quaestionil:lus LXXXIII CXllleS
fran David Mosher's Introduction to his translation
of this work.
Retr., II, 27.
See Poralie,
pp. 182-184 and Gilson, pp. 159,160
and Vernon BoUrke, Augustine's Quest of Wisdan
(Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishin1 0:IJFnY, 1945),
p. 146.
M ~inp.,

I, Q. 2, 2.
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Paul's purpose in the book of Ranans, then, is to demonstrate that
no person can boast in his or her own works as if they can win God's

awrovaJ..This
Grace

light on Paul's meaning in the passage at band.

sheds

meritorious

and

Augustine writes,

works cannot ooex:ist. They are q:,posites.

''The

Jews did not understand

just because of its very nature,

that evangelical

is not given as a due reward for good

grace is not grace." 11

works. otherwise

concern is not to eliminate or to belittle

Augustine's

He wishes to anphasize the nature of grace. Specifically,
by definition,

grace,

works.

good

that grace,

precedes works. ''No man is to think that be has received

grace because be has done good works. Rather, be bad not done good
works unless be bad received grace through faith.
gracious work of

God

''And good works, if

follow and do not precede that grace,
Augustine claims that,
given proof that grace

even born,

does

of the election
God

the

as has been said.

are any,

1113

precede works. This is the point of Paul's
of Jacob over Esau. Before these twins were

line,

Messiah of Israel.

there

in the passage fran Ranana 9, we have been

chose the ~er,

God. It would be Jacob's

forth

It takes a

in order for an individual to perfoxm anything

that is good. Augustine writes,

explanation

1112

Jacob, to be beir
rather

than

of the pranises

of

Esau's which would bring

It is an important fact that this choice

of God happened before either Jacob or Esau were born. Augustine cites
the

Scripture,

nothing either
11
12
13

"'For
good

the

children being not yet born

or evil,

and having

done

not of works but of him that calleth,

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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it

the elder shall serve the younger. "' 14 since

was said unto her,

choice

occurred

God's selection

before birth,

neither

by their

works. Au;Ustine writes of this

''Grace is therefore

good

of him who calls,

of him who receives grace.
produced

Jaoob nor

Good

and

Esau oould have merited

the oonsequent good works are

works do not procluoe grace bit

then

investigates

the JDealUBJ
of the verse,

purpose of God acoording to election might stand."
questions about this verse.

several

just,

text,

are

by grace."15

Au;JUstine

raises

the

(Ranans

First,

''Haw

indeed, bow can there be any kind of election,

'"l'bat

the

9:11)

He

can election

where there is no

difference? 1116 If there is, as yet, no difference

in works or in

faith or in merit between

there

between than,

Jaoob and

Esau, what is

so that God should choose the one

and

be

to dist~

not the other?

There is nothing.
AugUstine next asks,
kind of election

could

''But bow oould there be election,

or what

there be, if there was no distinction

of merits

because they were not yet born and had done nothing? 1117 Perhaps,

reasons,
rejects

election
this,

after

Esau were twins.
circumstances
produced

is based upon sane distinction

As

in their

natures.

14

a result,

surrounding

sane difference

there

was

no difference

their oonoeption or birth

in their natures.

in

15
16
17

I,

9:11,

12.

Ibid.
Ibid.,
Ibid.

Q. 2,

3.

the

Au;Ustine especially

Augustine is quoting 'Ranans

I, Q. 2, 4.
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and

that oould have

of astrology.
Ibid.,

He

oonsidering it, because of the fact that Jaoob

out that the case of twins is an important counter example to
clajm,g

be

points
the

Au:iustine next considers
and

rejection

Jacob's

of Esau oauld have been

based

faith and Esau's future

lack

future

'acoordi.rq to election'
and

or not God's election

whether

because

of Jaoob

on Bis foreknawlecge of
of faith.

1

'0oUld it be

foreknowlecge of all thin;JS,

God bas

foresaw the faith that was to be in Jacob even before he was

born? 1118 Augustine

rejects

this also. Bis aJ:'glDellt is that there is

little

if any,

between

difference,

foreknowing his works. Neither
been in existence

this text,

when

is~

God foreknowing Jacob's

Jacob's

good

cannot

preceded the lives,

and

be based

the

time of Jacob's

of Jacob's
election.

or evil prior to birth,

good

before

therefore,

the works of those
was based on

faith which was equally non-existent
Ju.st as

be

Jacob

bad done

in

at

nothing either

oauld not have believed anythin"J

God had chosen him.

It is significant
based

works had

on works sinply

involved, he cannot at the same time bold that election
God's foreknowl~e

and

Jacob was chosen to rule over Esau. If Paul,
that election

because election

faith nor his

faith

on foreknc:lwl~e,

that Augustine
because

rejects

the view

that election

this is the very view be expounded on

this verse in his Expositio guanmdam propositiom:m ex Epistola
Rananos and

his De diversis

is

guaestionil:us

LXXXIII in 394-395.

ad
However,

at the present time, Au:JUStine
writes:

The apostle,

therefore, did not want us to understand that it was
of God's foreknc:lwl~e that the yc>lll'ger was elected to be
served by the elder •••• It was not of works, because being not yet
born they had done no works. But neither was it of faith, ~use
they had not faith either.
What, then, was the reason for it? 9

because

18

19

Ibid.,

I, Q. 2, 5.

Ibid.
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~

turns again to the text but with a slightly

reading

in order to try to shed light

to

a distinction

make

here.

Perhaps

on its meaning.

than

we

are

1

That

might stand,,

with what

with what follows. 1-2° In this case the sentence

should not be read as,

1"l'he

elder shall

God1 s pw:pose according to election

that inplies

'P0ssibly

1

we should connect the words,

the pw:pose of God according to election

precedes rather

different

that there is sane~

selection

aver the elder.

they were

not yet born

serve the younger in order that

might stand."

This is the reading

in the younger that merited his

Rather the sentence should be read as, ''When

and bad

done neither

purpose of God according to election

good nor evil,

that the

might stand ••• 11 ~tine

writes

that this means:

There oould be no election on acoount of good works, according to
which the pw:pose of God might stand. So ''not of works but of him
that calleth, 11 that is, of God who justifies
the ungodly by grace
calling him to faith, 11it was said to her, the elder shall serve
the younger." So that the pw:pose of God does not stand accordHlg
to election, but election is the result of the pw:pose of God. 21
The fact that the elder was going to serve the younger was decided
by God

evil.

before either

was born and bad

God according to election

election

20

21

good or

:rt is this prior choice of God, which is not according to

anything but God's own call,

and

done anything either

that is so in order that "the pw:pose of

might stand."

God's pw:pose ~rding

to

is for him to call indivicJual.s purely by his own free choice

undeserved favor without regard to their
Ibid.,
Ibid.

:I,

Q. 2, 6.
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merit or faith.

This

oanpletely

out any boasting.

rules

works tut of him that

calleth,'

~

not by election

In light

Au:]Ustine asks,

whether

the merits

whether,

in fact,

that

faith

election

•'Whether

it is

of God, so that

So grace

of God who called

faith

merits

a man's justification,

is to be JllDbered amo?q the gifts

itself

concludes

that

canes before

faith

itself

is a gift

and to receive

all merits.

1

of

of grace.
no one can

power to do

-24 Au:JUStine's
is that

it was entirely

Jacob and not in any way of Jacob's

works or faith.

Jacob's

Au:]Ustine next turns

election,

''Haw oould he have merited

since

these thiD:;Js were spoken before

this

done au;Jht of good or evil?•-2 5 Esau's
God bad foreknown his evil
Al¥]UStine notes,

served by his elder

then,

to the rejection

his attention

asks,

brother

•'he

by evil

he

of his own doin:;J,

was bom, and before he bad

rejection

deeds

deeds

of Esau. He

oould not have been

or his lack of faith.

must also have predestined

because he foreknew his future

Jacob to be
good

works.,-2 6
Au;1UStine asks,
22
23
24
25
26

no

upon God's own

is based purely

and so begin to be justified

oonoerning

otherwise,

that

the mercy of God in callin:;J precedes,

therefore,

even believe,

because

Not of

do not precede the mercy of God; or

of faith

grace.,-2 3 He quickly

oonclusion

tut by tbe free gift

merits,

of the fact

choice,

good works.

to \DXlerstand

be wants us

1

in his good works.,-2 2

man may exult

•'Unless,

when be says,

•'BUt bere,

Ibid.
Ibid.,
Ibid.
Ibid.,
Ibid.

then,

"[H]ow did Esau deserve

I, Q. 2, 7.
I, Q. 2, 8.
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to be hated before

he was born?•-2 7 It

that

bate bit

He would

in the passage

Paul,

we

God forbid ••• For be saith

have mercy, and I will

not merit

Esau did

anticipates

these kinds of questions

in Esau's

show a::mpassion on wban I will

on this,

difficulty

n,nai:ns,

have OClllpaSSion.11

"If God will

have mercy on

which is,

show

why did his mercy

case? 1-28

The mercy of God is so canplete

as to produce faith

in whanever it is on wban God bestows it.

justification

with God?

to Moses, I will have mercy on wban I will

have mercy and show oc:q>aSSion to wban be will

0C1DpaSsion, our chief

either

answer. Augustine notes that

say, then? Is there unrighteousness

Augustine oaunents

wban be will

fail

God would make an.ythiD;J

it bas been shown that

of scripture,

by asJti.D;J •'What shall

(:Rananq 9:15)

that

There must be sane other

or love.

hatred

seems iooonceivable

sufficient

for

Augustine

writes:

If anyone boasts that he bas merited CXIJJ[)"Ssionby his faith,
let
him know that God gave him faith. God shows OCIJp!SSion by inspiring
faith in one on wban be bad OC'll'p'ISSionin~~
to one who was
still
an unbeliever a share in his callm;.
remains as to why Esau did not receive

The question
would

have produced the faith

considers
receive

If,

was unwillm;,
In this
27
28

29

case,
Ibid.
Ibid.,
Ibid.

in him. Augustine

or not the answer could be that

whether

it.

and good works

however, Esau did not receive
Jacob

faith

must have received

would not be a gitt

I, Q. 2, 9.

86

the mercy that

Esau

was unwilliD;

God's mercy because he

mercy because

of God bit

be was williD;.

a reward for right

to

williD;Jness.

considers,

Perhaps,~

mercy is also a gift

the willi~s

to receive

fran God.

or can no one believe unless

or will unless be is called,
him also gives him
faith? For no one can believe gniess be is called, altho\.r;Jh none
can believe against bis will. 3
be

wills,

and can no one be called unless God by calling

It must be observed that a person's
implies,

is never against

with the will.

the person's

will.

~

As we

here

It is always in accordance

This is important in that~

person is free in bis or her believing
to believe.

believing,

will insist

that the

even tho\.r;JhGod gives the will

shall see, be is beginning to use "free''

''Voluntary" in a sense which does not necessarily

and

illply the freedc:m of

indifference.
If willin;ness

to receive God's mercy is itself

mercy, the question still
mercy. Be was rejected
mercy necessary

and

part

of God's

stands as to why Esau was not given this
yet, it seems, God could

to be willing

to receive

and

have given him the

to have faith.

But Esau was not yet born and consequently could be neither willing
nor miwilling in all these matters. Why was be rejected
while be
was still in the wanb? We cane back to that difficulty,
troubled
of the question but also by our own
not only by the ~ty
1
abundant repetition.

Au;JUstine

willeth,
9:16)

30
31

looks at the sentence,

''Therefore it is not of him that

nor of him that runneth, but of God that bath mercy''

and he relates

Ibid.,
Ibid.

it to Philiwians

I, Q. 2, 10.
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2:12,13

where

(Ran.ans

Paul writes,

•'Work

out your own salvation

with fear and tranbling;

worketh in you both to will

Al¥;JUstinewrites,

1"l'bere

and

is God which

for it

to do his good pleasure."

be clearly

shows that

Of these

the good will

itself

is

w:rou;iht in us by the worltinJ of God. 1132 Be explains:

Clearly it is vain for us to will unless God have mercy. But I do
not know bow it could be said that it is vain for God to have mercy
consent. If God bas mercy, we also will, for
unless we willingly
the power to will is given with the mercy itself.
It is God that
If we
worketh in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure.
ask whether
a good will is a gift of God, I should be SU1'prised if
anyone would venture to deny that. But because the good will does
not precede the calling,
rut calling precedes the good will, the
fact that we have a good will is rightly attributed
to God who
calls us, and the fact that we are called cannot be attributed to
ourselves.
so the sentence, 11It is not of him that willeth, nor of
him that nmneth, rut of God that bath mercy'' cannot be taken to
mean simply that we cannot attain what we wish without the
of
God, blt rather that without his calling we cannot even will. 3

aig

The act of willing
The ability

to that

individual.

The efficacy

is in no way dependent

receive

it or to will

willing,

is included

individual

precedes

individual's

will

it.

upon that

and is necessary

individual's
the willing

This dependence of a person's

williIX1ness
itself,

to

any good

for that
will

upon God,

is not merely a dependenoe upon God in order

It is impossible

Ibid.,

of mercy

of mercy to an

and sufficient

I, Q. 2, 12.

Ibid.
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to have

It is a dependence for the very

to will rightly

calling.
32
33

of the mercy of God.

of mercy. God's choice of an

power to aCCX"ITlish what is willed.
itself.

a result

of God's gift

This is because

in the gift

good will.

Al¥;JUstine claims,

then,

to will is dependent upon God's gift

of a person

individual

the

is itself,

without

God's mercy and

This is a very different

view of the will's

than Au';JUStinedefended in De libero arbitrio

that the will to turn to God seems to
individual

III. 34 There we saw

within the power of the

be

prior to God's intervention.

dependence upon God

The view, here, that the will

to turn to God is not in the power of the individual
intervention

without God's

is what we have called the 0a1p1t:ibilist

view of the

freedan of the will.
Au';JUStineintroduces a distinction
God and a non-effectual.

call.

the

they

If there is no distinction

power of sane individuals,

if not all,

will respond to God's call.

writes,

"it oould

be

said correctly

is not sufficient

called follows.

1135

''Many are called

between

calls,

the

tut few

then it is in

to choose whether or not

If this were the case, Au';JUStine

mercy, tut of the man who willeth

that calleth

call of

This is to take into consideration

text in Matthew 20:16 in which it is written,

are chosen."

an effectual

between

that it is not of God who bath
and

nmneth,

for the mercy of him

unless the obedience of him who is

Since this view

bas already

Au';JUStineconcludes that there must

been

be two types

rejected,

of calling.

Many, that is to say, are called in one way, tut all are not
.affected in the same way; and those only follow the calling who are
found fit to receive it •••• For God calls in the way that is suited
to those who follow his callin;J. The call canes also to others; tut
because it is such that they cannot be m::,ved by it and are not
fitted to receive it, they can be said to be called tut not chosen.
And again it 'WOU.l.d
not be true that it is not of God who bath mercy
tut of man who willeth and nmneth. For the effectiveness of God's
mercy cannot be in the power of man to frustrate,
if be will have
none of it. If God wills to have mercy on men, be can call than in
a way that is suited to than, so that they will be moved to

34
35

See pp. 69, 70 above.
M Sipp-, I, Q. 2, 13.
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lmderstand and to follow. 36
God's mercy, then,

is not extended to all who are called.

extended only to those who are chosen.

In this

It is

way it can be true that

''God bas mercy on no man in vain. 1137 Au;JUStine continues:

Those are chosen who are effectually called. Those who are not
effectually
called and clo not obey their calling are not chosen,
for althou3'h they were called they did not follow •••• For, althcu;Jh
he calls many, he bas mercy on those whan he calls in a way suited
to than so that they may follow. But it is false to say that "it is
not of God who ha.th mercy l::ut of man who willeth and runneth,"
because God bas mercy on no man in vain. He calls the man on whan
he bas mercy in~
way he knows will suit him, so that he will not
refuse the call. 8

between an effectual

This distinction
raises

several

and a non-effectual

call

important issues and is the basis upon which lnmm

freedan is preserved in light of what seems to be the irresistil:>le
mercy of God. I shall

make several

observations.

First,

it is to be

rEIDEIJJ}:)Ared
that God's call is not based upon a foreknowledge of the
individual's
to the will

response.

as we have seen, bolds God's call bostage

This,

of man. God does,

respond if a certain

however,

know haw an individual

call is given, and, presumably, haw he would

respond if a different

call is given.

second, it seems that this

knowledge is the means by which God

chooses which type of call to send to individuals.
constitute
call
36
37
38

would

an effectual

He knows what would

call and what would constitute

for every individual.

He bestows

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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an effectual

a non-effectual.

call on those on

whan He chooses to have mercy and He bestows a non-effectual.

call on

those on whan He chooses to withhold mercy.
it is by a voll.mtary choice of the will,

Third,

responds to God's effectual
emphasizes this.
than

so that

call.

God calls

they

the

that an individual

Twice in the cited passage Au;Justine

chosen individual

"in a way suited

may follow." ltgain, A1¥;JUStine writes,

"He calls

to
the

man on whan he has mercy in a way he knows will suit him, so that he
will not refuse the call."
man. He calls

God's call does not overoane the will of the

those whan He chooses in conjunction with their

so they ''may follow'' and so they ''will not refuse."

These phrases

that when a man is chosen, God chooses him bit he also

indicate

voll.mtarily

responds to the call.

It is not that God's choice is based

on His foreknowledge of the free choice, blt,
knowledge of which calling

would effectually

response which He wants. God sends this
those individuals
The sentence,
knows

willing

on God's

rather,

elicit

effectual

voll.mtary

the

calling

to precisely

He chooses.

''He calls

the

man on whan he has mercy in a way he

will suit him, so that he will not refuse the call,"

of the elements I have pointed out. First,

oanbines

all

God knows what call will

suit the man. In other words, He knows that the man would respond if a
certain

call is given and that he would not if another

seoond, it is this
type of call

result.
calls,

rather

Third,
the

individual

call

is given.

knowledge that is the l:lasis for God's 9eD(ling one
than another

in order to achieve His desired

since God knows haw the man would respond to different

call that He

sends

is suited to the

will freely respond. The effectual
91

individual
call elicits

and the

a voluntary

response l:lut it is the response that

God

It does not go aga;nst

wills.

of the individual. and it oould not go against

the will

AD;;JUStine'soverriding

ooncern in this

God's purpose.

is to show that

section

God's choice is not dependent on the lnmm will :but on His own choice

to bestow mercy. That he bas successfully

preserved

fact that God sends whichever calling

He wills

the

result

be

the

sending the

freely

effectually

is not up to that

questions

would be willing

certain
call.

individuals

justified?

''why was not Esau called

1140 What the

heart

39

Ibid.,

40

and leaves

in such a way that he

to obey? 1139 Al.¥JU9tinedenies that it was lll)OSSil>le

scripture

may refer

canes fran a divine penalty

I, Q. 2, 14.

Ibid.
92

''who would dare to

whereby even Esau might have

his mind and yoked his will to the faith

person's

effectually

In the oontext of the passage in

that God bas no method of calling

awlied

free response.

in a way He knows will be

for God to call him in this manner. He writes,
affinn

the

about why He would not call every person

others with a non-effectual
is,

even ~h

It is due to God's mercy in

sane individuals

and why He calls

"Ranans, the question

That any

individual.,

call that He knew would elicit

that God calls

raises

will not be effectual.

responds to the call.

effectual

The fact

effectual

knows

is chosen, then,

individual

in order to get the

If He chooses to not extend his mercy, he

effectual.

will send a call which He
individual

in

If He wishes to have mercy on a man, He sends a call

He chooses.

He knows will

is evident

this

in which Jaoob was

to as the hardening of a
for sin.

But if the obstinacy of the will can be such that the mind's
aversion fran all modes of calling becxoes bardened, the question
is whether that very hardening does not cane fran sane divine
penalty, as if God ahandons a man by not calling him in the way in
which be might be n:wed to faith. 1lbo would dare to affil:m thai the
0Dnipotent lacked a method of persuading even Esau to believe? 1
By this

that

of a person's

hardening

God makes a righteous

to no one. Rather,

a man is

call

that

justification.
that

by God

an undeserved

gift

might be tempted to raise

for the person to respond in

effectually,

that

this

this

of mercy is purely

gitt

the objections

to accept.

the apostle

himself

find fault?

It is true that whatever
over another

reason

buman society

of God proceeds

in which there

Ibid.
Ibid., I, Q. 2, 15.
Ibid. A1.¥;JU.stine is quo~

lnnaM
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raises,

it is

mercy fran

may be for His choice

is beyond the In.mm ability

A1.¥;JU.stine1 s argument for the justice

with ordinary

there

Anyone

For who

A1.¥;JUstineargues that

for God to have mercy on sane but to withhold

one individual

God is not

instances

In those

is difficult

his will? 1143 In response,

withstandeth

in that

This is not lmjust

say then lmto me, Why doth be still

'"l'bou wilt

the

of graoe.

A1.¥;JU.stine acknowlecges

not lmjust

chooses not to provide

is due the individual.

where God does choose to call

42
43

is inp,sed

anything

is necessary in order

that

anything

withholding

41

He acts lmjustly

hardening which God causes is an miwillingness

1142 God sil!ply

made better.

and receive

others.

not mean

a man is made worse, but only that be provicles nothing whereby

effectual
faith

person :t>eoane unrighteous.

We must not think

to be merciful.
whereby

''the

~ does

heart,

to understand.
fran a oarp'\rison

are many transactions,

9:19.

of

sane

of which consist
for expecting

justice.

a particular
~

with those who are debtors

with humanity.

individual.

bit

1

s debt,

or unjust

if tba creditor

band,

other

out that,

points

this

also does not

•'This decision

does not lie

with tba creditor.11 44

in h1mn society

This 0a1111cm ooourrenoe
deal~

en tba

pajlDSDt for a debt.

wishes to forgive
violate

No one is oonsicSered mirighteous

of debts.

~

is similar

to God's

writes:

all men are a mass of sin, since, as the apostle says, "In Adam
die'' (I oor. 15:22), and to Mam the entire h1mn race traces
hmanity must pay a debt
the origin of its sin against God. sinful
of punismnent to the supreme divine justice.
~ that debt is
exacted
or ranitted
there is no mirighteousness.

Now

all

'l'be critical

point

is that

God does not cause any person to sin.

Both the one who reoei ves mercy and the one who does not are

'l'be only difference

of the punisbnent.
debt

of the one and to exact the debt

different
art:>itrio

view of original

soul)

that

is inherited.

God chooses to ranit

of the other.

illplies

(or the disposition
Guilt,

that

in De libero

it is sanething m:>re

to fo:m certain

which merits

the

This is also a

sin than that which we observed

III. 46 Here, Augustine

than m:>ral difficulty

is that

~

divine

habits

punismnent,

of the
is also

passed dawn fran Mam to all of bis descendents.

To be sure, no one resists
bis will. Both be who is aided and
be who is left belong to the same mass of sin. Both deserve the
punismnent which is exacted fran the one and ranitted
to the
other •••• only let us hold fast with unshakable faith the fact that

there
exacts

44
45
46

is no unrighteousness
with God; so that, whether be ranits or
the debt, be cannot rightly
be chuged
with unrighteousness

Ibid.,

I, Q. 2, 16.

Ibid.

see pp.

68-70 above.
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fran wban be exacts it; and be wbo receives remission O\.¥]ht
not to glory in his own merits. 'l'be fozmer pays back nothing mt
what be owes, and the latter bas nothing that be bas not
reoeived. 47
by him

At this point,

~

are in Peening conflict
that God's election
not influenced

are actually

of Jaoob

by their

and

result

of

the

'l'be

his rejection

of

first

which

statanent

Esau was

faith

is

prior to and
(or lack of

This is cx:q,letely

between than.

a

free choice of God. Secxmdl.y, it is true that there is no

in God's choice. Electing one and rejecting

injustice
entirely

both true.

works (good or evil) , their

or any other distinction

faith),

that two statanents

bas ooncl.uded

another is

just.

The next

~t

of two Scripture

Ai.¥JUStineseeks to resolve consists

difficulty
verses.

made. 1148 The second

one reads,

is "Jacob

•"l'bau

batest nothing that

I loved, mt Esau I bated."

Thou bast

(Ranami

9:

13). Al.¥JUStine
claims that God does not bate Esau the man, wbo is a
creation

of God and is therefore

perversity

of

the good

not bate

''God does

men and sinners,
wills.

1149 In

good.

God bates

nature which God created.

Esau the

man, mt Esau

the

the

sin which is a

As

Au;JUStine writes,

sinner ••••

They

men as fashioned by God, sinners by their

are both

own

this way God does not bate anything Be bas made, Be only

bates the evil which is not a created thing at all.
As be

SllllDarlzes his explanation of

Au;JUStine returns

47
48

49

the

difficulties

in

RaDans

to the theme of the book, that is, that no one bas

M 8inp., I, Q. 2, 17.
Alt:ho\¥;JhA1.¥JUStine
refers to this as a Scripture
verse, I ooul.d not find the reference, even after
consultiD;1 two exhaustive ooncornances.
Ibid., I, Q. 2, 18.
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9,

roan for boa.stin:;J before God.
all

those who

have

been

understandiD;1 of grace,

He

justified

writes,

•'The

apostle,

therefore,

and have dem:mstrated for us the

have no other intention than to

shaw

that be

that glories should gloi:y in the I.ord.,.soA1J;1UStinethen asserts
of the iq;,lications

and

sane

of his inte%pretation for the notion of free will:

Free will is ioost important. It exists,

indeed. but of what value

is it in those who are sold under sin? ••• We are cxmnanded to live
righteously, and the reward is set before us that we shall merit to
live b.aWily for ever. But who can live righteously and do good
works lmless be has been justified by faith? We are cxmnanded to
believe that we may receive the gitt of the Holy Spirit and beoaDe
able to do good works by love. But who can believe lmless be is
reached by sane call~,
sane testimony :borne to the truth? Who has
it in his power to have such a iootive present to his mind that his
will shall be influenced to believe? Who can weloane in his mind
sane~
that does not give him delight? But who has it in his
power to ensure that sane~
that will delight him will turn up,
or that be will take delight in what turns up? If those~
delight us which serve our advancement towards God, that is due not
to our own whim or industi:y or meritorious works, but to the
inspiration of God and to the grace which be bestows. He freely
bestows upon us voll.mtary assent, yamesteffort, and the power to
perfom works of fervent charity. 5
In

light of Au;JU9tine1 s interaction

with this passage in Ranans,

his notion of free will, at this point, is not that of a will with the
freedan of indifference.
the ability

In

other words, an individual does not have

to choose and perfom what is right apart fran God's

intervention.

The

will, here, is free in that it is voltmtary.

When

an

individual chooses to believe, that is a voltmtary choice. It is not
autoncm::,ussince it is God that gives the desire so to choose
bestows the

acoordance
50

51

effectual

call.

It is voluntary in that it it is in

with the individual's

Ibid.,
Ibid.

and

desires.

I, Q. 2, 21.
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:It is not imposed fran sane

external.

CXllpl].sion. God gives the voluntary

of Adam, all hlnanCJ are enslaved to sin.

Since the fall

they cannot,

of their

'1"8MiM

in .Mam, was lost when .Mam sinned.

but it is of no help unless God intervenes.

writes,

in the above passage where~

will]

in those who are sold under sin?''

chooses to effectually

This means

choose to becYJM and to do good.

initiative,

awn

This freedcm, which existed
will

assent.

This is seen

'0f what value

1

is it

[free

ODly if God, in His mercy,

an indiviclual

call

Free

will that person be able to

respond to His grace.

The only possible

oonclusion is that it is wills that are elected.
itself can have no motive unless sanething presents
itself to delight agd stir the mind. That this should ha~n is not
in any man's power. 2

But the will

It is,

however, in the power of God to "delight

and stir•

of anyone He chooses in such a way that they will voluntarily
in faith.

In light

cxq,atibilist

condition

view of the freedcm of the will.

is ~ed.

an effectual

call.

This is the presence
unless God calls

If God does call

to turn. Goci's effectual
sufficient

we see that

condition

then,

the

It is possible

for the

antecedent

of God's mercy expressed in

person cannot refuse

turning

to God.

cSenyin-J the freedcm of the will.

The will

even if the choice to turn to God is not within the power of the
52

Ibid.,

I,

Q. 2, 22.
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to will

and a

is both a necessary

for the individual's

Au:JUStine
is not

respond

in this way, the person cannot will

effectually,
call,

mind

Au:JUStine
is boldm;l a

to choose to turn to God only if a specific

indiviclual

to turn.

of our study,

the

is free

God, that

is in accordance with the person's

turning

person does not turn, the not turning
will.

If a person turns to

It is free because it is voluntary.

individual.

will.

If the

is in acoordance with his or bar

'l\1rnilV] or not turning is never bp)sed

agajnst the will of the

individual.
In

this work, AD;1U5tine's use of the tel.'Dl ''voluntary''

fran that in his earlier

works. Rather than the freedan to do

otherwise,

or the freedan of indifference,

acoordanoe

with the will."

contraries,

in De libero

effectual

call,

a person's

''voluntary''

Where ''voluntary''

arbitrio,

and voluntary

be necessary

is different

53 DOW'they

and ''necessary''

are not.

at the same time. If
failure

DOW' means

A

God does

to turn to God is

"in

were

choice can

not grant an

necessary. This is

because it was not within his or bar power to turn to God. This failure

is also voluntary because it is in acoordance with (not opposed to) the

person's
lies

will.

The heart

of the questions Au;JUstine has investigated

in the very nature and purposes of God, of wban he writes,

his judgements are inscrutable

The

In De

diversis

In the

guaestionibus

54

ad Simplicianum, the case of Jacob

and insights

Oonfessiones,

examiner and the narnined53

and his ways past fjnding out. 1154

Freedan of the Will in the Confessiones

and E:sau was scrutinized

of the will.

''But

were drawn regarding the freedan

it is Augustine who is both the

I.Dok.ing over his life

and growth fran early

For this discussion in Book I see W• 39, 40; for
Book III, see W• 73, 74.
M Sinp., I, Q. 2, 22.
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childhood through his conversion, Au;;JUStinepaints a picture of total
dependence

upon God. The many descriptions

vivid illustrations
his own will.

of his inner tm:moil are

of his perception of the freedan and ~le
view that emerges is one fran a different

The

than that in the second question of Book I of De diversis
ad

of
perspective

guaestionibus

flinplicianum.
De diversis

guaestionibus ad Simplicianum is a work of exegesis

while the Oonfessiones is a work of introspection
data

of revelation,

the

Usilq the

fomer affords a look into the purposes of God.

Usilq the data of experience, the latter
both works aiq:,hasize the individual's
guaestionibus

and prayer.

reveals

depemence

the mnan heart.

While

on God, De diversis

ad ainplicianum explores this fran God's perspective

and

the Oonfessiones views it fran that of the individual.

Because of this,

there is little

speculation

concernin;J the general questions relatilq

to the freedan of the will.

AuJU9tine really does not discuss it at all.
deep reflection

in the Oonfessiones

Rather,

he unveils

on his own experience. His agoey at beilq

his

''l:>ound,
not

with the irons of another, but my own iron wi11. 1155 and his lOD:Jilq
for the true freedan which only God can brilq fill

and overflow the

pages. It is out of this personal story that sane observations
the

will's

al:>out

freedan can be ma.de.

Book VIII of the Oonfessiones is that in which AuJUStine's

struggle

reaches

a climax.

Manichaeans, scepticism,

Years of pursuing wisdan through the

and into Neo-Platonism have led him to the

doorstep of the Christian faith.
55
Oonf., VIII, 5, 10.

He need only to enter.

99

It is perhaps

significant

that

S:i.nq:,licianus. SiJli,licianus
Platonists.

who was a faioous professor
works. ~ine's

the story of the conversion
of rhetoric

reaction

be found himself

will

divided

inclination

to satisfy

his passions.

Another

seeing

between the desire

to retain

travelled

Christian,

Augustine

that

his

to God and

while oontimd ng

on sane official

business.

Pontitianus,

already

c,amnmjties

of m:mks. Pontitianus

also

of the emperor who chanced to read the life

Antony and resolved,
fortunes

felt

the story of Antony, the Egyptian, who

related

widely establishing

of two friends

He

to turn fully

arrived

to imitate

be ''burned

control ·of his life

mesaEm;Jer, Pontitianus,

of Victorinus,
of Platonic

bound in his will.

the works of the 1'postle Paul on the table,

a baptized

told

and translator

to the story was that

him. 1156 However,

the strong

in his rea.djng of the

encouraged ~ine

related

He also

was sharply

seeking help fran

Book VIII opens with ~ine

then and there,

for the D:>nastic life.

to renounce their

The illplct

of their

of

positions

story

upon

was deep and powerful:

SUCh was the

story of Pontitianus.

But Thou,

was speaking, didst turn me towards myself, taking
rrrt back, where I had placed myself while unwilling

o Lord,

Pontitianus

left,

AugUstine was deeply troubled.

out to his C'XIJptnjon, Alypius:

56
57

Ibid.
Ibid.,

VIII, 7, 16.
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be

whilst

me fran J:>ebjnd

to exercise
and Thou didst set me face to face with myself,
self-scrutiny;
I might behold how foul ; was, and how crooked and sordid,
bespotted and ulcerous. 5
After

and

that

He cried

''What is wron; with us? What is this? What heardest thou? The
start up and 'take' heaven. and we, with our learnin:J,
but wantin;J heart, see where we wallow in flesh and blood! Because
others have preceded us, are we ashamed to follow, and not rather
ashamed at not followin:p." 58

\ml.earned

Again,

it was Au:_1ustine's will which waged war within him. Be knew

that he had to will resolutely
felt

in order to enter into God's will but he

himself to be staggerin;J and swayin;J with a divided will.

seened

to will to enter and the other fou;ht against

enterin;J.

<me part

God and

continence beckoned fran one side while his passions beckoned fran the
other:

The very toys of toys, and vanities of vanities,
my old
mistresses, still enthralled me; they shook my fleshly ga:nnent, and
whispered softly, ''Dost thou part with us? And fran that manent
shall we no more be with thee for ever?" ••• Yet they did delay me,
so that I hesitated to blrst and shake myself free fran them, and
to leap over whither I was called, -an unruly ~it
sayin;J to me,
''Dost thou think thou canst live without them?" 9

Augustine ran to the corner of the garden and cast himself down,
weepin;J bitterly

in prayer.

Into his tllow;Jhts came the voice of a child

chantin;J, ''Take up and read; take up and read.
neighbor's

1160

It came fran a

house. Au:_1ustinereootmts:

So, restrainin;J the torrent of my tears, I rose up, interpretin;J it
no other way than as a cx:moarv\ to me fran Heaven to open the book,
and to read the first chapter I should light upon •••• I grasped,
opened, and in silence read that paragraph on which my fl'JeB first
fell, -''Not in riotin;J and dnmkenness, not in chamborin;J and
wantonness, not in strife and envyin;J; but put ye on the Lord Jesus
Christ, and make not provision for the flesh, to fulfill
the lusts
thereof." No further would I read, nor did I need; for instantly,
58
59

60

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

VIII, 8, 19.
VIII, 11, 26.
VIII, 12, 29.
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as the sentence
into my heart,-

converted.

He was finally

of the 1nnan will.
person's

absolute

individual's

passages.

As we

have observed,

is not concerned with assertin;J

work, Augustine

He is reveal.in;J,

dependence upon

will.

infused

ended, -by a light, as it were, of security
all the gloan of doubt vanished away. 61

thro1.qbout this

and defendin;J

by his own inner

God; incllldilq

the

This dependence is powerfully

life,

a theory

the

entire

r\ependence of the

in several

illustrated

For instance:

[H] e appeared to me not m:::>rebrave than happy, in bavi:D; thus
disoovered an cg>ortunity of waitin;J on Thee only, Which thin:] I
was sighin;J for, thus bound, not with the irons of another,
but my
own iron will. My will was the enany master of, and thence had made
a chain for me and bound me. Because of a perverse will was lust
made; and lust indulged in :becamecustan; and custan not resisted
became necessity.
By which links, as it were, joined together
(whence I teim it a "chain") , did a hard bonclage bold me
enthralled.
But that new will had beglm to develop in me, freely to
worship Thee, and to wish to enjoy Thee, o God, the only sure
enjoyment, was not able as yet to overoane my fonner wilfulness,
made stro~ by lo~ indulgence. Thus did my two wills, one old and
the other new, one carnal, the other spiri~l,
contend within me;
and by their
discord they unstrurX] my soul. 6

passage the word "custan'' is consuetudo,

In this

as ''babit.

translated
the

Augustine

bindin;J power of habit.

a final

can be broken.

new will

Augustine's
The fact

that

61
62

:Ibid.
Ibid.,

habit
VIII,

is describin;J

He is not assertin;J

It is true that

necessity.

it is a chain that

63

1163

is not stro~

habit
At this

the

that

which is often

developnent
the

habit

and

produces

fo:cms a chain which binds,
point

:but

in the :narrative,

enc>U1hto break the chain of habit.

can bind does not release
5, 10.

see pp. 50-52 above.
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the

individual.

who is

habit

bound by the

This is because,

f:can responsibility.

admits about b:imsel.f, the person will.ilqly
the

habit.

The indiviclual.

will~ly

pursued and fed his own lust

and that

chain of habit.

strengthened

SIJCX!lnbs to
~

does not !fflCX!IPDb intentionally.

enters

this

into and strengthens

even if he or she

habit

that

eq;,basizes

lust,

as~

so fed,

be will~ly

in a

resulted

Be writes:

was thJ:ou1h me that custan became more oanbati ve against
whither I willed not. And who,
me, because I bad cane will~ly
then, can with any ~ustice speak against it, when just pmishment
follows the sinner? 4

And yet it

~

did not will

to be bound but he will~ly

place where he would be bound.
which follows

The pmishment

This is enou;h to make him responsible.
is just.

Another sentenoe

''FOr the law of sin is the violence

this,

is drawn and held,
that

even against

it so will~ly

falls

its will;

deserviig

to be so held in

into it. 1165 once the person is chained by

his or her lusts

and oontimies

lusts,

becx:mes bound in them. Be or she will

satisfy

them even if he or she would rather

the

desires

of the person,

the will

blameworthy because it was entered
~

volmitarily
111

64
65

0 wretched

Oonf.,

Ibid.,

VIII,
VIII,

A person who

to indulge

in these

oontimJe to strive
be free

to

of them. 1'gainst

is bound. This cxmp1].sion is still
and embraced volmitarily.

b:imsel.f to a place

man that

illustrates

of custan, whereby the mind

custan (babi t- oonsuetudo) , he is held against his will.
chooses to satisfy

came to the

I am! who shall
5, 11.
5, 12.
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A man

f:can where he can only cry out,
deliver

me f:can the body of this

death' but Thy graoe only, ~ Jesus airist

to his oomrersion, the intensity

As Augustine grew closer

divided will increased.

our IDrd? 1166

He describes the will which can enter

of his
God's

will and the will that cannot:

I was disquieted in spirit, beiD1most inpatient with myself that I
entered not into Thy will and covenant, o my God, which all my
bones cried out unto me to enter, extolling it to the skies. And we
enter not therein by ships, or chariots, or feet, no, nor by goin:]
so far as I had cane fran the house to that place where we were
sittin:]. For not to go only, but to enter there, was nau;Jht else
but to will to go, but to will it resolutely and tho~hly;
not to
stagger and sway about this way and that, a chargeable and
half-~
will, wrestlin:], with one part fallin:] as another
rose.
·
With a half-wounded will,
will resolutely.
between

the

ease

and the difficulty

Augustine

f0\.¥1ht against biJDSP.lf. He

be

makes a

could

not

point of observiD:] the difference

with which his body responded to his will 's cxmwsnd
the will

itself

to turn to God. He describes

the

bad

in foll~

''monstrous thiD:]'

his desire
168

to will

of the divided

will as follows:

The mind oc:mnands the body, and it obeys forthwith; the mind
oc:mnaDdcc
itself and is resisted.
The mind oam,and,.q the band to be
moved, and such readiness is there that the oc:mnandis scarce to be
distin'Juished fran the obedience. Yet the mind is mind, and the the
band is body. The mind oc:mnands the mind to will, and yet, thou:;Jh
it be itself,
it obeyeth not •••• But it willeth not entirely;

it cc:mnandeth not entirely. For so far forth it
and so far forth is the thin:] ocmnanded
not done, as it willeth not •••• For were it entire, it would not
even oc:mnandit to be, because it would already be. It is,
therefore, no monstrous thin:] partly to will, partly to be
unwillin], but an infi.mity of the mind, that it doth not wholly
rise, sustained by truth, pressed
down by custan.
And so there are
therefore

ocmnandeth, as it willeth;

66

67
68

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

Ibid.,

quotin:] Ranans 7:22-24.
VIII,
VIII,

8, 19.
9, 21.
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two wills, because one of them is no~ entire:
SlJWlied with what the other needs. 6

~'s

conclusion that there

are two wills

with the Manicbaean notion that there

confused

in each indiviclual.

~

and the one is

digresses

is not to be

are two separate

to a:cgue this point.

He is

emphasiziD;J that it is the one soul which is divided in intent
than that tbere are two separate
one beiD;J good and the other

evil,

rather

souls which are of divided purpose:
as in Mani.cbaeisn.

raged within him was not between two substances

to will entirely

minds

The war which

but between his desire

to turn to God and his refusiD;J to will entirely.

ocm:nents that "I neither

willed entirely,

nor was entirely

against

unwilliD;J.

by myself. 1170 He

Therefore was I at war with myself, and destroyed
concludes this digression

He

the Manichaean notion of two souls by

assertin;J:

Thus, also, when above eternity delights us, and the pleasure of
teq;>oral goods bolds us down below, it is the same soul which
willeth not that or this with an entire will, and is therefore tom
asunder with grievous perplexities,
while
of truth it prefers
that, but out of custan foli>ears not this.

'ff'

ThrolxJbout the period
consecration
turn to

God

iJl'IDMiately following

as bishop A1Y;1UStineheld that

without divine intervention.

the

~'S

bman will

Both in his exegesis of Ranans

9 and in his personal experience he emphasizes the total
69
70

71

Il:>id.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

VIII,
VIII,

10, 29.
10, 24.
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is unable to

cSependence

of

is both a necessary

upon God. God's mercy intervening

individual

the

and sufficient

of the will's

condition

seen in passages

in De diversis

to God. This bas been

tumjng

such as

ad ~jnpliciamn

guaestionjbJs

following:

the

Clearly it is vain for us to will tmless God have mercy. But I do
not know bow it could be said that it is vain for God to have mercy
tmless we willingly
consent. If God bas mercy, we also will, for
the power to will is given with the mercy itself.
It is God that
worketh in us both to will and to cSo of his good pleasure.
If we
ask whether a good will is a gitt of God, I should be sw:prised
if
anyone would venture to deny that. But because the good will does
not precede the calling,
b1t calling
precedes the good will, the
fa.ct that we have a good will is rightly
attributed
to God wbo
calls us, and the fa.ct that we are called cannot be attributed to
11It
ourselves.
So the sentence,
is not of h:im that willeth,
nor of
h:im that rmmeth, b1t of God that hath mercy" cannot be taken to
mean simply that we cannot attain what we wish without the aid of
God, but rather that without his calling we cannot even will. 72
That God's intervention
individual's
first

turning

will

sentence:

•'Clearly

is a necessary

condition

of the

to God can be seen in this

passage

it

is vain for us to will

mercy." Unless God has mercy, our willing

the sentence:

the individual

If God's mercy is present,
will

certainly

it

could be said

willingly
72

will

to refuse

is not in the power of the individual
the mercy. This

is the meaning of the sentence:
that

consent."

it

is seen fran

for the power

If God has mercy, we also will,

call,

God have

It cannot be

condition

11

is given with the mercy itself."
effectual

is in vain.

That God's mercy is a sufficient

efficacious.

tmless

is vain

that

M Si.mp., I, Q. 2, 12.
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alludes

to will
as an

to turn to God. It

to turn if God supplies
•'BUt I: cSo not know bow

for God to have mercy tmless

Another passage

by the

to this

we

is the

followin;;J:

Those are chosen who are effectually
called. 'l'bose who are not
effectually
called and do not obey their calling are not chosen,
for al~
they were called they did not follow •••• For, althotgh
he calls many, he bas mercy on those whclll he calls in a way suited
to than so that they may follow. BUt it is false to say that 11it is
not of God who bath mercy tiut of 111111who willeth and runneth,"
becalise God bas mercy on no man in vain. Be calls the man on whcm
be bas mercy in ~ way he knows will suit him, so that he will not
refuse the call.

~,~is
given,

eq;>basizing

the man cannot

definition

the call

of faith.

~

effectual

call

the

1

s turning

necessary condition.

the

explain

individual

called

to God. It is also,

~

is clearly

of the will,

in the Oonfessiones.

freedan

of he will,

74

The

condition

of

call

Those who

The first

is present

can

are not effectually

do not respond.
the OC11pc1til:>ilist position

on the

as we have described it. 74 This is also implied
While there

is no systematic

treatment

nowhere does AU;JUStine imply that

his power. Rather,

of the

the turning

we hear him cey

to
out in

dependence upon God's mercy:

And, not indeed
73

11cbosen."

holding

God was up to him and within

his utter

vain.''

passage.

only if the effectual

be said to be

is by

as we have seen, a

This too can be seen in this
that

is

the response

elicit

•'God bas mercy on no man in

that

are not chosen and they

freedan

knows will

call
call

of God can thus be seen to be a sufficient

b:urnanwill

two sentences

God infallibly

writes

once the effectual

This is becalise an effectual

refuse.

that

that,

Ibid.,

see pp.

in these words, yet to this

I, Q. 2, 13.
9, 10 above.
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effect,

spake I much

unto Thee,

-''But Thou, 0 Lord, Bow long?" ''Bow long, Lord? Wilt
Thou be angry for ever? Oh, 1"'flDEIDbernot against us fmmer

for I felt that I was enthralled by them. I sent up
cries, -''Bow lon;J, bow lon;J? Taoorrow, and
tanorrow? Why not now? Why is there not this hour an end to my
uncleanness?'' 75
iniquities;"

these

sorrowful

Durin;J the

first

years of Au;1UStine's life as a bishcp,

the

developnent of his view of the freedan of the will bas reached a very
different

position

fran that which he had previously

five brief

observations

to be made. First,

voluntary.

The use of the word ''voluntary"

use in previous periods.

otherwise.

a choice is free if it is
here is different

will whether
In this

than iJil>lyi.D;Jthe freedan of

or not the individual

could

have acted

sense, ALr;JUStinenow held that an act could be both

necessary and voluntary at the same time. It is necessarily
without the intervention
The person's

against

the

not turning is, however, voluntary.
person's

at this

true that,

of God, a person can not turn to Him in faith.
That is, it is not

will.

The seoond observation
Au;JUStine,

fran the

a voluntary act is one which is in accordance with the

indifference,
individual's

Rather

held. There are

is that,

periods,

held that it was part of the essential

time, still

nature of sin that it be voluntary.
what brought responsibility.

as in the previous

An

This voluntary

individual

nature of sin is

is responsible

for an act if

it was a voluntary act. Even if it was not within the individual's
power to turn to God, because his or ber not turning was in aOOC>rdan0e
75

OOnf.,

VIII,

12, 28.
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with his or her will,

the :individual is responsible

for the fact that

he or she did not turn to God.
observation

The third

is that divine intervention

is both a

to turn to God.

necessary and sufficient

oondition for an individual

'Onless God intervenes

bestowiD3'
mercy, it is iq;,ossible

by

to turn to God. It is beyond the ability

individual

to turn to God unless God first
intervenes

of the individual

gives the person faith.

by extendiJv;J His mercy

for the

to an individual,

If God

that individual

will turn to God. This is because the mercy of God includes an
effectual

call of that individual.

knows

what call would

sends

this

be such

The

call is effectual

to elicit

the response of faith.

call to the individual

effectual

because God

on

whan He chooses

God

to have

mercy and the person responds in faith.
The fourth observation

is that Augustine

defendin;J the notion that ea.ch individual

God. His exposition

of

Ranans

person's

The fifth

evil can
effectual

observations

dependence

that divine
condition

for a

is that it awean to

be

more difficult,

view, to bold that the origin and responsibility

for

traced to man and not God. If God's choice to send an

call is J:iased solely on His

held responsible
effectual

observation

latest
be

above

The individual's

own

to God.

turning

given this

with the

thane.

with

is 0a11>letely dependent upon

is both a necessary and a sufficient

intervention

concerned

9 and his explanation of his

experience both overflow with this
upon God is consistent

is very

own

will,

no individual. can be ·

for the type of call he or she receives.

call is both a necessary and sufficient
109

condition

If an
for a

person's

turning

to God, it is difficult

be in any way blameworthy

could

to see bow the :indivic!ual.

if be or she failed

to turn to God. The

view that the :individual. was free because the not turning
accordance with the :individual's

will,

Au;Ustine awears to bold durin:} the early
the

not sean to alleviate

does

the

task to apply the view

It would sean to be a difficult

difficulty.

was in

of evil.

problan

In the next chapter,

we shall see bow three specific

factors

ex>ntr:ibuted to the developnent of Au:;JU,stine'sview of the f~
the

will ~t

factor

the period we have traced.

The first

is the increase in Au:;JU,stine'sreliance

with the Scriptures.
priest

and bishop.

mral

and spiritual

the mra1

to

years of his episoopacy

stiu3gle.

and spiritual

~le

of his duties

is his observations

The last

factor

of his parish.

oontr:imtin:}

upon and familiarity

This came about as a result
The second factor

life.

110

as a

about bis own

is his confrontation
These influenced

,-eoogni~e the role of habit and the role of God's intervention
:individual's

of

with
him to

in the

We have traced

how

~tine's

view of the freedan of the will

developed throt¥Jhout the period between his conversion to Christianity

in

386 and his

early years as bishop. In the first

becxlning a Christian,

~ine

held an inoalpati.l:>ilist

he held that it is within an individual's

to turn

to God. After

was

not necessary to

becxJning a priest,

Au;1USti.ne

recognize the power that habits bad in hindering the will of a

began to

person. Shortly after
the

power, without any change in

he held that God's intervention

enable an individual

view. That is,

either to turn to God or to turn away.

anteoedent conditions,
Specifically,

few years after

he

was

consecrated as bishop, he began to bold

oanpati.l:>ilist view in that God's intervening

necessary and a sufficient

mercy was both a

condition for an individual's

turning to

God.
As we observe

period,

three

influences

the

tbEmes

changes in his

life calling

throu;Jhout this

anerge which it is reasonable to postulate

that led to this develqment in ~i.ne's

freedan of the will.
Au;1UStine's

own

These

view of the

are the influence of the scripture,

moral and spiritual

str1J:Nle, and that

111

as

that

of

of his pastoral

work of tryi.D;J to help his co~egation
chapter I shall briefly

In this

live D:)rally and spiritually.

explain each of these

t:banes and

I

shall show how ea.ch of these may have played sane role in the
developnent of Augustine's position

The

regardiD;J the

Influence of scripture

priest
wrote

and bad oane to anbraoe them as authoritative,
he

felt a desperate

need to understand and

to his bishop, Valerius,

both for his own spiritual
work of the ministry.

~

with the scriptures

Althou;1h Au;Justine was acquainted
his life

freedan of the will.

when be became

use than properly.

plead;ng for time to stucly the Bible

health

and in order

to be equipped for the

His inmersion in the sacred writings

continued

throughout his life and shaped his thol.¥fllt to a much greater
than the

other

influences

Be

which we shall

degree

consider.

It is clear that Au;Justine's perception of his need for the
scriptures
the

was not ta!p)rary.

Be became increa.si.D;Jly preoccupied with

Bible and with ma.king the meaning of the text clear.

sermons, letters

and fonnal treatises

explaining this

to his audience. Augustine's heavy reliance
evidenced by the ~e
very few years after

As

or that passage

on the scriptures

outpouri.D;J of exegetical
his ordination.

Be published

works which

is

oocurred

a

TeBelle observes:

A sudden surge of interest in the epistles of Paul beoanes
awaz-ent about 394. In quick succession Augustine wrote an
Exposition of Eighty-Four Propositions on the &:>istle to the
Ranans, then an Exposition of the &:>istle to the Galatians, then an
unfinished Exposition of the &:>istle to the Ranans, as well as
discussions of Pauline problems in questions 66 ~ 68 of the
112

collection

of responses to various questions. 1

These "WOrks, ooupled

the

first

of the Enarrationes

thirty-two

Danini in monte, further

Bible.

2

BaboocJt points

and particularly
the

of

a vehicle
between

illustrate

in Psalm:>s and the De senoone

his growiDJ preoccupation

that

He writes

caused

the

~e

with the

for a func'lamental shift

that ''Beyond that,

one may add,

113

I shall sketch Au';JUStine's treatment

of

guaestionil:,us LXXXIIIquestion

60-62. 4 I shall cx,rpare this with his treatment

RaDaDS

68 and

in De diversis

guaestionil:,us ad Sinplicianum Book I question 2 which we di SCIJSsed
above.

2

3

4

it

that became

EJqx>sitio guarundam propositionum ex &;,istola ad Rananos prepositions

1

on

in his views on the interaction

God's grace and man's freedan.

as it is found in De diversis

Paul

in his position

his study of and writing on the Pauline text

In light of this,

including

be preached

out haw it was Au';JUStine's study of st.

Ranans 9

freedan of the will.

was precisely

with the many semons

Eu;Jene Teselle, Au:rustine the Theologian (Herder
1970), p. 156.
of
Williams. Ba:txx>ck, "Al.¥;1ustine's Interpretation
:Ranans (A.O. 394-396)," Au:rustinian Studies Vol.
10 (1979) p. 56, note 4.
Bal:xx>ck, ''Augustine's Interpretation
of Rauancz (A.O.
394-396)," p. 56.
BaboocJt in ''Augustine's Interpretation
of :Ranans,"
p. 63 note 29, places De diversis guaestionibus
LXXXIII as chronologically prior to EJqx>sitio
guarundam propositionum ex &;,istola ad Rananos,
be admits ''The relative
dating is not
al~h
secure." I shall follow his order.
and Herder,

113

9

Ranans

In

treats

9 in

De

Diversis OUaestionibus LXXXIII

question 68 of
the verse,

De

diversis

''Oh Man, who

doing so he refers

are you to talk

to much of the

will return two years later

in

De

God chooses

in und~tandi

5

back to God?"

In

same portion of Ranans 9 to which he
diversis

Simplicianum. This, however, is his first
which is so central

LXXXIIIAD;1UStine

guaestionibus

guaestionibus

ad

treatment of this

chapter

:ng the means and purposes by which

:individuals.

Sinoe one person is chosen by God and another is not chosen,

AD;1UStinereasons, there must be sane distinction
this distinction

r:v, in

is located is of central

his expositing

this

concern.

text for Simplicianus,

between

than.

As we saw

Where

in Chapter

AD;1UStinelocates the

distinction

in the free choice of God. There was no distinction

individuals

themselves which would warrant God's choosing one and not

the

other.

In this

earlier

that this distinction

treatment,

in the

however, AD;1UStinemaintained

must be scmewbere in the individual..

He

writes:

all means he bas mercy on wban he wants, but this will of God
cannot be unjust. For it sprm;JSfran deeply hidden merits,
because, even though sinners themselves have constituted a si.J¥;1le
mass on acoount of the sin of all, still it is not the case that
there is no difference among than. Therefore, although they have
not yet been made righteous, there is sane preceding thiD;J in
sinners whereby they are rendered worthy of righteousness, and
again, there is sane preceding thing in other sinners whereby they
are deserving of obtuseness.
You have the same Apostle saying
elsewhere: ''Because they did not see fit to have a knowledge of
God, God gave than up to an unsound mind." God gave than up to an
unsound mind- this is bow He hardened Pharoah's heart, and they did
not see fit to have a knowledge of God- this is bow they showed
By

s

Ranans

9:20.
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thanselves

of beinq given up to an unsound mind. 6

worthy

Au;1ilstine is clearly
to the merits

of another
hidden."

The difference

how He deals

results

even if

these

fran sane difference

does not

is which results

is "sane preoedirq

of one and rejection
are ''deeply

between how God deals with one :individual

Augustine

what the difference

God's choice

of the individuals,

with another

the individuals.

it

attribltinq

thing''

explain,

that

in this

in different

which merits

either

of assertinq

that

is within

passage,

merits,

and

mractly

lJut only that

righteousness

or

obtuseness.

Au;Justine makes a point
with the Scripture

which says that

'"it

this

is not in conflict

is not of him who wills

nor of

him who runs, lJut of God who sbows mercy 1117 It is be.re, in arguing
this

point,

that

individuals

Augustine

which warrants

explains what the difference
different

treatments

is within

the

by God. He explains:

For even if each person with petty sins or genuinely grave and
mnerous sins, however many, is yet worthy of God's mercy by virtue
of a great lament and the ~sh
of repentance, this does not
depend on himself, who would perish if abandoned, lJut on God who
shows mercy and who canes in response to his prayers and anguish.
For it is not eD0l¥1hto will except God show mercy; lJut God, who
calls to peace, does not show mercy except the will bave preceded,
because on earth peace is to men of good will. And since no one can
will unless urged on and called, whether inside where no man sees,
or outside throu;Jh the sound of the spoken word or throu;Jh sane
visible
signs, it follows that God produces in us even the willir.q

itself.

6

7
8

8

De diversis
guaestionil::,us LXXXIII 68, 4, trans.
David L. Mosher in The Fathers of the Church, Vol.
70. (Washington D.c.: catholic
University Press,

1982) Hereafter
Div Quaes., 68,
Ibid.

Div

ouaes.

s, quoting

JkJMDS
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9:16.

Apparently it is ''by virtue
repentance''

that an individual

Au;1Ustine insists,

anguish."

The

salvation

of God's mercy. But, as
is in no way dependent

only because God shows His mercy is a
"in response to his prayers and

God shows His mercy

critical

sentence in this passage is ''For it is not

enough to will except God

show

mercy; mt God, who calls

not shaw mercy except the will have preceded ••• "
stmnarizes his systan.
and

to attain

his earliest
possible
preserves

First,

Here

to peace, does

AD;1Ustine

it is in:possible to will to be righteous

it without God's mercy. This is clearly
views which we discussed

in opposition

to

in which it aweared to be

will to live rightly. 9 Au;1Ustine, here,

to imepeM~tly
the

of

If a person were left alone, he or she would be

in sin and would perish.

person rescued.

beoanes worthy

the individual's

upon the individual.
left

of urgent lament and the anguish

view that the individual

is dependent upon God for

salvation.
The

second point in his systan is that the will of the individual

precedes God's showing mercy. This is consistent
in De libero arbitrio

which we observed

same time) in which it

was

Book III

with the position
(written about the

possible for the individual

in order to receive divine aid, without His intervention.
intervention

was

needed for the turn:ing mt only after

intervention

was

it possible to live rightly.

Au;1Ustine wrote De diversis
the

actual turning
In De diversis

9

As

to turn to God
No

divine

we saw, by the time

guaestioni.l:Jus ad Simplicianum, he held that

to God was also included in the mercy of God.

guaestioni.l:Jus LXXXIIIquestion 68, AD;1Ustineheld

See R>• 40-41

above.
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that the hllDim will precedes God's mercy. God bas mercy on those
will to turn to Him. The individual's
righteousness,

however.

turnm;J is not enough to merit

Only the mercy of God can bestow righteousness.

This mercy is merited by an individual
God. In this

who

way the difference

when be

which results

or she wills to turn to
in sane individuals

chosen by God and others not be:in;J chosen resides

be:in;J

individuals'

in the

wills.

Rana.ns 9 in

In

ad

Expositio guarundam Propositionum ex &>istola ad Rananos

Augustine's work Expositio guarundam propositiom.n

Rananos 60-63, be traces

with in De diversis
ad

the

the

ex &>istola

same portion of :Ranans 9 which be dealt

guaestionilJus LXXXIIIand De diversis

guaestionilJus

Simplicianum. This work was written very close to the same time as
fo:cmer and, as a result,

explanation

of the text.

there is little

Augustine

difference

in Au;JUStine's

writes:

''For when they were not yet born, nor had they done anything
either good or evil, in order that the purpose of God's election
might oontinue, not because of works but because of his call, she
was told, 'the elder will serve the 'YO',D;1er',as it is written,
'Jaoob I loved, but Esau I hated."' This moves sane people to think
that the apostle Paul had done away with the freedan of the will,
by which we earn the esteem of God by the good of piety, or offend
him by the evil of impiety. For, these people say, God loved the
one and hated the other before either was even l:>orn and could have
done either good or evil. But we answer that God did this by his
foreknowledae, by which be knows the character even of the
unborn ... 10

10

J

Expositio guarundam propositionum ex Epistola ad
Rananos, 60, 1, trans. Paula Fredriksen
Landes
(Chioo, calif.:
Scholars
Press, 1982) Hereafter Prop
ad Ran.
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thiD;Js must l:>e observed about this

8eVeral

most obvious, Augustine insists
of the will.
individual
scripture
either
they

8eoond,

''God loved the one and bated the other

indicates,

God is not unjust.

and bati.D;J the other

future faith

seem,g

which Be foreknows they
seem,g

Be has

freedan

Augustine rejects

even before

or illpiety

case, the faith

or the

power m'leper,dent

of God's

life.

the notion that

it might l:>e the future

works of an :individual which God foreknows and to which
Augustine siD;,ly states,

before

God's loving the one

to l:>e a response to the faith

will have. In this

worltiD;J in the :individual's

foreknowledge,

or illpiety.

to l:>e within the individual's

say that election

the

it is by the freedan of the will that an

are born, of their

iD;,iety

that Paul did not eliminate

and

earns God's esteem or offends Him. Third, t:bo1.¥;1hthe

either

was born,"

First,

passage.

good

Be respond,8-

"If God elected works, why does the ~le

is •not according to works? 1111 since it is not the

foreknowledge of good works which causes God to love the one, the role
of good works must l:>e expJajned:

For this very reason, then, one should understand that we are able
to do good works through love, and we have love through the gift of

as the Apostle himself says: ''For the love of God
into our hearts by the Holy Spirit, which has been
given to us" (S:S). Therefore no one should glory in his works as
they were his own, for he does than by the gift of God,
~h
since this love itself works good in him. What then has God
elected? For if he gives the Holy Spirit, through whan love works
good, to whaDe\7er he wishes, haw does he choose the Spirit, s
recipient?
If he does not choose according to merit, it is not
election,
for all are equal prior to merit, and no cboioe can be
made between absolutely equal thi.D;Js. But since he gives the Holy
Spirit on1y to believers, God indeed does not choose works, which
he himself bestows, for he gives the Spirit freely so that through
love we might do good, l::ut rather he chooses faith. For unless each
the Holy Spirit,

has been poured

11

Ibid.,

60, 4.
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one believes in him and perseveres in his williJ¥JMSs to receive,
he does not receive the gift of God, that is, the ~y Spirit,
whose pourJB1
forth of love enables him to do good.
To do good works is a gift

prior to God's intervention.

of God. They are a result

Augustine insists,

not future good works which merit election.
as in question 68 of De diversis
be a distinction

He

~ine

this

prior to merit, and no choice can be

equal

~-"

Spirit.

by

the sentence,

it is not election,

equal

made between

in

"If He

for all are
absolutely

is located in the individuals

This distinction

themselves.

is asSl.llliD;J here,

in order for God to be just

indicates

not choose acoordin;J to merit,

does

that it is

therefore,

guaestionil:Jus LXXXIII, that there JllllSt

between individuals

choosiB1 one over another.

of and not

It is not their good works, since works cane fran the Holy

Rather,

since it is to believers

that He gives His Holy Spirit,

Au;JUstine concludes that it is faith which God chooses.
Au;JUstine discusses

the relationship

between God's call and man's

free response:

Moreover, the nature of grace is such that the call precedes merit,
the sinner when he had deserved only damnation. But if he
rea~
follows God's call of his own free will, he will also merit the
Holy Spirit, ~h
whcm he can do good works. And ranaining in
the Spirit -no less also by free will- he will also merit life
eternal, which cannot be marred by aey flaw.
God's call canes first.
the

call and therefore

The

the call

sinner does not initiate

that is extended

is an expression of

God's grace. cmce the call is given, the individual
12
13

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

60, 5-10.
60, 14, 15.
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or deserve

responds "of his

own

free will."

and the

This free response merits the gift

subsequent ability

to do good works. Here, as in his other

A1¥;JUStineattempts to reason in a mamer

treatments

of

consistent

with Ranans 9:15,

Ranans 9,

of the Holy Spirit

'"Therefore

it depmd'"I not on man's

willin;J or nmning, l:lut on God's mercy. 11114 He writes:

Paul does not take away the freedan of the will, l:lut says our
will does not suffice unless God helps us, making us merciful so
that we can do good works through the gift of the Holy Spirit, as
he had just said above, "I will have mercy on whan I will have bad
mercy, and I will show him CXIT'p'\SSion
on whan I will have bad
11
ocq:,assion. For neither can we will unless we are called, nor
after our callin;J, once we have willed, is our will and our rmming
sufficient unless God both gives strength to our running and leads
where he calls. Therefore, clearly, we do good deeds not by our own
willin;J or running l:lut by the mercy of God, ~ our will
(which alone can do nothin;J) is also present.

eq>hasizes that the freedan of the will is preserved.

~tine

However, the will is not able to choose and attain

God's intervention.

individual

which

14
15

~tine

holds that it is in response

early works on 'Ranans 9, ~ine

insists

that

will can turn to God in response to His callin;J or the

can refuse to respond by turning.

distinguish
does

life.

call of God that a person freely wills to respond.

In both of these

an individual's

livin;J without

anly God can enable a person to aCOClll)lish good

God's work in the person's

to the initial

right

between

an effectual

in his De diversis

call

guaestionibls

warrants the election

and

~tine

a non-effectual

not

call,

as he

ad Sinpl.icianum. The distinction

of one and the rejection

Ibid. , 62, 1, quotin;J Ranans 9: 15.
Ibid., 62, 1-4.
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does

of another is

located in the individuals

thanselves.

It is their

faith

or lack of

faith which determines their destinies.

Ranans

9 in De Diversis ouaestionibls

Although we have already
Al.¥;1Ustine's exposition

of

ad f:inpticianun

given a great amount of attention

Ranans

9 in De diversis

guaestionil::u;

to
ad

Simplicianum, a brief overview of sane key points will help highlight
haw

Al.¥;1Ustine's use of the Scriptures

thought ex>ncernm;J the freedan of
this

text was written

discussed.

The

central

influenced the developnent of his

the

will.

only two years after

It must be remembered that
those which we have just

issue in OCl'l'{Ylrm;Jthese

three treatments

laoans 9 is where Al.¥;1Ustinelocates the distinction
choosing of sane individuals

and the rejection

we saw16 that Au;Justine, in this latest
that the distinction

between individuals

of

which warrants

the

of others.
work, rejects

is the faith

the idea

that God

foreknows one will have and the inpiety that God foreknows that the
other will have. The distinction
It is entirely

is not within the individual. at all.

within God's purposes and free choice. G.R.

Evans

writes:

time he bad oauposed his answer to QUeStion TWo, he bad
thought again about the passage in :Ranans (9:11) where Paul says
that God loved Jacob and bated Esau before either was bom. This
led him to the view that God DDlStmake His choice before the
individual is in a position to turn to God of his own volition. It
follows that man is given two things by grace: ~irst the power to
will, and then the power to do what is willed. 1
By the

16
17

See

pp. 83-85 above.

G. R. Evans, A1RUStine OD Evil (cambridge:
cambridge university Press, 1982), p. 169.
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Au;JUStine writes:

There oould :be no election on aocount of good works, according to
which the purpose of God might stand.
So ''not of works tut of him
that calleth," that is, of God who justifies
the ungodly by grace
calling him to faith, "it was said to her, the elder shall serve
the ~er."
to election,

Election
individual.

that the purpose of God does not stand acoo~
election is the result of the purpose of God. 8

So
lJut

is not acoording to works, faith or anything
It is entirely

according to God's purpose.

save one and leave another. As we have seen,

He sends

within the

God chooses to
an effectual

to all those He chooses. He may send a non-effectual

calling

those He does not choose or, to sane, He may send no calling

a11. 19 In this God is oanpletely
forgiveness
transactions
not others.
By

just.

in which a creditor
Justice

is not oanpranised and mercy is expressed.

in three different

Beyond this,

bawever, there are places where he

admits that it was his attention

aided this

developnent.

first

to the scripture

of these is the oft-quoted

.M Simp., I, Q. 2, 6.
Au:11,lStinedoes not say whether God sends sane type
of calling to every individual, in which case all
those wban He does not choose would receive

non-effectual
non-effectual

with

its meaning influenced him to

explicitly

The

works, to

it can :be seen bow his interaction

the text and his work at discovering

18
19

the mercy of

might choose to remit sane debts and

ocq>aring Au:11,lStine's ~ches,

his position.

at

It is analogous to lnmm

on sane and not on others.

the same passage of scripture,

shift

He bestows

c::alling to

callings, or whether sane get
callings and sane no calling at all.
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which

text in

the

Retractationes

guaestionibus

in which he describes his workin;J on De diversis

ad ~i,rplicianum,

the solution

"In

of this question,

indeed, lalx>red in defense of the free choice of the buman will;
the

grace of God oonquered •••• 1120This indicates

act of laboring over these Scriptures
was the

I,
:but

that it was the very

in the writing

of this work which

occasion of his change in view.

Another

passage that :indicates that it was the Scripture

tbo\¥;Jht is found in chapter

aided the developnent of Augustine's
of De praedestinatione

sanctorum.

Altbo\¥;Jh the whole chapter

of Au:1l,lstine's review of his fomer position
mature view fran the Scriptures,

which

and

seven

oonsists

a defense of his

I shall only cite a portion:

For I did not think that faith was preceded by God's grace, so that
means would be given to us what we might profitably ask,
except that we could not believe if the proclamation of the truth
did not precede; rut that we should oonsent when the gospel was
preached to us I tbo\¥;Jht was our own doing, and came to us fran
indicated in sane
ourselves. And this my error is sufficiently
small works of mine written before my episoopate •••• I had not very
carefully sought, nor had I as yet found, what is the nature of the
election of grace, of which the apostle says, ''A remnant are saved
aCCX>rdingto the election of grace." Which assuredly is not grace
if any merits precede it; lest what is now given, not aCCX>rdingto
grace, rut aCCX>rdingto debt, be rather paid to merits than freely
given.21

by its

his error to the fact that he had ''not

Au:1l,lstine, here, attributes
very carefully
the Scriptures.

sought."
In fact

In the

oontext, he is writing about seeking in

he highlights

his chal¥Jes in thou;Jht. Assertions
20

21

Scriptural

likes these,

Retr., II, 27.
De praedestina.tione

texts

which influenced

and the

obvious shift

sanctorum III, 7, trans. Robert
in A select Library of Nicene and
Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. V, (Di~:
T&T
Clark, reprint Grand Rapids, Mich.: F.erdmans, 1987)

Ernest

wallis
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in his exegesis
a large

of RaDanCJ 9 support

the

view that the Scriptures

played

role in the developnent of his views on God's grace and rnnan

freedan.

Influence of A1.¥1UStine's

The

Personal

During the first

Christianity,
spiritual

H:>ral stru.Nle

years after Al.¥1UStinewas ocmverted

he retained

much

of his Neo-Platonist

developnent of the indivic!ual..

progressive

and continuous spiritual

fact,

Au;rustine

future.
became

on the

It was hoped that

and enjoyed in this

life.

ID

sanetimes wrote as if it was not too far off in the

As the years progressed,

a priest,

perspective

This included the notion of a

ascent.

happiness of the soul would be attained

to

however, and especially

these early aspirations

after

were seen as inp,ssible.

he

As

Peter Brown observes:

great hope had vanished. ''Whoever
then write, "that in this mortal life a man
may so disperse the mists of bodily and carnal :ima.gin.m;Jsas to
possess the unclouded light of ~eless
truth,
and to cleave to
it with the tmSWerVm;Jconstancy of a spirit wholly estranged fran
the ocmnon ways of life -he understands neither What he seeks, nor
who he is who seeks it."
[de CODS. eva?XJ· rv, x, 20]
Ten

years later

this

thinks", Augustine will

Augustine, indeed had decided that he would never reach the
fulfillment
that he first thc>u;Jhtwas pranised to him by a
Christian Platonism: he would never :inp)se a victory of mind over
body in himself, he would never achieve the rapt contemplation of
the ideal philosopher. It is the most drastic chim;Je that a man may
have to accept: it involved nothing less than the~
of the
bright future he thou;Jht he had gained at cassiciac:un.
22

Peter Brown, p. 147.
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which plagues the lnmm

A1.¥;JUStine
came to see that the difficulty

will is much more severe than his Neo-Platoni sn would have thc:u;Jht
possible.

As be

Confessiones,

reviewed his life and spiritual

pilgrimage in the
to this difficulty.

mnerous passages leap out to attest

In one place be describes

how a himing

habit

was

developed:

thus
[H]e appeared to me not more brave than baWY, in ha~
discovered an opportunity of waiting on Thee only, which thing I
was sighing for, tlms bound, not with the irons of another, but nr,
own iron will. My will was the enemy master of, and thence bad made
a chain for me and bound me. Because of a perverse will was lust
made; and lust indulged in became custan [oonsuetudo or ''habit"];
and custan not resisted became necessity. By which links, as it
were, joined together(~
Item it a "chain"), did a bard
bondage bold me enthralled. 3

As

lust,

A1.¥;JUStine
describes the progression fran the perverse will to

fran lust to custan and, finally,

not asserting

fran custan to necessity,

be

is

a theory about sin as much as be is sharing his own

experience.

He states

opportunity

to serve God. It was his will which bound him as with iron.

He goes

who was

sighing for the

on and writes that ''Thus I came to understand,

experience,
Spirit,

that it was he himself

what I bad read, how that 'the

and the

Spirit

in this life,

oanpletion

own

1tgainst the

~gainst the flesh. 11124 These are not the

of a man who is optimistic

reflections

flesh lusteth

fran nr,

about

attaining

spiritual

let alone the near future.

While it is true that the Confessiones give us an inside look at
Al.¥;JUStine'sreflections
of his
23
24

own

on his

own

moral struggle can also

life and st.n.¥Nles, his experience
be

gleaned fran passing references

Conf., VIII, 5, 10.
Conf., VIII, 5, 11, quoting Galatians 5:17.
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in his oorrespondenoe. For exanple ~tine
on the power and subtlety

writes with great insight

of pride:

For the man who bas not declared war 21gainst this enany bas no idea
of its power; for if it be oatp:ratively
easy to cUspense with
praise so lo~ as it is denied to him, it is difficult
to forbear
captivated with praise when it is offered •••• and yet,
fran be~
althou;h
strenuously oontend~ with m'J adversary,
I often receive
wounds fran him when I am unable to put away fran
the
fascinat~
power of the praise which is offered to me. 5

myse3t

Pride was a sin which ~tine

as a very present threat.
He

hatred.

fran the inside,

not as he

sins of his past which were put away upon his conversion,

knew the

anger.

knew

reveals

His writ~

struggl~

bas the

to be right

sin to which he was tenl)ted was

Another

to Profuturus

relationship

the

between anger and

flavor of one who is,

in this

l:lut

himself,

still

area:

And well do you know, U1'/excellent brother,
haw, in the midst of
such offences, we must watch lest hatred of any one gain a bold
to God with
upon the heart, and so not only hinder us fran pra~
the door of our chamber closed, but also shut the door against God

Himself; for hatred of another insidiously creeps upon us, while no
one who is arx;JrY oonsiders his aD:Jer to be l.Dljust. For anger
habitually cherished against any one becanes hatred, since the
sweetness which is m:in:]led with what arpear:1 to be righteous anger
makes us detain it lo~er than we ought in the vessel, lmtil the
whole is soured, and the vessel itself is spoiled. 26
While these are examples of Augustine's
other places,

he

explicitly

that spiritual

asserts

which is never ocmplete in this life.
"this
25
26

is not actually
~-,

Ibid.,

He

2.
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in

growth is a process

writes to Januarius

OC111:>leted
in us so lo~

22, 8.
38,

own moral struggles,

as we are still

that,
'groaning

within ourselves,
of our body: •••
oaupleted

and waitin;J for the adoption,

,.,2 7

in this

~ine's

life.

As

spiritual
a result,

to wit, the reda!ption
will not be

growth

urges h.:imto keep in

~ine

mind that:

[W] e are not to thinJ.t that we otght to be made happy and free fran
all difficulties
in this present life, and are therefore at liberty
to nummir profanely again.crt. God when we are straitened
in the
thin1s of this world, as if He were not performing what He
pranised •••• The new life, therefore,
is meanwhile begun in faith,
and maintained by hope: for it shall only then be perfect when this
mortal shall be swallowed up in life, and death swallowed up in
·--V1v1.AJry;
• • •28
.

COnfrontin;J his own moral s~le
produced

and realizing

fran a life of sin are more powerful than he bad previously

imagined very well may have oontributed

perspective
influenced

that the habits

to shaping Au:;JUstine' s

on the freedatl of his own will.
the developnent of his theory

he fought against

need for divine

his own sbortoanings,

intervention.

He needed

Tb.is

may also have

of lnmm freedan as well. As
he increasingly

recngni2:ed his

it himself and he came to see

that every person needed God's grace in order to overoane the habits

of

the soul and to turn to God.

The Influence

of Pastoral

nity

Not only was Au;Justine oonfronted with his own moral and spiritual.
struggle,
27
28

but his surprising

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

ordination

55, 14, 25.
55, 14, 26.
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to the priesthood

thrust

h.:im

into the daily toil
settling

His days became occupied with

life.

disputes amo~ the JDEIDbe't"Sof his church

representing
authority.

the

interests

He also

preached and letters
he

of pastoral

of the

and need

church

as well as

to those in civil

invested a great deal of energy in the
he wrote.

As he

sernK)1'\S

he

tried to help people live rightly,

was oonfronted, flgain, with the sl1.J3gishness of the blnan will.
We pointed out that,

very soon after

his ordination,

appealed to Valerius for time to study the scripture.
order to aid his own spiritual
better

his oo~egation.

easy situation

previously

As

Far fran feeling that the pastoral

in light of his own skills

period know bow great

work which now disquiets

SOl.qht this

and

in

growth, but also to be equipped to lead

thol.¥Jht, A11;1USti.neadmits that,

at any earlier

He

Au:;Justine

and

gifts,

as he had

"it is true that I did not

was urJ unfitness

crushes urJ spirit.

to his assessment of his fitness

task was an

for the arduous

1129

for the task,

Au:;Justine

writes:

The things which I lack are so many, that I oould n:>re easily
eminerate the things which I have than those which I desire to
have. I many venture to say that I know and tmreservedly believe
the doctrines perta~
to our salvation. But urJ difficulty
is
the question bow I am to use this truth in ministering to the
salvation of others, seeking what is profitabie not for myself
alone, but for many, that they may be saved. 3

standing

before his oo~egation,

various stages of Christian
definitive
29

30

developnent. Few had apparently made as

a break with their pasts as
Ibid.,

Ibid.,

A11;1USti.nesaw a people in

21, 3.
21, 4.
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had A11;1UStine. Prendiville

in

oc:mnents:

It is certain that Au;JUStine's people were no a!¥]8ls; according to
his sennons and letters they swore, fornicated, got drunk, lied,
and were envious and superstitious.
Little wonder that in this
setting his idea of habit takes on a new and more earthy tone. 31
A specific

individuals

example of Au;JUStine's struggle with the wills of the

in his OO:D:Jregationis recorded in a lcm;J letter

to

Alypius, now bishop of Thagaste. Au;JUStine recounts his persistent
preaching against the habit which his oo:D:Jregation bad of celebrating
the

feast of Iaetitia

frustration

in gluttony and drunkenness.

is evident throughout

this letter.

His plea.ding and

He writes:

I asked further, with the deepest sorrow, haw it was that, although
Moses the servant of God broke both the tablets of stone because of
these rulers of Israel, I could not break the hearts of those who,
though men of the New Testament dispensation,
were desiring in
their celebration of saints' days to repeat often the public
perpetration of excesses of which the people of the Old ~t
eoonany were guilty only once, and that in an act of idolatry.
describes his preaching as, ''Pathetically

~ine
33

11

begged than •••

11

ranincUng'•,

I charged
35 ''And

,

preaching finally
~ine

31
32

33
34
35
36

than

to oonsider ...

I pled with than .••

produced an

11

11

•

,

34

11

I especially

36 This

intensity

aootional response in the hearers.

recalls:

John G. Prendiville,
of Habit in the ~t

''The DeVelopnent of the Idea

of saint ~ine,

pp. 61, 62.
~-

29,

Ibid.,
Ibid.

4.

29, 5.

Ibid.
Ibid.,

29, 6.
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11

of

I did not move than to weep by first weepin:J myself; l:lut while
th.iD:;Js were bein:J spoken, I own that, n:,ved by the tears
which they began to shed, I myself could not refrain fran followiD;J
their example. And when we had thus wept together, I concluded 'trJ
sermon with full persuasion that they would be restrained by it
fran the abuses denounced. 37
these

Unfortunately,

many of those who wept went back to gluttony

and

drunkenness the next day. It seezr:!d that Augustine's preachll¥J

and

pleadin.1

sins to

had

failed.

~tine

attrimtes

this

return to

these

the power of the custan:

Next morning, however, when the day dawned, which so many were
accustaned to devote to excess in eatin:J and drinking,
I received
notice that sane, even of those who were present when I preached,
had not yet desisted fran oanplaint, and that so great was the
power of detestable custan with than, that, usin:J no o~
arglDSllt, they asked, ''Wherefore is this now prohil>ited?" 8

The custan of sin was so powerful

that it led to rationalization.

People came up with excuses in order to ex>ntinue in the very sin over
which they bad wept only a day earlier.

attanpts

Augustine is

weakness

of the hunan will in a powerfully visible

is especially

valuable because it records both ~tine's

ex>nfrontll¥J the
This letter

Clearly,

way.

at leadll¥J his ex>l¥Jregation to holiness as well as the

response of the people. The grip of the habit was more pc,werfu1 than
the prea~

of ~tine

~ine

records,

and the people's

however, that eventually

grasp his point of view and resisted

38

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

those

29, 7.
29, 8.
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response.

individuals

the tanptations

dnmkenness.
37

aootional

came to

to gluttony

and

Another exanple of Au;Ustine's confrontation

with the sluggish

will of his ocm;regation concerns the habit of swearirq.
the

semon on the Mount, Au;Ustine addresses this

passage

of scripture

In his work on

as be explains

the

in which it is written:

•~,"
says He, ''Ye have heard that it bath been said to
them of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shall
perfonn unto the Lord thine oath: But I say unto you, SWear not at
all; neither by heaven, for it is God's throne; not by the earth,
for it is His footstool; neither by Jerusa.lan, for it is the city
of the great Km;J.Neither shalt thou swear by thy bead, because
thou canst not make one hair white or black. But let your
ccmmmication be Yea, vea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than
these oaneth of evil. 1139
~tine

writes of the habit of swearirq:

And therefore let him who understands that swearirq is to be
reckoned not amo~ ~ that are good, rut amo~ thirqs that are
necessary, refrain as far as he can fran indul.girq in it, unless by
necessity, when he sees men slow to believe what it is useful for
them to believe, except they be assured by an oath •••• But no one
learns, unless he has bad experience, how difficult
it is both to
get rid of a habit of swearirq, and ~ to do rashly what
necessity sanetimes ccq>els him to do. 4

SWearirq is to be avoided as far as is possible.
admits, is not easily done.
Brown ocmnents, ''This

The

habit is difficult

campaign against swearirq,

39

40
41

~ine

to overoane. Peter
indeed,

brought him up against the ocupulsive force of certain
Dn1Chas

This,

would have
habits,

any modern campaign against siooltm;J might do. 1141 ~ine
De sermone Danini in monte, I, 17, 51, quotirq
Matthew 5:33-37, trans. William Findlay, revised
D. s. SChaff, in A select Library of Nicene and
Post-Nicene Fathers,
Vol. VI, (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
F.erdmans, 1980) Hereafter
De senn mt.
De senn mt., I, 17, 51.

Peter

Brown, p. 149.
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quite as

himself points out the difficulty

as he concludes the section on

swearin;J, "[W] hat can be named or ~t

toilsane,

where the believin;

industry,

than the

These

persistent

soul is strai.nm:;J every nerve of its

sulJdui.D3'
of vicious habit?

illustrations

be seen~ngly

of more lalx>rious and

~

1142

AD;1UStinefound his oon;regation

shaw bow

in the bindi~

lalx>r in tryin;J to help

habits of various vices.
them _ overoc:me

these

to

His

afforded

him

ample OR;>Ortunity to observe the power of habits and the weaknessof
the lnlDim will.

It seems reasonable to postulate,

since the significant

developnent of Au;JUStine's view of the freedan of the will oocurred
durin;J the period of his priesthood and early episoopacy, that these

observations

oaiprised

one influence on AD;1UStineas his view

developed.

In this

chapter we have postulated

three possible

influences

on

the developnent of Au;JUStine's view of the freedan of the will between
his conversion and his writin;J of the Confessiones.

of SCripture,

his personal mral

laborin;J in his pastoral
we

and spiritual

His intensive

5t.ruNle and his

duties all may have contrimted

have observed fran the inccmpatibilist

study

to the shift

view to the CXl!pltibilist

view of lnlDim freedan.

. Conclusion

we have traced the developnent of Au;JUStine's view of the freedan
of
42

the

will fran his conversion to
De senn

the

mt., I, 18, 54.
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writin;J of his Confessiones.

We

have found that in the first
inc::,arpatibilist

his oonversion, be held an

years after

view of the freedan of the will.

we have seen this

that he believed it was within the power of an individual
turn

in

to choose to

to God or to refuse to turn to God. This act was free if it was

voluntary and, at this
of indifference.

An

time, ~ine

meant by ''voluntary''

the

freedan

act oould not be necessary and voluntary at the

same time. A person, then, had the ability

change in antecedent oonditions.

to turn to God without any

It was not necessary for the mercy or

grace of God to be present in order for the person to be able to turn
to Him.
After Al.J:1U9tine'sordination
he still

held to this

to the priesthood,

inc::m:pat:ibilist view. Be still

we

have seen that

held that a

voluntary act oould not be necessary. There Jm1Stbe freecbn of
DuriD;J this period, however,

indifference.

Al.J:1U9tinerecognized

power of the habits of the soul to hinder the lnmm will.

possible

the

It was

for persons to get to the point where they oould not free

themselves fran the habits they had freely developed. It is always
possible

to turn to God for divine aid in order to be free.

After beoaniJVJ bishop, A1.¥Justinebegan to bold that it was not
even possible

to turn for divine aid without God's mercy beiD;J present.

God's grace was seen as a necessary and sufficient
person to turn to Him. ~ine

bad begun to

oondition for a

bold the oc:mpatibilist

view of the freedan of the will.
We

have also seen three factors which may have influenced this

developnent

in Augustine's

moral struggle

thought.

These are

and the moral struggle

133

the

Scriptures,

he confronted in his

his own

oo~egation.

With these in mind it is not surprisi.J¥J that AD;JUstine's

view of the freedan of the will underwent such a profound developnent
in such a short time.
into the freedan of the bJnan will

AD;JUstine's investigation
marked
as

with a deep desire to find the truth

a drive to achieve consistency.

These

and thoroughness with which he approaches
go over and over the

scholarship.

matter,

as

well

are evident in the persistence
the

topic.

His willingness

same grcnmd is an admirable daoonstration

to

of solid

Be has aC0Clli)lished the JOOmnental task of setti.J¥J the

problans out with clarity

relevance,

and

oanplex systematic solution.
do

about the

is

Any

well to begin with the saint

as

well as of proposi.J¥J a

investigation
fran Africa.
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into these issues would
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